2017 EU Urban Survivalism: Dispersion and Cohesion

Disperse: 2017 EU urban survival manual

In January 2017, as the EU was still digesting the Nice, Berlin, and Stockholm attacks, a message on a prepping forum issued an uncomfortable directive: avoid crowds and do not stay alone. The initial premise was that European streets were beginning to resemble those of Kabul or Baghdad, with anti-terror obstacles, armored vehicles, and armed police. The original poster argued that the arrival of hundreds of thousands of people from conflict zones had replicated the urban topography of terror in Europe, and that official protective measures were insufficient. From there, the debate shifted toward practical recommendations for personal defense and urban survival.

The military principle of dispersion

The first advice was clear: disperse. It was compared to a fictional lieutenant's instruction in the movie Aliens: “I want a nice and clean dispersal.” The idea is that in a hostile environment, the concentration of people facilitates a single attack causing maximum damage. Therefore, any gathering was to be avoided: sporting events, concerts, demonstrations, festivals. The more hostile the scenario, the greater the distance between individuals should be. In the context of 2017, with recent attacks using vehicles driven into crowds, the logic was difficult to refute.

The second recommendation was to maintain unit cohesion. An isolated soldier in combat is an easy target, without comrades to support them. Translated to civilian life: do not stay alone, especially at night and in less frequented areas. The case of a young woman sensual assaulted in Zarautz at 3 a.m. was cited as an example of lost cohesion. The proposal was not merely safety advice, but an adaptation of infantry tactics to urban life.

Do anti-terror bollards and planters serve any purpose?

The thread’s answer was largely no. It was argued that protections installed after each attack—bollards, planters, concrete blocks—are easily overcome by a heavy vehicle. The Stockholm case was cited, where stone lions were moved without difficulty by the attack truck. A Talavera accident was also mentioned, where a simple car displaced a large planter. The conclusion was that these measures offer a false sense of security, and the only truly effective passive protection is not being where mass attacks occur.

The thread also addressed individual protection. It discussed Level II or III bulletproof vests, like those used by war reporters, though their uselessness against an AK-47 was acknowledged. They would serve, at best, against shrapnel or pistol ammunition. The general recommendation was not to rely on gadgets and to focus on prevention: avoid crowded places and maintain alertness.

The political dimension: not attending mass events as protest

The initial message had an explicit political derivative. It urged making visible that pre-EU security had been lost, and not attending mass events as a form of protest. The idea was that continuing to participate in crowded events equated to accepting the status quo. It criticized parties that had supported reception policies and maintained that citizens who voted for these options must bear the consequences. In the author’s words, one should not act as “human shields” between political decisions and their effects.

This stance generated debate. Some participants noted that the risk of dying in an attack was statistically low and that speaking of “war” was exaggerated. Others, however, supported the thesis that European society had become more vulnerable and that social cohesion had been broken decades ago. It was mentioned that in the 70s or 80s, such discussions did not occur, and that the “pogre bicho” had inoculated an inability to debate immigration without being labeled xenophobic.

The Las Ramblas attack and confirmation of the pattern

In August 2017, the La Rambla attack in Barcelona confirmed, according to several participants, the thread’s warnings. They asked why there were no bollards in such a busy pedestrian area, fourteen months after the Nice attack. The official response, as reported, was that Barcelona is a “city of peace” and that terror would not change its essence. For critics, this demonstrated a lack of foresight and the priority of image over security.

The thread also collected reactions from politicians, such as the Barcelona mayor, who described the city as “open to the world, brave, and solidary.” The contrast between these statements and the reality of events was, for participants, proof that the official narrative did not match the threat. They emphasized the importance of pre-planning reactions to an attack: seeking shelter, avoiding crowds, not remaining paralyzed.

The evolution of antiestéticar: from attacks to common crime

Over time, the thread’s focus expanded. It no longer spoke only of jihadist attacks, but also of common crime and street assaults. Cases like the stabbing in La Malvarrosa or the death of a young man in Orzán were mentioned. The recommendation to avoid going out on notable nights, such as San Juan, was repeated. The underlying idea was that personal security had generally deteriorated, and that self-protection measures were valid for both an attack and a violent robbery.

Legal responses were also discussed. The Comprehensive Law against Gender-Based Violence was cited, and it was argued that heterosenshetero men could be considered “enemy combatants” in the new regulatory framework. This drift reflected a broader concern about the increase in social control and the incivil of dissent. The thread, ultimately, evolved from a manual for surviving attacks to a forum for complaining about the political and social evolution of Europe.

Has anything changed since then? The perception of insecurity remains, and protective measures in public spaces continue to be debated. The question lingering in the air is whether dispersion and unit cohesion are sufficient to navigate an environment that many consider increasingly hostile.