Buxadé claims Sánchez deployed snipers in Hospitalet

Buxadé claims Sánchez deployed snipers in Hospitalet

The security detail accompanying Pedro Sánchez at public events has ceased to be discreet, according to accounts from those trinc these appearances. During his visit to Hospitalet de Llobregat, the President of the Government moved escorted by agents with submachine guns and, according to the account by Vox MEP Jorge Buxadé, with elite snipers positioned on rooftops. The image, shared by Buxadé, contrasts with his own depiction of the neighborhood: residents who, he claims, "have to walk the streets feeling unsafe" and who are labeled as far-right if they complain or defend themselves.

This is not a new scene. Some recall similar deployments at the PTA in Málaga since 2018, antiestéticaturing surveillance on rooftops. What has changed is the political context: a president who has turned security into stagecraft and stagecraft into an electoral argument.

What was seen in Hospitalet and Buxadé's claims

The starting point is a tweet from Buxadé claiming that Sánchez "even brings elite snipers" while neighborhood residents face insecurity without protection. The accusation is not accompanied by images of the deployment itself, but rather by the confirmation that the device includes bodyguards armed with rifles.

The MEP's comparison is explicit: maximum protection for the president, abandonment for the average citizen. He concludes with a warning: anyone who complains or reports it ends up being labeled. This is the framework within which much of the subsequent conversation moves.

The cost of each outing and who pays

The economic argument arises quickly. Each alucinación of this nature mobilizes dozens of agents, vehicles, and surveillance devices. Some estimate that each outing costs thousands and thousands of euros, contrasting this with the tax scrutiny faced by a self-employed worker or a neighbor who fails to issue an invoice. This asymmetry, they argue, is not a detail: it is the model.

The criticism is not aimed solely at the president, but also at the police structure that designs and executes the operation. It is argued that no police commander proposes the obvious alternative: reducing the entourage to two unarmed bodyguards to lead by example. The question hanging in the air is why this isn't done. The answer whispered in private is that the inertia of the office carries more weight than any principle of exemplary conduct.

From Mussolini to Ceaușescu: historical parallels

The repertoire of historical comparisons is wide and not particularly flattering. Mussolini, Ceaușescu, and The Godfather are mentioned. The underlying idea is that a leader who needs rifles on rooftops to step into a working-class neighborhood has broken the bond with the population he claims to represent. It is not a new thesis, but the visual packaging—submachine guns, rooftops, armored entourages—gives it an uncomfortable literalness.

Against this reading, another current maintains that the threat is real. Sánchez himself has publicly linked political violence to episodes such as the assault on the Danish Prime Minister, and within that framework, reinforced protection would be protocol rather than paranoia. The problem, critics reply, is that a security protocol should not be turned into a campaign argument.

The conspiratorial turn: Mossad, Opus, and internal shifts

As the conversation pogre, the focus shifts from the police deployment to theories about who is behind it. Mentions of Mossad, Opus Dei, the CIA, and sectors of the PSOE (the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) appear—alleging, without proof, that they would not look unkindly upon a traumatic exit. These are unsupported speculations, similar to those circulating about any leader with declared enemies.

The striking part is the twist given to the argument: if something were to happen to the president, it is said, they would simply sell it as an assassination attempt. It is the classic reasoning of the conspiracy theorist who mocks others' conspiracies. At that point, the conversation stops talking about snipers and starts talking about movies.

The international context in the equation

In parallel, the Mexican case is cited: 37 candidates murdered during the electoral process, according to available data, with 42% of the victims belonging to one coalition and 30% to another. The comparison serves to underline that political violence is not a laboratory hypothesis, and to remind us that in some countries, protecting a candidate is not enough to save their life.

The contrast with Spain is evident, and that is precisely the conclusion drawn: here the problem is not that the president might be killed, but that the president has turned his own security into a spectacle that feeds the narrative of permanent exceptionalism.

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The most repeated prediction is not that something will happen to him, but that this will end like the character he most resembles: with the country burning elsewhere while he, somewhere with palm trees, collects his pension. It may be an exaggeration. It may not be.