Gisbert says the government is opening a disinformation case against him

Rubén Gisbert announces government proceedings over disinformation

Gisbert announced that the government is opening proceedings against him over “disinformation” and a “hate crime.” He did so in a social media post, igniting yet another chapter of a culture war that long ago stopped being about Ukraine. It is about where criticism ends and censorship begins. The proceedings—known only through his own account—put the lawyer and polemicist at the center of a debate as divisive as the conflict that triggered it.

What he is accused of and why the legal classification matters

Gisbert is not just anyone. A lawyer, highly active on social media and with a discourse that much of the public reads as aligned with the Kremlin’s narrative, he has built an awkward profile by weighing in on every controversy. Those who loathe him describe him as a figure seeking attention. Those who defend him, even if they share nothing of what he says, point to the same thing from the other side: what is being pursued here is not the figure, but the message.

The legal problem is the usual one. Several participants stress that “disinformation” is not a category in the Código Penal (Spain’s Incivil Code) and that “hate crime” is a legal category elastic enough to fit almost anything. In the discussion, it is suggested that hate crime has little traction in a case like this, and that the real legal fit might be sought elsewhere: articles 592 and 593, intended for anyone who maintains “intelligence or any kind of relationship with foreign governments” in order to undermine the authority of the State.

What penalty does article 592 of the Código Penal carry?

Article 592 punishes with a prison sentence of four to eight years anyone who, in order to undermine the authority of the State or compromise the dignity or vital interests of Spain, maintains relations with foreign governments, their agents, or international groups and organizations. Article 593 is cited in relation to the previous one, and in the analysis circulating it is hinted that, if the matter goes down that road, the terrain is far murkier than that of an inconvenient opinion.

Money laundering through live “donations” of purple banknotes is the hypothesis some are floating. None of that has been proven. All of this is, as of the date of the conversation, an open case with no outcome.

The “disinformation crime” and the specter of censorship

The question running through the matter is uncomfortable: Does the crime of “disinformation” exist? The answer given in the debate is that it does not under that name, but that the machinery can manufacture an equivalent. A recurring comparison hangs in the air: the case of a German general suspended from duty and pay for admitting Russian superiority is recalled, and there is regret that here many rejoiced over it. The argument repeated is that censorship no longer needs to ban: it is enough that the State has more capacity to litigate than the individual and can wait for a judge to get bored.

The shadow over the Fiscalía (Public Prosecutor’s Office) is explicit. It is recalled that two months ago, in words attributed to the prime minister, the answer to “Who does the Fiscalía depend on?” was a loaded “Well, that.” And in parallel, reference circulated to a leaked speech from the no-confidence motion in which the Kingdom of Spain was described as an autocracy.

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The figure: pro-Russian, lawyer and polemicist

Gisbert is labeled a Russian propagandist because, it is argued, he repeats point by point the Kremlin’s excuses for the invasion of Ukraine: the Nancy, the genocide in the Donbas, NATO expansion. In the debate he is reproached for having frequented the terrain of an alleged Russian spy in the Donbas and for accusing the West of genocide of civilians.

Those who see it as a warning shot argue that they will nail him for something else, but that the underlying message is clear. The reply to that is as uncomfortable as it is pertinent: if the government can open proceedings over what one thinks, the list of those next is long and begins with whoever is applauding today. One of the lists that circulated most—control of the judiciary, media as propaganda, ideologization of education—can be read in full in the original source.

The three positions on the case

There are three clear strains. The first celebrates the case: they saw it coming and assume there is Russian money moving behind it. The second, among those who cannot stomach the figure but defend the principle, holds that you cannot agree with what he says and at the same time rejoice that he is being pursued, because tomorrow the same standard will be applied to someone else. The third points to the subject himself: manipulative and pro-Russian, and yet entitled to air his opinions freely, because the country’s continued freedom depends on it.

The case has become an uncomfortable test for almost everyone. And the test will not be resolved by a tweet.

Those who celebrate the case are left with their contempt for the figure. Those who antiestéticar it are left with the precedent. The case, as of today, still has no verdict, no known formal charge and no official explanation that disproves or confirms the version he himself published.