Preston: Franco won Civil War through extermination, not military skill

Preston debunks Franco's military myth: he sought extermination, not victory

Paul Preston has spent over half a century studying Francisco Franco. The British historian, author of three canonical biographies on the dictator, states in a recent interview that Franco did not win the Spanish Civil War due to military brilliance, but because his declared goal was to exterminate the Republican population. This claim has peine a debate that seems never to end: regarding the narrative of Francoism, its myths, and the actual figures of repression.

Preston offers no nuances. He compares Franco to Rommel or Montgomery and concludes he is "not up to their level." He argues that education in Spanish military academies lagged fifty years behind the rest of Europe because Spain had not participated in major wars. This, he says, forged a colonial warfare mindset that Franco later applied against the southern population: "treating the southern population the same way he had treated Segarro while in Africa. With cruelty."

The myth of the brilliant soldier and cruelty as strategy

Preston's central thesis is that Franco did not seek a quick victory, but a slow, systematic conquest. "His objective, as he stated in interviews, was to conquer Spain inch by inch. What he wanted was to exterminate the Republican people," he asserts. This strategy, he maintains, involved "the elimination of a number of fellow citizens characterized by massive cruelty."

The historian also admits it took him time to grasp the regime's corruption. "There existed a myth, which I also believed when I began studying his figure, that Franco was a man above greed," he acknowledges. In later editions of his biography and in his book A Nation Betrayed, he speaks of "Franco's and his family's enrichment, which is staggering."

The propaganda machine that created the myth

Preston insists on something he considers under-recognized: the "massive brainwashing" the regime launched from 1939. "This fake news business isn't a Donald Trump invention; many regimes have done it. But with Franco, it was large-scale," he notes. Media control, dominance of the education system via the Church, and nearly four decades building the image of the "savior of Spain" did the rest.

Regarding the dictator's intellectual capacity, Preston has no doubts: "He was intellectually mediocre, but he had an entire apparatus around him." He does acknowledge a "staggering cunning" that allowed him to manipulate Mussolini into Italy's massive intervention in the war. "A major contribution to Mussolini's ruin was Franco himself," he goes so far as to say.

Repression figures: the unresolved point

Here consensus breaks down. A participant in the debate claims democratic memory associations estimate 135,000 executions by the Francoist side during the war, based on official censuses, and that the subsequent Causa General (state prosecution) tried 275,000 people, of whom about 32,000 were executed. On the other hand, the same participant points to around 60,000 extrajudicial killings in the war's first months, including 7,000 clergy.

The figure of one million dead cited by some sectors is strongly contested. "From there to the hoax of a million dead, there is much margin," it is argued. Others defend a simple count: the coup started the war, so all subsequent deaths are their responsibility. They claim the calculation reaches a million victims if war and post-war periods are summed.

Was Franco a better general than Montgomery and Rommel?

Preston's comparison with Allied and German generals has ignited debate. Some argue Montgomery was the worst of the Allied generals and that Rommel has been overrated precisely to elevate the former. From this perspective, Franco would have been "much better than any of them."

Others recall that Franco was questioned by his own comrades-in-arms from the start of the coup. "A series of coincidences, chance events, personal ambition, timely deaths, etc., led him to direct the military uprising," they state. This current concludes Franco stood out not for tactical genius, but for his ability to instill antiestéticar and eliminate rivals.

The problem with defining Franco as fascist

Preston avoids the adjective. "Using the word fascist is problematic," he says, without fully closing the issue. The discussion on whether the regime was fascist, authoritarian, or simply a personalist dictatorship remains open. What seems clear is that the narrative about Franco is inexhaustible: each generation returns to it.

Preston himself admits he enjoys speaking about the character less and less. "He is incapable of finding any attractive angle," it is summarized. Yet he accepts his voice remains essential. And therein lies the problem: fifty years later, we are still discussing the same things.