Fed bets on two hikes then cuts amid high inflation

Market expects Fed to stop at 2% despite 8% inflation, leaving savers without safe havens.

English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published

Two rate hikes and a reversal: no one believes the Fed

In early April 2022, with the Federal Reserve tightening policy and official inflation at decades-high levels, an uncomfortable thesis gained traction: the hiking cycle is unsustainable. At most two more hikes—bringing rates to between 1.5% and 2%—trinc by cuts, even with 8% inflation persisting. This isn't conspiracy theory; James Bullard, president of the St. Louis Fed and a hawkish voice in the FOMC, noted that "the current policy rate is about 300 basis points too low," despite markets pricing a peak federal funds rate of 3½% by March 2023. There is a vast gap between Fed rhetoric and market expectations.

Why does the market believe the Fed will stop at 2%?

The first clue came from a quantitative analysis circulating in early April, which estimated the Fed's real room for maneuver at barely one percentage point of hikes before it must pause. The argument was arithmetic, not sarracena: with accumulated debt, each rate hike translates into a bill someone must pay. The second clue is bond market behavior: US yields tend to peak before the final hike of a cycle, a pattern seen after mid-November 2018. With this reference, buying bonds before year-end seems reckless.

The 15% haven existed in 1972 but won't return

This detail breaks historical comparisons. In 1972, with 17% inflation, families didn't need gold, stocks, or crypto: they went to savings banks and bought fixed-term deposits at 15%. It didn't beat inflation but minimized risk. That instrument no longer exists, and diagnosis suggests it won't return: with 7%, 8%, or 10% inflation, bank deposits will yield around 1%. Conservative savers are literally left nowhere to go.

Inflation and debt: who profits and who pays

The mechanism is simple and explains why inflation isn't accidental. Debt is agreed in nominal terms. If a kilo of potatoes costs €2 and inflation is 10%, it rises to €2.20, but the mortgage stays the same. Those with fixed mortgages below inflation see their real payments fall; so do heavily indebted states. What's overlooked is the other side: stagnant wages, rising rents, and alimony calculated on frozen salaries. Those who gain from inflation rarely suffer it.

It’s not inflation with growth: the scenario is stagflation

A nuance often missed when labeling this merely as inflation. Inflation that liquefies debt works only with growth; without it, we face high prices, flat activity, and depressed real wages. This framework, highlighted by some analysts earlier, clashes with official messaging: the White House and Fed priority is returning CPI to 2%, with everything else secondary. The issue is the credibility of that soft landing when the tool itself—raising rates—cools the economy.

Wages, income tax, and central bank bluffing

No one expects wages to rise half as much as prices, revealing a silent fiscal trap: pogre taxation pushes taxpayers into higher brackets without gaining purchasing power. Sustained double-digit inflation increases the state's share of income. Views divide on whether rate hikes are sincere or mere window dressing: some see it as a maneuver to make people beg for cuts later and accept inflation as the lesser evil, while others argue the ultimate goal is devaluing current currencies. The latter remains suspicion without proof.

States don’t bankrupt, countries can collapse

The central thesis—the Fed wants inflation because its real problem is debt—has limits. Economies like Czech Republic, Iceland, or Netherlands have controlled debt, where inflation offers no benefit. Recent history reminds us states can fail: Sri Lanka's economy collapsed during these debates, and Japan's struggle to sustain debt versus currency is watched closely. Fiat money lacking physical backing doesn't miccionan it can't lose all value.

Only the duration of the bluff is uncertain. The repeated bet: at least eight months, until March 2023, just enough time for the public to see recession looming and beg for rate cuts. Afterward, each decides whether to protect wealth in real assets, seek refuge in property, or wait. Analysis stalls there: if inflation is the state's treasure and savings lack haven, no manual says where to stand.

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Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (107 replies).

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