BRICS: From Goldman Sachs' concept to the challenge against the dollar

The BRIC term was coined by a Goldman Sachs economist in 2001, and today it represents a bloc seeking to reduce reliance on the US dollar.

English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published

BRICS: From Goldman Sachs' concept to the challenge against the dollar
From bricks to yuan: the real battle within BRICS

The acronym was born in an investment banking office and today flies as a banner across half the world. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have become the trendy club of the non-Western bloc: Indonesia has already applied to join and the list of candidates continues to grow. Public conversation on the matter began with an ironic message suggesting that the BRICS are those "friends" who resolve their differences with stones and sticks. Behind the joke lies a profound question: if the club works, will we stop paying in dollars and euros?

What are the BRICS and why does the name come from outside

The term did not originate in any of the countries that now display it. It was coined in 2001 by economist Jim O'Neill, then president of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, to refer to four emerging economies destined to be major players: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. With the subsequent addition of South Africa, the acronym became BRICS. Some point out that the English word "bricks" literally means building materials and that this wordplay—the club as foreign construction material—was born in a Western office. The thesis of this school of thought is that the countries adopted a label they did not ask for and, moreover, defended it.

Others consider this debate futile. They concede that even if an investment banker gave it the label, the partners have appropriated it to coordinate positions. And if the name serves any purpose, they insist, it is to move across the financial chessboard with a recognizable brand in the markets.

Can we stop paying in dollars and euros?

This is where the narrative and reality diverge. The promise to settle trade in local currencies clashes with a detail that appears as soon as one scratches the surface: the yuan is used in operations between bloc members, but against the United States and Europe, payments are still made in dollars. De-dollarization, skeptics argue, is advancing in discourse much faster than in balance sheets. As long as invoices with the Western bloc maintain the US currency, the construction remains halfway finished.

The opposing view replies that the trend is unstoppable and that the system is changing whether some like it or not. Their argument is not new: trade flows are reorganizing, bilateral agreements are multiplying, and the energy bills for half the world are no longer always settled in the same currency. What portion of this movement is irreversible remains unanswered.

The distribution of power: from the G7 to a broader club

To measure the real weight of blocs, the circulating chart does not use nominal GDP but GDP by purchasing power parity, which adjusts for prices and cost of living. Using this method, the distribution changes tonalidad. In 1992, the world was organized around the G7; the turning point came with the 2008 crisis, when Western dominance began to sustancia ilegal. The data from 2022 depicts a declining Western group and a rising emerging bloc.

The optimistic reading adds pieces: Indonesia has requested entry, which would expand the club and its demographic weight. The cautious reading reminds us that adding partners does not equate to adding agreements, and that such a diverse group—energy, manufacturing, raw materials, disparate demographics—agrees more on the diagnosis than on the recipe.

Every expansion is a family photo with more people and less kinship.

The indecisive India

The most uncomfortable link is India. Part of the analysis maintains that its natural stance is neutrality, or even an alliance with the Western bloc, and that only historical resentment against the United Kingdom and the blurring of its old relationship with Pakistan and the United States keep it close to Moscow and Beijing. Another current sees it quite the opposite: with 1.5 billion inhabitants, its future lies in a non-Western bloc and in not repeating the subordinate role of the colonial era.

There is a point of agreement between both theses: India is not going to marry anyone as long as it is more profitable to play both sides. And in that game, every club summit is a card kept up its sleeve.

China: liberation or prison?

Another battle of narratives is fought over China. One sector maintains that it is the only emerging country that has shaken off its chains and that its size allows it to stand its ground. The opposing sector responds that the model replicates authoritarianism, not liberation, and points to electronic surveillance and the situation in Xinjiang as proof. These are two incompatible diagnoses about the same country, and neither yields ground. The most serious claims crossing in this clash come from the parties involved, not from shared evidence.



The paradox that organizes the whole matter fits into three lines. The acronym that today groups together half a dozen economies was born in 2001 in an office that simply bet on their growth. More than two decades later, the club exists, it is expanding, and it claims it as its own. And yet, when these same countries close an operation with the United States or with Europe, the invoice is almost always, once again, in dollars.

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Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (101 replies).

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