Leaked audio recordings actually clear the operator of blame
Two different operators gave the same order to switch off safety systems to AVE and Iryo drivers in Spain. The system had been down for days and the failure was one of coordination.
English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published
The leaked audio recordings show that two different operators at the CRC gave the same instruction to switch off and restart the safety system to the drivers of the AVE and Iryo trains, pointing to a routine procedure rather than an improvised decision. The failure would not lie in the order itself, but in the lack of coordination between operators when the Iryo driver was unable to start the train.
The sequence revealed by the recordings shifts the focus of the investigation. Two different operators at the Regulation and Control Centre gave exactly the same order to two drivers of different trains: switch off and restart the safety system. There was no improvisation or personal decision. They trinc the procedure that had been applied all along.
## Two operators, the same instruction
The operator who spoke with the AVE driver and the one who contacted the Iryo driver were not the same person. Both relayed the same switch-off and restart sequence for the system. That rules out an employee acting on their own. Coordination existed before the call.
The safety system had not been working since the previous Tuesday. Several AVE trains bound for Seville had departed earlier that morning. The same procedure was probably applied on those earlier journeys without anyone questioning it.
## The failure was one of coordination, not judgement
The Iryo driver could not start the train. Some signalling beacon was preventing it. That is where the chain broke: two different operators were handling two different drivers, and the lack of coordination at that specific point left the safety system to chance.
The operator never doubted the procedure was being carried out correctly. They had ordered it done many times before. That certainty is what turns the case into an operational design problem rather than individual negligence.
## The leak that changes the reading
The two audio recordings published were meant to single out someone responsible. What they actually do is clear the operator: they did what they had been taught to do. The question that remains open is how many times that practice was repeated while the system was down and how many trains ran with the safety system switched off.
The sequence revealed by the recordings shifts the focus of the investigation. Two different operators at the Regulation and Control Centre gave exactly the same order to two drivers of different trains: switch off and restart the safety system. There was no improvisation or personal decision. They trinc the procedure that had been applied all along.
## Two operators, the same instruction
The operator who spoke with the AVE driver and the one who contacted the Iryo driver were not the same person. Both relayed the same switch-off and restart sequence for the system. That rules out an employee acting on their own. Coordination existed before the call.
The safety system had not been working since the previous Tuesday. Several AVE trains bound for Seville had departed earlier that morning. The same procedure was probably applied on those earlier journeys without anyone questioning it.
## The failure was one of coordination, not judgement
The Iryo driver could not start the train. Some signalling beacon was preventing it. That is where the chain broke: two different operators were handling two different drivers, and the lack of coordination at that specific point left the safety system to chance.
The operator never doubted the procedure was being carried out correctly. They had ordered it done many times before. That certainty is what turns the case into an operational design problem rather than individual negligence.
## The leak that changes the reading
The two audio recordings published were meant to single out someone responsible. What they actually do is clear the operator: they did what they had been taught to do. The question that remains open is how many times that practice was repeated while the system was down and how many trains ran with the safety system switched off.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (0 replies).
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