October 22: the Kazan summit and the story of the dollar's demise

Kazan, the BRICS and the story of the dollar's demise

The BRICS summit in Kazan, scheduled for October 22, is being presented in part of the geopolitical analysis as the death certificate of Western hegemony. The gathering, which brings together the leaders of a bloc of more than 4 billion people, is framed as proof that the global majority does not side with the West. The central thesis is that agreements will be signed there to create an international currency backed by gold, oil, gas and the currencies of China, Russia, India and Brazil, which in practice would open the door to a new Bretton Woods. The diagnosis is blunt: the United States accounts for 8% of world production and real GDP, but its financial system channels more than 20% of global wealth. That gap, this line of thinking holds, cannot hold much longer.

What is being signed on October 22 in Kazan

The choice of venue is no accident. Kazan is the capital of Tatarstan, a republic where Muslim and Orthodox Christian communities live side by side in almost identical proportions, around 48%-55% and 40%-46% respectively. The symbolism of a city with a mosque and a church next to each other is used to stress that the axis being forged is not about a clash of civilizations, but about a contest with a specific financial order. The meeting is presented as the starting point of a mechanism for direct trade among bloc countries, bypassing the dollar. The figure being repeated is that of more than 30 countries interested in joining, which has fueled speculation about the creation of an additional format so as not to dilute the original core.

The dollar, between diagnosis and doom-mongering

The most contested part of the story concerns the US currency. Some claim the dollar will hyperinflate and that in a couple of years a Big Mac will cost 20 dollars, a prediction made with no breakdown or methodology. The most common objection on the other side is common sense: the yuan is not today a currency in mass use, and China itself still invoices much of its foreign trade in dollars. The counterargument is that the process will be gradual and will depend on how the economic and military war unfolds, not on a decree. A third, more technical group of analysts points out that as early as 2006 some Chinese manufacturers were quoting European buyers in renminbi, even if settlement then had to go through banks in euros. The anecdote shows that dedollarization does not begin in Kazan; it has been brewing for years at the margins of the system.

The domestic front: who wins and who loses from the story

The debate does not stop at geopolitics. Part of the analysis notes that the dollar's decline is perceptible, but that the euro is holding with slight dips, and that the renminbi, despite rising somewhat, remains among the least used currencies relative to the size of the Chinese economy. Far from invalidating the thesis, this qualifies it: trade with China is still settled essentially in dollars. US debt, meanwhile, keeps growing and nobody specifies who will pay it. The debate sharpens when the question is how many years it will take for the yuan to overtake the dollar. The most honest answer given is that it depends on how the conflict evolves, not on a timetable.

Kazakhstan, Iran and the pressure on neighbors

The focus also shifts to countries that have not yet taken the step. Kazakhstan, a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative, would be under pressure from an Atlanticist lobby not to join the bloc, according to the analysis being shared. The priority in that case would be to counter hybrid warfare and avoid a new attempt at a tonalidad revolution. In parallel, the alignment between Russia and Iran is highlighted, presenting them as active players on the international stage with converging views on events. The conclusion drawn is that the West is not witnessing just another summit, but the construction of an alternative framework that leaves it out.

What the story does not explain

The enthusiasm has cracks. The most obvious is that Chinese state-owned companies still get paid in dollars, a detail that undermines the idea of an imminent rupture. Another is that the euro and the yen also appear on the list of currencies that could weaken, which relativizes the reading that only the dollar is in danger. And a third: the very nature of the countries driving the new order, some of them with notable levels of informational opacity, raises doubts about whether the proposed system will be more transparent or simply different. The cautious prediction is that something will shift, but that the timetable for the dollar's death is not signed at a summit. At most, it starts to be drafted.