Pentagon ranks Chinese fleet at 355 ships, ahead of US Navy's 296

Pentagon ranks Chinese fleet at 355 ships, ahead of US Navy's 296

In May 2017, a US report warned that China 'has already risen' and that its naval development was 'rapid and constant.' Six years later, the Pentagon estimates the People's Liberation Army's battle force at **around 355 vessels**, compared to **296 for the US Navy**, 295 Russian warships, and 69 for the Royal Navy. This numerical comparison is no longer debatable: the country that three decades ago was a giant market where the West manufactured cheaply now leads the ranking by hull volume.

How many ships does China have and how many does the US?

The figures used by the Department of Defense place the Chinese Navy ahead in terms of vessel count, with official projections pointing to **400 hulls by 2025**, with growth concentrated in surface combatants. This data is not isolated: in the last seven years, more than a hundred new China Coast Guard ships have been launched, some of **12,000 tons**, exceeding the US Ticonderoga-class cruisers of 9,800 tons. Additionally, production is carried out at costs no Western shipyard can match.

The most uncomfortable warning does not come from a hostile think tank, but from Admiral Mike Gilday, who previously highlighted the numerical problem in a potential Pacific conflict: 'I don't say that a smaller, technologically superior fleet can never defeat a much larger fleet, I just say that, with the possible exception of three cases in the last 1,200 years, none has done so.'

The three Chinese fleets not included in the counts

The official count excludes what some analysts call the third fleet. The Maritime Militia of the People's Armed Forces, known as 'little blue men,' operates with government-funded trawlers and, according to available descriptions, some are equipped with small arms, anti-aircraft, and anti-mine weapons. In 2016, **230 fishing vessels** were counted swarming around the same islands in the South China Sea. The Coast Guard, integrated into the Central Military Commission, adds another long hundred new units.

The operational problem is evident: in a crisis scenario, distinguishing a neutral fishing boat from an armed platform becomes impossible. Anyone who trinc the USNS Impecable incident in 2009 knows what this looks like in practice.

Aircraft carriers: prestige assets in a sea full of missiles

The second argument for US superiority lies in aircraft carriers. The objection running through the harshest analyses is that hypersonic anti-ship missiles and drone swarms turn an aircraft carrier into an expensive target. As a precedent, an exercise is cited where a Swedish diesel submarine allegedly sank a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier in wargames. Meanwhile, China builds islands in the South China Sea that function as static aircraft carriers in the region.

Military spending that does not match the narrative

If spending is measured in purchasing power parity and Iraq and Afghanistan wars are discounted, China's military production effort surpasses that of the United States. This is compounded by the deployment of US bases in Japan, Spain, or Poland, and the diversion of material to Ukraine. A calculation circulating in analyses places the cost of a US soldier equipped and in combat at **$17,000**, compared to **$1,700** for their Chinese equivalent. The difference is not one of technology: it is one of cost structure.

Japan, South Korea, and the problem of allies

The hypothesis of an Asian bloc aligned with Washington holds up poorly against commercial numbers. More than 30% of South Korean exports go to China and Hong Kong, and there are over a million Chinese living in South Korea. The South Korean capital is within artillery range of North Korea. Japan presents a similar profile. In this context, the question is not who would win a war, but who has incentives to enter one.

What if the number of hulls were not the decisive variable?