Hilo oficial de Japon: Economía y Sociedad antes y después de la Burbuja

muyuu

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La potencia exportadora que sigue siendo - de momento y aunque China se acerca - la 2ª economía mundial, lleva sufriendo 20 años el estallido de su particular burbuja inmobiliaria.
[inglés]
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article16957.html
The end game for Japan?
The first country to really feel the pinch could very well be Japan; in the bigger context, Greece is just the appetizer. Japan's debt-to-GDP ratio has grown from 65% in the early 1990s when their crisis began in earnest to over 200% now. Fortunately for Japan, the high savings rate has allowed shifting governments to finance the deficit internally with about 93% of all JGBs held domestically[3]. This is the key reason why Japan gets away with paying only 1.3% on their 10-year bonds when other large OECD countries must pay 3-4% to attract investors.

Now, predicting the demise of Japan has cost many a career over the years. Despite the ever rising debt, and contrary to many expert opinions, the yen has been rock solid and bond yields have remained comparatively low. I often hear the argument from the bulls that the Japanese situation is sustainable because they, unlike us, are a nation of savers. Wrong. They were a nation of savers.

Looking at chart 5, it is evident that the demographic tsunami has finally hit Japan. The savings rate is in a structural decline and the Ministry of Finance in Tokyo may soon be forced to go to international capital markets to fund their deficits. I very much doubt that non-Japanese investors will be as forgiving as the Japanese, and that could force bond yields in Japan in line with US and German yields. Herein lies the challenge. Japan already spends 35% of its pre-bond issuance revenues on servicing its debt. If the Japanese were forced to fund themselves at 3.5% instead of 1.3%, the game would soon be up.
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evolución de la deuda pre/post-burbuja


dos décadas perdidas en el Nikkei (que está al 25% de niveles de hace 20 años)

Resume 20 años de depresión deflacionaria.

comparativa de burbujas JP/USA:


deflación (ya posteado en http://www.burbuja.info/inmobiliari...ones-de-yenes-al-0-1-que-no-falte-dinero.html):
Japan Eases Monetary Policy to Fight Deflation - NYTimes.com


Paralelismos con España: http://www.burbuja.info/inmobiliari...na-15-anos-despues-la-historia-se-repite.html
 

Samuel_five

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Pero que a nadie se le ocurra comparar a España con Japón ... En Japón "se podían permitir" el error ... En España NO ...

Japón es una super-potencia exportadora ...

No todos los Estados tienen la misma capacidad de endeudamiento-burbujil ... Si Japón puede pedir mil euros y devolverlos ... La España actual no tiene capacidad para devolver ni dos euros ... y ha pedido mil :8::roto2:

Tenemos que cambiar mucho y empezar a ponernos las pilas ... Yo creo que podemos ... ¡YES, WE CAN!
 

muyuu

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No habia sido superada ya por la china?
El PIB ha repuntado y mantienen la 2ª plaza, pero dado el tamaño de China y el margen de subida es de esperar que en PIB nominal sean los segundos pronto.

Japón sigue como segunda economía del mundo por delante de China, el PIB creció un 4,6% anual - Cotizalia.com

Pero ojo, que un pinchazo rellenito en China a medio plazo no se puede descartar. La inmobiliaria en ciudades importantes ya se les ha ido completamente de las manos.
 

Samzer

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El PIB ha repuntado y mantienen la 2ª plaza, pero dado el tamaño de China y el margen de subida es de esperar que en PIB nominal sean los segundos pronto.

Japón sigue como segunda economía del mundo por delante de China, el PIB creció un 4,6% anual - Cotizalia.com

Pero ojo, que un pinchazo rellenito en China a medio plazo no se puede descartar. La inmobiliaria en ciudades importantes ya se les ha ido completamente de las manos.
Como te oiga Chiaofú, te vas a enterar. :D
 

Serpiente_Plyskeen

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Unos cuantos links al respecto de Japón del blog de Kathy Lien (experta en el mercado de divisas):

12-Marzo-2009: Este artículo es relevante porque con ese volumen de deuda, a Japón le puede hacer mucho daño un recorte de rating.
Which Countries Have the Most Debt? | Kathy Lien
Which Countries Have the Most Debt?
Date March 12, 2009

The Economist has a great image on which countries have the most debt as a percentage of GDP. Japan tops the list amowed by Italy and the United States. Japan actually has 2x more debt than the U.S. which I find particularly scary and leads me to wonder if Japan could face a ratings downgrade.

