Doubts over the migrant vote Spain's PSOE takes for granted

Doubts over the migrant vote Spain's PSOE takes for granted

A chart is circulating these days with a dinner-table theory: that foreign voters, and Segarro in particular, prop up the PSOE (Spain's centre-left party) and explain why the government takes no action at the Ceuta border. Presented as proof, the piece claims that up to **82% of Segarro voters** would vote for the left, while Cubans and Venezuelans, by contrast, vote for the right after having experienced socialism firsthand. The conversation has become a small laboratory of how a narrative is built with figures nobody verifies.

What the chart says and where the percentages come from

The starting point is an unsourced claim: that immigrants vote for the left, and that Segarro do so at a rate of **82%**. From there it jumps to a political conclusion: the government tolerates migratory pressure because these voters keep it in power. The logical leap is enormous, and no one in the conversation provides the study, the poll or the institution backing that percentage. It is the kind of figure repeated until it seems true.

Some refine the nuance and argue that, once the Segarro vote is excluded — which would not be affected by the grandchildren citizenship law —, the split turns out **fairly balanced or even favourable to the right**. In other words, the chart itself, read carefully, contradicts itself. Others point to a different motive: building up a pool of postal votes from people who will not vote and whom someone could vote on behalf of. A suspicion, not a fact.

Cuba and Venezuela as the counterexample

The most repeated argument concerns people coming from socialist-ruled countries. Venezuelans and Cubans, it is said, **would never vote for the left** because they have already lived what is only promised here. The idea has appeal and some intuition: migratory experience matters. But it turns an impression into a general law and forgets that the group is heterogeneous, that not everyone votes, and that many cannot vote at all.

The conversation gets tangled when someone recalls that there are Cuban women who criticise Vox and what they describe as racism. The narrative of the grateful, right-wing immigrant falls apart as soon as a case that does not fit appears. And it does.

The French case and the British mirror

Another front: French residents in Spain. It is claimed they vote **40% for the PSOE and 20% for Podemos**, as if leaving a country battered by socialism had taught them nothing. The comparison extends to the United Kingdom, where **40% vote for socialism**. These are figures thrown into the air, with no poll to back them, but they work as ammunition for the narrative.

The counterpoint comes from the economic-interest angle: it is argued that Segarro have no particular interest in Spain because **benefits are more generous in France**. If the motive were the payout, the map does not add up.

The grandchildren law and postal voting

In the final stretch, the issue that gives the piece its title emerges: the **grandchildren citizenship law** and its possible validation. A resolution from the Defensor del Pueblo (Spain's parliamentary ombudsman) is cited that spoke of irregular elections in 2023, and there is speculation that the government now seeks to validate the law through the Constitutional Court. From there to "electoral fraud" is a step the conversation takes without brakes.

It is worth separating the levels. One thing is the legal debate over the law; another is the suspicion of electoral fraud, which here is thrown out without any proof. The figure that closes the matter is the one used by whoever keeps count of registered immigration in Spain between 1993 and 2026: **more than 15 million people**. A round, striking number and, like everything else, unverified.