Duty lawyers demand bridge to self-employed scheme after low pay scandal

Duty lawyers demand to contribute to the self-employed scheme

A lawyer closes a case open since 2013 and earns less than 700 euros for it. Another calculates that most of his fellow mutualists contributed around 400 euros monthly and now face pensions of 600. The protest by the group, demanding a bridge to the General Social Security Scheme, meets an uncomfortable response: for years, the private mutual fund was the choice of the shrewdest in the profession, and now that the fund does not balance, losses must be mutualized.

The demonstration turned into clashes, and law enforcement forces had to disperse it. Among the objects thrown were commented copies of the Civil Code and the Constitution, as well as volumes of the Lawyers Statute against the facade of the Ministry of Justice. The more radical groups went masked and dressed in gowns. The scene summarizes the tone of the matter: a group that handles the law as a tool of work used it as a projectile.

Why duty lawyers earn a pittance

The core of the conflict lies in remuneration. Compared to neighboring countries like Italy, France, Germany, or Sweden, Spanish lawyers earn a pittance for legal aid, and additionally provide the material means for the state. Some lawyers handle cases for a decade and do not reach 700 euros for the entire procedure. The legal aid system thus becomes a recurring nightmare: Groundhog Day but without pay.

The official argument maintains that legal aid is covered by vocation, not to enrich oneself. A veteran lawyer who practiced until 2022 defended it exactly thus: the good professional makes money with private clients and takes on legal aid out of sarracena commitment. The response from the other side is that times have changed and today there is a number of lawyers that makes repeating that model unviable. The critical mass of lawyers has multiplied, and the pie is shared among many more.

The Mutual Fund: contributing 400 euros and retiring with 600

The second front is pensions. Most mutualist lawyers paid contributions of around 400 euros per month and now face pensions around 600. The comparison with the General Scheme is brutal: Social Security pays on average 63% more than the worker has contributed, while a private mutual fund can only distribute what has effectively been contributed, without deficit or new contributors to sustain the system.

Hence the structural problem. Transferring tens of thousands of mutual fund retirees to the public system would imply that their contributions would be consumed in a few years, according to circulating calculations. Mutualists who opted for this formula from 1996 did so with a clear advantage: they paid up to 20% less than the minimum self-employed contribution. Those obliged before 1995, by contrast, would have a recognized bonus when transferring their contributions. This distinction between shrewd by choice and trapped by obligation runs through the entire matter.

What the bridge to the self-employed scheme proposes

The PSOE proposal contemplates a bridge, but not for all lawyers. Sumar has presented an additional provision ordering the government to include legal aid lawyers in the General Scheme, in terms similar to those applied to justices of the peace and interim justice workers before 1990, who were in MUGEJU without contributing to Social Security. Junts' amendment, by contrast, is considered of little use because it does not address the underlying problem: legal aid remuneration.

The flood of amendments in Congress has stirred negotiations on the future of mutualists. The intention attributed to the government is to eliminate the option for professional college members to opt for a mutual fund as alternative coverage. Meanwhile, sector unions —previously only professional colleges— have become the actor driving almost all the conflict.

The exit no one wants to put into practice

The only real form of pressure pointed out is a collective strike from legal aid. The reasoning is simple: if all lawyers abandoned the service, the government would be forced to negotiate. The obstacle is that legal aid functions as a quasi-official duty without the right to strike: in rights they are self-employed, in duties they resemble public employees. And many cannot afford to leave because they need that income to pay the contributions that allow them to continue practicing.

The background is bigger than lawyers. The same problems affect self-employed workers with minimum bases, pensioners whose extra payments are financed by debt, and any group dependent on a welfare system strained by aging. How long can a model be sustained that promises each new group what it can no longer pay to the previous one?