26-Enero-2010: Standard and Poor’s rebaja la perspectiva de la deuda pública japonesa a "negativa", que todavía conserva:
Japan?s Ratings Outlook Cut on Lack of Hatoyama Plan (Update3) - Bloomberg.com
Japan’s Ratings Outlook Cut on Lack of Hatoyama Plan (Update3)

By Keiko Ujikane

Jan. 26 (Bloomberg) -- Japan’s sovereign credit rating outlook was lowered by Standard and Poor’s on concern Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s administration lacks a plan to rein in the world’s largest debt load.

“The policies of the new Democratic Party of Japan government point to a slower pace of fiscal consolidation than we had previously expected,” S&P said in a statement today. Japan’s rating could be lowered from the current AA, the third highest, if economic data “remain weak” and measures to buttress growth “are not forthcoming,” the company said.

Today’s move highlights concern that the shrinking Japanese population and contracting gross domestic product will erode a savings pool that has kept benchmark 10-year note yields more than 2 percentage points less than U.S. Treasuries. Japan, which has $10 trillion of debt, is the latest to be served warning on fiscal deficits, amowing Greece and Spain in recent weeks.

“Should the change in outlook spur people to start seriously doubting Japan’s fiscal health, yields on long-term government bonds will climb,” said Hiroshi Morikawa, a senior strategist at MU Investments Co., which manages $13 billion in Tokyo. “That will not only limit the government’s fiscal- stimulus measures but will also boost borrowing costs, deterring companies from investment.”

Swaps Reaction

The yen pared gains immediately after the release, before resuming a rally against the dollar. It was up 0.9 percent at 89.52 as of 9:42 a.m. in London. Credit-default swaps showed an increase in Japanese bond risk. The cost of protecting the debt from default for five years gained 6 basis points to 90 basis points and traded at 88 basis points as of 4:53 p.m. in Tokyo, according to BNP Paribas SA prices.

S&P reduced the outlook to “negative” from “stable.” Any cut to the local-currency rating would be the first for Moody’s Investors Service or Fitch Ratings since 2002, data compiled by Bloomberg show. Moody’s and Fitch Ratings kept their grades unchanged today.

Finance Minister Naoto Kan told reporters in Tokyo that the government will pursue both fiscal discipline and economic growth. National Strategy Minister Yoshito Sengoku, who yesterday said the debt situation is "more than very severe," said today that the S&P step is a warning from the markets.

Bond yields rose yesterday after the government said the nation’s debt will probably swell to 973 trillion yen ($10.8 trillion) by the end of fiscal 2010, 8 percent more than the estimated 900 trillion yen for the year ending March 31.

Hatoyama Blow

The outlook cut is the latest blow to a prime minister whose ratings have fallen since the Democratic Party of Japan ousted the Liberal Democratic Party in September. Hatoyama had to replace his first Finance Minister, Hirohisa Fujii, due to illness, while Ichiro Ozawa, the No. 2 DPJ official, is being investigated for a land deal by his campaign finance organization that led to three arrests.

Hatoyama is planning to sell 44.3 trillion yen in bonds to fund his record budget proposal, an amount that could increase if the nation’s recovery slows or tax receipts slide. He won elections in August pledging to bolster households’ purchasing power.

S&P said it will monitor the government’s medium-term fiscal plan due to be released in the first half of 2010. Further steps may also be unveiled after elections in July for the upper house of Japan’s parliament, the company said. Should the commitments “moderate the government’s debt trajectory, the ratings could stabilize at the current levels,” it said.

AA Category

Because of Japan’s international assets, including about $1 trillion of foreign-exchange holdings, the yen’s status as a “reserve currency” and the economy’s “diversification,” S&P said it expects the rating to remain in the AA category even if the grade is lowered a step.

