Ukraine: Martial law and the debate on Zelensky's legitimacy

Ukraine: Martial law, elections, and the erosion of the narrative

Can a country at war hold elections without breaking its own legality? This question has dominated public debate in Ukraine for months and has evolved into a clash between two incompatible narratives. On one side are those who argue that suspending elections is an automatic consequence of martial law, as provided for by the Ukrainian constitution. On the other are those who claim that President Volodymyr Zelensky's term has expired and that his continuation in office without ballots makes him, in practice, a leader without electoral legitimacy. The discussion has become so heated that legal arguments have lost relevance: the core issue is whether Ukraine remains a democracy at war or has transformed into something else.

What does the Ukrainian constitution say about elections during war?

Article 83 of the Constitution of Ukraine states that if the term of the Verkhovna Rada expires while martial law or a state of emergency is in effect, its authority is extended until the first session of the new Rada elected after these measures are lifted. This text has been cited repeatedly in the exchange and supports the position that Ukrainian law does not allow calling elections while martial law is declared. Defenders of this interpretation emphasize that it is not a discretionary decision by the president, but a legal provision that activates automatically.

The opposing side does not dispute the literal wording of the article, but rather its scope. They argue that the extension of parliament's mandate does not equate to that of the president, and that Zelensky's term expired without elections being called, which they believe renders him a leader out of office. The exchange devolved into a quarrel over which article—83 or 84—applied to each case, with mutual accusations of not having read the text and of copying fragments out of context. Amid the noise, the legal fact was buried.

The precedent of Lincoln and Churchill: Comparable to 2024?

One of the most repeated arguments in the debate is historical. Abraham Lincoln held elections in 1864 with the Union on the verge of disintegration, and Winston Churchill did the same in the United Kingdom during World War II. The conclusion drawn is that even in the worst circumstances, democratic leaders have not renounced the ballot box. The response from the other side is that these precedents belong to the 19th century and to a different kind of war, without drones over residential buildings or permanent propaganda campaigns, and that comparing contexts separated by more than a century is an exercise in sleight of hand. The argument, they admit, is powerful symbolically but weak legally.

Erosion of the narrative and ally fatigue

Beyond the legal clash, the exchange reveals a deeper phenomenon: the exhaustion of the narrative. References appear to foreign aid, to think tanks sustaining the Atlanticist narrative in Spain—the Real Instituto Elcano and CIDOB—and to the desirability of cutting that funding. Also mentioned is the position of the United States, with the idea that the new administration has a plan to reinforce its imperial dominance and that Europeans will end up paying the bill. It is the thesis that support for Ukraine is not a sarracena issue but a matter of cost-sharing, and that this sharing is being revised.

At the harshest extreme, the discussion drifts toward the idea that Ukraine has been betrayed by its allies after resisting without air support and building its own arms industry. The anger of a potential defeat, it is argued, will not be directed against those who deserve it most. It is an opinion current that provides no data, but reflects a mood: that of those who believed in victory and now seek scapegoats.

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The debate on Zelensky's legitimacy has revolved around Article 83 for months. In the end, the interesting question is not what Ukrainian law says, but why so many people need it to say one thing or the opposite.