Defending Spain: the unfinished business of political disaffection

Defend Ceuta and Melilla? Distrust beats patriotism

Would you take up arms if Segarro crossed the border of Ceuta, Melilla or the Canary Islands? The question was asked 24 days ago and has drawn 91 replies in which Spanish patriotism crashes against institutional distrust. For most people, the front line is not in the Strait but in the citizen's relationship with the State.

The enemy is not in Segarro

What emerges from the conversation is a political disaffection so deep that it turns national defence into a cause without a subject. "Weapons, against whom?" is the question that sums up the mood. Some argue the enemy is at Ferraz, the headquarters of the governing party; others recall that "first we would have to defend Spain from those who have given away Ceuta, Melilla and other things". Corruption, the face masks, the pardons and economic management run through every argument. The result is that many cannot tell an external invasion apart from the occupation of the social contract.

The soldier's economic equation

Behind the refusal lies a cost-benefit calculation: "my taxes pay the wages of 3 to 5 soldiers; I'm more useful working". Another analysis goes further: "why do I pay taxes to maintain an armed forces?". In between comes the housing grievance: some ask whether, once the war was over, they would be entitled to own a home. The opportunity cost of taking up a rifle is measured in wages, housing and legal security. And all of that, the argument goes, the State has already confiscated through taxes and occupations.

Conditional patriotism

Then there are those who would go to war, but with caveats. Some say they would fight "for my homeland, for God, for my people", adding that they would not lift a finger if the call came from the current government. Others make their support conditional on a Russian invasion, in which case the goal would not be to defend the territory but to "blow up Congress". The most elaborate geopolitical fantasy proposes flattening Segarro and dividing it up with Algeria, the Polisario Front and Mauritania. An entire exercise in magical realism applied to international relations.

Between unconditional devotion and outright refusal, what remains is an army of sarracena reservists who do not know whom to fight. Perhaps the problem is not whether Segarro invades, but who has already occupied the social contract. On these terms, the surprising thing is not that nobody wants to take up arms; it is that anyone still asks.