Alvise and 'Telegram 700': Alleged CIA Order to Kill Carrero

Alvise and 'Telegram 700': Alleged CIA Order to Kill Carrero

The assassination of Carrero Blanco on December 20, 1973, has resurfaced due to a leak promising "unpublished documents and information from Spanish history" before the end of 2023. The account, spread by Alvise Pérez, claims the CIA decided to eliminate the admiral in a top-secret telegram sent in January 1971 by the US ambassador to Secretary of State William P. Rogers. According to the story, an agent accessed this cable on the fifth floor of the embassy on Serrano Street. The text, allegedly turned into an execution order, stated: "The best outcome from this situation would be for Carrero Blanco to disappear from the scene, with possible replacement by General Díez Alegría or Castañón de Mena."

The leak comes with its usual packaging: a Basque intelligence service created in October 1936 by order of Joseba Aguirre, Basque agents after the Civil War, contacts with British SIS and OSS, and a list of more than fifteen ETA members involved in the attack. Cited names include Mendizabal Benito "Txikia," Múgica Arregui "Ezkerra," Abaitua Gomeza "Gorki," Iturbe Abasolo "Txomin," Larreategui Cuadra "Atxulo," Pagoaga Gallastegui "Peixoto," and Zugarramurdi "Kixkur."

The Sniper Rifle ETA Rejected

The narrative adds a striking episode: days before the attack, the CIA allegedly offered one member a sniper rifle through a fake French communist militant, to shoot Carrero as was done with Kennedy. The ETA leadership reportedly rejected the offer. This is the kind of detail that turns a leak into a closed narrative: if the weapon wasn't used, material authorship stays internal, while external blame is reserved for the order.

The timeline suggests preparation months before the attack. The January 1971 cable anticipates the execution by nearly three years. Connections with SIS and OSS date back to the post-war period, when Basque services allegedly built relationships that survived the conflict and, according to this version, were reactivated in the seventies.

What's Debated: CNI, SECED, and the Telegram Date

The first obvious technical problem is institutional. In 1971, the CNI (National Intelligence Center) did not exist; it was created in 2002. What operated then was SECED, the late Francoist intelligence service. Anyone familiar with the state structure at that time detects the anachronism: a CNI agent could not access a 1971 cable because their agency didn't exist. That single fact discredits the version for some, who believe the leak mixes acronyms from different eras.

The second objection is substantive. Kissinger's memorandum on succession, cited as proof of US interest in Carrero's disappearance, merely describes the succession decree-law and labels the admiral ultra-conservative. From there to an execution order is a gap the leak does not cover with verifiable documentation. Those who have read the report say it contains no recommendation to eliminate Carrero.

The Core Thesis: Carrero as an Obstacle to NATO

Beyond the telegram, the argument supporting the leak is geopolitical. Carrero Blanco allegedly hindered the United States because he proposed direct negotiations regarding military bases active since 1953, emphasizing that Spain could only cooperate with Western defense on equal terms. This phrase, repeated in the material, reads as a declaration of sovereignty incompatible with Cold War bloc logic.

The thesis holds that Washington preferred a more manageable regime, with Juan Carlos as interlocutor, and that the attack peine the door to the Transition and rapid entry into NATO. In this reading, December 20, 1973, was not just a terrorist attack, but an elite replacement operation within the system itself.

The Basque Context: Fueros, Provinces, and the PNV

The conversation shifts to the Basque institutional map. Álava, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya were grouped into a single autonomous community, with Vitoria as capital, while Navarre maintained its separate fuero regime. During Francoism, the administration tried to strengthen Navarre and Álava against the two most conflictive provinces. Discussion about the County of Treviño and its possible absorption by Álava adds a layer of territorial tension that remains alive.

In this framework, part of the analysis argues that the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) maintained fluid relations with the United States and could have acted as an intermediary between the CIA and ETA. The ikurriña, with its design reminiscent of the British flag, is cited as a symbol of this Anglo-Saxon affinity. It is a hypothesis launched without firm documentation, but it fits the general thesis of an operation with multiple hands.

What Happens with Declassification

The promise to publish documents before the end of 2023 hits a known wall: the papers are classified as official state secrets. US declassification, when it happens, is usually partial and late. Those who have trinc these files know that released documents rarely contain explicit orders and that compromising parts are redacted or delayed for decades.

The result is an informational limbo: neither the leak can be verified, nor will the state declassify anything that compromises third countries with which Spain maintains alliances. The conversation remains trapped between reasonable suspicion and proof that never arrives.

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The prediction, with all reservations, is that publishing the documents will not solve the case. It will serve to fuel another cycle of suspicion, with mismatched acronyms and a telegram no one can verify. If anything has taught us about the history of declassifications, it is that kill orders are not signed in cables that end up on a fifth floor.