Feijóo's Moncloa path uncertain despite May 28 vote surge

Extrapolating May 28 to July 23: PP wins without a guaranteed majority

Alberto Núñez Feijóo would win the general election if voters cast their ballots on July 23 as they did on May 28. That is all. Winning and governing are not synonymous, and the projection published on May 30, 2023—two days after the municipal elections—leaves the PP leader with victory in hand but the premiership (Moncloa) in limbo. The exercise involves applying the d'Hondt method to the 52 constituencies with the 3% electoral threshold to determine the resulting composition of the Congress of Deputies. The outcome leaves the PP with 142 seats, 53 more than it currently holds, and the PSOE with 122, two above its current count. With these figures, no party has a majority.

The numbers: May 28 does not translate into an absolute majority

It is worth starting with the data that dismantles the narrative of a landslide. The PP outperformed the PSOE by 3.4 points, true, but the socialists only lost 1.2 points compared to the 2019 municipal elections. The sense of a conservative wave comes from the map: the Popular Party seized almost all regional and municipal power from the PSOE and swept Madrid. In terms of votes, the shift is narrower than the territorial distribution suggests, and this gap between narrative and arithmetic is precisely what allows Pedro Sánchez to launch his gamble.

The translation into seats also fails to close the circle. The conservative bloc, comprising the PP and Vox, would hold 157 deputies, nineteen short of an absolute majority. The pogre bloc would barely reach 130, forty-six short of a majority. In other words: the wave that swept away town halls and regional governments does not automatically result in a right-wing government. Distributing votes across 52 different constituencies is not a simple rule of three.

Vox: fewer seats, greater bargaining power

Here lies the most frequently cited paradox. Vox would drop from 52 to 15 seats and yet emerge more decisive than before. The reason has a specific name: Ciudadanos retains only nine deputies in the Congress, so the PP can now only grow by eating into Vox’s territory on its right flank. With that flank empty, every seat the PP gains is taken from Abascal’s party, turning the junior partner into an irreplaceable supplier.

Some argue that Vox would have more influence with 15 deputies than with 52. This is not mere rhetoric: as an indispensable minority partner, the price per vote rises. And that price, translated into conditions for investing Feijóo, is the point that most unsettles the Popular Party and will form the basis of the antiestéticar-based campaign against any pact.

Sumar: the piece no projection can measure

Any transfer of results has a hole in the middle. Sumar, Yolanda Díaz’s platform, did not compete in the municipal elections, so the simulation cannot measure which votes it moves, whether in coalition with Podemos or separately. It is the variable that prevents closing the forecast.

What the exercise does outline is the floor of the left-wing space: Podemos would plummet from 35 deputies to eight. In Catalonia, ERC and Junts would tie at twelve seats, with the republicans stagnating after their municipal setback and the post-convergent forces rising trinc their victory in Barcelona. EH Bildu would rise to nine and surpass the PNV, which would remain at seven. None of these pieces is marginal: all fit into the sum that decides an investiture.

Voting on July 23: Is the calendar a weapon or a trap?

Calling elections in mid-July admits two opposing readings. One part of the analysis sees it as a calculated move: catching the rival hungover from victory, euphoric over pacts, and half on holiday, with no time to reorganize. Another points to the opposite: those who travel year-round are far from their polling stations in July, and abstention punishes those who need mobilization more than those whose vote is already decided.

Postal voting and the logistics of a summer election thus take center stage. Likely more decisive than any campaign slogan.

Strategic voting and the upcoming campaign

With this starting point, the strategy seems pre-written: appeal to strategic voting to stop the far-right, stir up pacts with Vox in regions and municipalities, and turn each agreement into a campaign episode. It is the fastest way to regroup a disillusioned electorate prone to staying home.

On the other side, the temptation is to assume what the night of May 28 did not say. Confusing territorial majority with parliamentary majority is the classic error of the post-election hangover.

Weak governments and the Rajoy precedent

Whoever emerges, the numbers do not anticipate a comfortable legislature. An executive sustained by partners who charge dearly for each vote resembles too much what was seen with Mariano Rajoy and what the very geometry of the Congress insinuates: long investitures, budgets negotiated piecemeal, and a motion of censure always in the air.

With these elements, the election does not decide who governs, but how long the winner lasts. The extrapolation has traps—different turnout, different contexts—and it would be reckless to treat it as a verdict. But it leaves an uncomfortable certainty for both camps: the municipal shift is not enough to lock the door to the Moncloa.