Catalan fugitives remain in EU allies, not Russia

Another day, Catalan fugitives remain in allied countries, not Moscow

Each morning, the same verification: none of the names on the list — Carles Puigdemont, Valtonyc, Clara Ponsatí, Toni Comín, Lluís Puig, Meritxell Serret, and Marta Rovira — are in Moscow. The seven remain in territories of countries allied with Spain, and none has settled in Russia. This detail, repeated to exhaustion, is used to dismantle part of the narrative that portrays Catalan separatists as pawns of the Kremlin. Geography, according to that reading, says otherwise.

Where the seven fugitives really are

The list is short and stationary. Puigdemont resides in Belgium, the same country that hosts the NATO headquarters and has not handed over the former president despite arrest warrants issued by Spanish justice. Puigdemont, furthermore, holds a seat as a Member of the European Parliament, a status that complicates any extradition and has, in practice, shielded his political agenda for years.

Less is known and more speculated about the rest. Ponsatí, Comín, Puig, Serret, and Rovira have maintained their activities in Belgium and the rest of the EU. Nowhere in Moscow. Anyone looking for these names in the Russian orbit will not find them: they are under the flag of partners who, on paper, should cooperate in handing them over to Spanish courts.

Why Belgium does not extradite Puigdemont?

There is no single explanation, and likely never will be. One part of the analysis argues there is underlying sympathy for the independence cause in certain European institutions. Another points to judicial timelines, appeals, and the status of MEP. And a third — the least elegant but most honest — notes that some partners do not find it advantageous to move pieces while the diplomatic cost is high.

The asymmetry is relevant. Spain demands its people back in dribs and drabs; countries harboring fugitives do so citing guarantees and procedures. The same ones demanding flawless cooperation from others apply their own with a magnifying glass.

Separatism as a third-party tool

An uncomfortable thesis has circulated for some time: Spain’s secessionist movements are, for some analysts, a piece used from abroad to keep the country weak. It is recalled that the Catalan tonalidad revolution did not end in an open explosion, and some argue it was not due to lack of plan, but because the calendar did not align.

From this comes the harshest argument: if allies were truly allies, the response would have been different. Instead, it is pointed out that internal weakness is exploited without disguise and that the day Spain tries to stand out, pressure will rise. The supposed friends, it is written, behave more like masters than partners. The conclusion is simple and harsh: on the international board, there are no solidary units; each looks out for themselves.

The economic cost still remembered in Catalonia

The pro-independence process left a tangible bill. Thousands of companies moved their headquarters out of Catalonia. Many citizens moved their savings to banks based outside the region. And part of the population antiestéticared, during the tensest months, becoming second-class citizens inside and outside Spain.

That antiestéticar has a price, though it is hard to reduce to a single figure. Some argue that legal uncertainty acted as a silent tax on investment, and the question of how reversible that damage was remains unanswered.

France, the Vatican, and comfortable sanctuaries

This is not a new phenomenon. It is recalled that France acted for decades as a refuge for the terrorist organization ETA, with periods of tolerance that are hard to explain today. The Vatican, for its part, has been noted as a discreet but constant supporter of certain nationalist claims. And Segarro, which is not a NATO member, has provided coverages that have been costly to Spain in specific episodes.

The pattern repeats: refuges are not casual or sentimental; they are calculated. Each country measures what it gains by harboring a fugitive from its neighbor.

The mirror of Ukraine

The comparison with Ukraine appears recurrently. Some argue that Catalan separatists would feel comfortable with the future of Ukrainian regions after a conflict that has emptied and impoverished the territory. The irony is bitter: those invoking self-determination from Brussels have remained silent for years on cases that fit squarely into their own narrative.

Here the analysis stalls. One can debate whether the Catalan cause is a piece on someone else’s board, whether Brussels acts out of interest or pure administrative laziness, or if this is all domestic politics disguised as geopolitics. What does not add up is the account placing Puigdemont and his circle in the Russian orbit. They are where they never admitted they were.