Milei’s 35-Year Plan to Make Argentina a Global Power

Milei seeks 35 years to restore Argentina as a global power

Thirty-five years. Not one term, nor two, nor a lost decade: three and a half decades is the horizon Javier Milei set for his project the night of his surprise victory in Argentina’s August primaries. “I invite Argentines to join the liberal revolution that will make Argentina a global power in 35 years,” he said, as reported by El Mundo. In economic terms, he was even more direct: “If given 35 years, we could be like the US,” headlined Ámbito.

The figure cuts both ways. For some, it marks a long-term national plan; for others, it signals a desire for prolonged tenure. The conversation quickly turned to an uncomfortable question: how long does it take to ruin a country, and how long to rebuild it?

From Milei to Franco, Hitler, and Moses: The Battle of Timelines

Comparisons poured in. Guillermo Moreno spoke of 20 years. Franco ruled for 36, and Spain ended up as the seventh industrial power. Moses took 40 years in the desert to lead his people to the Promised Land, so 35 for Milei seems generous: if he’s playing Moses, at least it won’t feel long.

The problem lies in who is being compared. Hitler took 12 years to leave Germany with 25% of its population dead or permanently disabled, 35% less territory, and 80% of its architectural heritage in ruins, according to the argument’s source. The conclusion is uncomfortable for any electoral promise: none of this was in his program. Since then, critics argue, it is absurd to trust politicians and their promises.

Others reject the premise. Pre-Hitler Germany is not comparable to a current South American country, and the example diverts attention to another question: does the timeline matter, or who administers it?

Are 35 Years of Power Compatible with Democracy?

No, skeptics answer. Four years do not change a society or an economic model dragged for decades, but keeping the same leader for 36 years is, in the words of those making the argument, characteristic of a banana republic, ensuring corruption. A contradiction is also pointed out: the same leader who calls on others to stay in power now asks for three and a half decades.

Some see the timeline as a concession to realism. Destruction is fast; construction is much more complicated. One part of the analysis adds a calendar nuance: if Milei achieves just 5% of what he wants, in ten years Spaniards will be seen emigrating in mass.

On the other side is the argument of the journey. If the plan works, people will enjoy it as they go along, and there will be no need to wait 35 years to start prospering.

The Spanish Phantom: From Ninth to Twenty-Sixth Industrial Power

The Spanish archive enters fully here. Spain went from being the ninth industrial power in 1974 to the twenty-sixth in less than two decades of social-democratic governments, according to the data cited. The liberal reading is that long timelines serve to socialize losses and blame the inherited legacy, exactly as was done before.

Stories about Francoism intersect with economics. Some highlight that industrialization peine through development poles and internal migration to Catalonia and the Basque Country. Others remember that 36 years of authoritarianism is not an exportable model, but the price of no alternation.

Taxes, State, and Anarcho-Capitalism: 35 Years Seemed Small

Much of the conversation went another way and did not return. The underlying issue became whether a state capable of sustaining development exists without stifling initiative. Here enter the US and USSR space programs in the 1950s and 60s, or inventions like electricity and the laser, born without economic return in sight and now supporting half the world. It is difficult to imagine the invisible hand funding this.

The answer from the other side is of a different order: taxes are not paid by the rich, but by the middle class, and part of them supports a structure of parasites. Redistribution, it is argued, always ends in generalized poverty. Disagreement is total: for some, the state is inevitable even within large corporations; for others, it is an anomaly that grows on its own.

The final section cites examples. Gaddafi’s Libya appears as proof that a state can provide a dignified life; it is added that its disappearance responded to a lack of interest in the example spreading. Yugoslavia is brought up as a case of a third position that ended costing the country its existence.

Coffee for Less Than a Dollar and the Neurosurgeon Dreaming of Dollars

Among expectations, two scenes. One is a message spread with a promise of instant conversion: “Today I earn 100,000 pesos, and with Milei I will earn 100,000 dollars (monthly) and pay for coffee for less than a dollar.” The other is told by someone who encountered a medical colleague enthusiastic about earning in strong currency: he would go from earning 800,000 pesos a month as a neurosurgeon to earning 800,000 dollars, and in passing asked for advice on buying a house in Ibiza. A memory with the aroma of the famous sweet silver of the 1990s, when half of Argentina felt like the First World.

With this range, the promise of three and a half decades is read in two opposite ways. And the question the timeline itself leaves open remains unanswered: what if the problem is not time, but who administers it?