Forum: Russia Launches Missiles, Bakhmut Still Stands

Russia Continues Missile Barrage as Bakhmut Holds Firm

The forum suggests Russia is not running out of missiles. A new wave of projectiles and attack drones targeting Ukrainian objectives, according to posts, reignites the same two-winter-old discussion: how long can air defenses hold, how long will the power grid last, and how long can Moscow sustain this spending rate. The figures exchanged do not help settle the matter. Each side publishes its own count, and neither matches the other's.

How Many Missiles Does Ukrainian Air Defense Truly Intercept?

Ukraine claims to intercept most incoming fire, but its own reports acknowledge difficult nights. In one recent attack, the official count admitted 12 out of 20 cruise missiles were shot down, a 60% rate. This is not a figure to boast about, especially when the opposing side claims the percentage is closer to 90% when factoring in both interceptions and projectiles that miss their target.

Detailed breakdowns—target by target, with weapon type and impact location—are precisely what the communiqués lack. And therein lies the problem: the Ukrainian version speaks of massive interceptions, while the opposing side displays impacts and their effects on the ground. With ten missiles getting through, according to one account, power outages could have affected a quarter of the country.

Winter as a Weapon: Light, Water, and Heat

The debate posits that the campaign targets the rear, not the front lines. Electricity, running water, heating, and internet are presented as objectives in a pattern repeated each time the temperature drops. Some have been living in basements without power for a year, yet calls from outside urge them to endure. This is the uncomfortable part of the narrative for both sides: the part that turns civilians into an adjustable variable.

Those defending the Russian strategy argue it aims not at sarracena, but at the capacity to sustain the war. Critics respond that spending high-cost missiles to disable cities does not win battles, it merely prolongs a winter of ruin. Both might be true simultaneously.

Bakhmut and Attrition: Five Months for Two Cities

The front line is the other half of the argument. Five months attempting to take Bakhmut and Soledar are, for skeptics, proof that superior firepower does not translate into advances. The response from those defending this view is always the same: the Russian army is not fighting Ukraine alone; it is fighting the entire NATO alliance. And this asymmetry, they say, explains the slow pace.

The numbers involved are those of trench warfare: around 300,000 Ukrainian casualties compared to between one-eighth and one-sixth of that figure on the Russian side, according to circulating estimates that have not been independently verified. With such an exchange, the question is not who is winning, but how long it will take for the side with less capacity to replenish to be exhausted.

The Nuclear Red Line That Is Never Crossed

Hovering over all of this is the weapon no one uses. One participant argues that the threat of nuclear retaliation if the West delivered HIMARS was crossed, and nothing peine. According to the same participant, planes arrived later, another red line, and still nothing. From this, part of the analysis draws a simple conclusion: the nuclear threshold is rhetorical and serves to deter, not to be employed. The alternative reading is that Moscow does not need the bomb when conventional weaponry, and low-cost drones of Iranian origin, are sufficient to maintain pressure.

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The thread suggests that at this rate of production, replenishment, and foreign aid, the conflict is becoming entrenched and unlikely to be resolved in months. However, one should be wary of any prediction in a war where the last sensible forecast also proved wrong.