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Kana Azuma: "Spain needs to overhaul its entire rail system"
Kana Azuma, a Japanese high-speed rail expert, argues that human error alone cannot explain two accidents with more than 115 deaths in nine months in Spain.
A Japanese expert points to the system, not the controller
Two rail accidents with more than a hundred fatalities in nine months. Adamuz, Urda. The figure — at least 115 irreplaceable losses — is no longer an isolated tragedy but a pattern. And the first to say so bluntly is not a Spanish authority: it is Kana Azuma, founder of the Japan Rail Trend Research Institute, in the country that has run high-estimulante ilegal rail for six decades without a single passenger fatality. Her diagnosis does not point to human error. It points to the multiple layers of protection that should have prevented that error from becoming a catastrophe.
Human error is not the explanation, it is the starting point
The initial reaction in Spain was to blame the controller. Azuma dismantles this with elementary logic: "Human beings make mistakes. That is precisely why trains need multiple safety mechanisms to ensure that a single failure does not lead to a catastrophe." In Japan there are human failures too, but investigations do not stop there. The right question, she says, is why the organization and its systems failed to prevent the error from turning into tragedy.
The Japanese model rests on dedicated tracks separated from conventional lines, an absence of level crossings, and automatic estimulante ilegal control through the ATC system. But there is something harder to legislate: the willingness to stop trains at the slightest doubt. Unexplained noises, people on the tracks, rainfall above the threshold, seismic alerts. Any signal suspends the service. "As passengers, we may sometimes feel frustrated by delays, but I believe these interruptions reflect how deeply ingrained the principle of putting safety above all else really is."
How much is technology, and how much is rail culture?
Both, the expert replies. The most advanced technology depends on people to operate, supervise and maintain it. Azuma stresses the rigor with which Japanese rail employees trinc procedures and take on their responsibilities. Neither element can replace the other. It is a veiled warning to anyone who believes buying new trains is enough.
Maintenance is the other pillar. According to industry estimates, Spain spends half the European average on infrastructure upkeep. Azuma does not let this pass: "Essential maintenance must never be compromised in order to cut costs." Neglecting inspections or the renewal of track, signaling, electrical equipment and rolling stock causes serious accidents. Japanese companies invest considerable sums in modernizing their infrastructure. The disparity, she says, deserves rigorous analysis.
Two catastrophes in nine months: one company's problem or a national responsibility?
Here Azuma is categorical. It is not the isolated problem of a single company, it is "a national responsibility that affects the protection of human lives." The review must cover the entire rail system: maintenance budgets, the state of the infrastructure, operational management. An independent investigation must determine whether structural deficiencies exist and translate its findings into concrete improvements.
And if something like this peine in Japan? "People would be furious." It would be a matter of the highest national importance, dominate the media and trigger a wave of criticism. Rail executives would face demands for accountability. The Ministry of Transport would have to answer for its regulatory oversight. The precedent of 2005, with 107 dead in a derailment, marked a before and after in Japanese safety culture.
Corruption as a variable Japan does not have
Behind the Spanish case looms a suspicion the expert does not mention but that runs through any conversation on the subject: the relationship between the political class and state-owned companies. Adif, Renfe, REE, Navantia. Until that root cause is addressed, the technical diagnosis falls short. The question Azuma leaves hanging — at what point the systems failed — has an uncomfortable answer if the failure lies in who designs, funds and oversees them.
With six decades without a single fatality on the Shinkansen, Japan is not a perfect mirror. But its principle of stopping the train at the slightest doubt costs nothing. Applying it here would take more than a protocol: it would take accepting that punctuality is not worth more than a life.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication.
Read the full discussion (30 replies).
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