Greece saw its credit rating lowered to five steps above noninvestment grade by Moody’s last month and also cut at S&P and Fitch. The nation’s government has since proposed cutting its budget deficit by almost 10 percent of GDP in three years. Spain’s credit outlook was lowered by S&P in December.

While the yield premiums on Greek debt over German securities reached the widest since the 2001 debut of the euro after the ratings moves, the impact on Japan may be less immediate. Investors outside Japan own about 6 percent of the nation’s government bonds, and domestic buyers have sought the notes as a haven amid the nation’s shrinking economy.

Domestic Investors

“If the U.S. were to have such cut, people will stop buying government bonds,” said Toshio Sumitani, chief strategist at Tokai Tokyo Securities Co. “But in Japan, 90 percent of bond holders are Japanese. So there is very little reason for the government to worry about foreign investors when issuing new debt.”

Moody’s rates Japan’s debt at Aa2, also the third-highest investment grade, with a stable outlook. Fitch’s outlook is one step lower, at AA-. An S&P cut to AA- would put Japan on par with Taiwan and Kuwait, Bloomberg data show.

“The public finances remain supported by relatively moderate debt-service burdens,” Andrew Colquhoun, a member of the sovereign ratings group for Asia and the Pacific at Fitch in Hong Kong, said today. “If we look at government interest payments as a percentage of tax revenue, Japan’s burden is below that of Italy and Canada, and not too far off of the U.S.’s.”

Thomas Byrne, senior vice president of Moody’s in Singapore, said that “even though Japan is issuing a record amount of JGBs, we think the market will finance this without putting big upward pressure on yields.”

Changing Guard

Byrne earlier this month said that the replacement of Japan’s finance minister four months into the government’s term increased concern about the commitment to contain the debt. Japan’s government needs a “well-articulated” target to reduce public borrowing, he said in December.

In the run-up to the Dec. 25 budget unveiling, Fujii had insisted on keeping new bond sales for the next fiscal year at the same level as the previous government budgeted for the year ending in March. Kan, by contrast, has repeatedly signaled his priority is economic growth.

Kan said today that fiscal discipline is important and that markets will be able to absorb new bond issues. He reiterated his call for the Bank of Japan to end deflation, which has restrained a recovery from the nation’s worst postwar recession.

The central bank today left its benchmark interest rate at 0.1 percent and Governor Masaaki Shirakawa pledged to maintain an extremely accommodative policy.

Japan’s GDP shrank to the lowest level since 1991 in the third quarter, unadjusted for price changes, and it’s poised to lose its title this year as world’s second-largest economy to China. Its population has been falling since 2006.

To contact the reporter on this story: Keiko Ujikane in Tokyo at kujikane@bloomberg.net
23-Marzo-2010: Un banco público Japonés, el Japan Post Bank, aumenta los límites en los depósitos de 10 a 20 millones de yenes - podéis leer en el post más acerca del tamaño, pero creo que lo relevante es que el 75% de los depósitos están invertidos en deuda pública Japonesa:
What Japan Post?s New Deposit Limit Means for JPY | Kathy Lien
What Japan Post’s New Deposit Limit Means for JPY
Date March 23, 2010

This morning, Japan Post Bank announced plans to double their deposit limit from 10 million to 20 million yen. Japan Post Bank is the country’s largest postal service operator and also its largest financial institution. With financial assets of 300 trillion yen or the equivalent of US$3 trillion, their holdings exceed the entire GDP of France. They are also 1.5 times larger than Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, the country’s largest private bank. Therefore as you can imagine, even though the Japanese Yen barely reacted to the announcement, decisions by Japan Post can and will have a long term impact on the financial markets.

Japan Post Could Invest New Deposits in Treasuries

Approximately 75 percent of the funds held by Japan Post are invested in Japanese government bonds. Since their privatization launch in October 2007, they have been looking to diversify the assets collected from postal savings deposits. In the fourth quarter for example, they bought Y300 billion or US$3 billion worth of U.S. Treasuries. Their holdings of foreign securities increased by Y2 trillion over the past year which is large in absolute terms but small compared to Japan Post’s overall holdings. However if Japanese citizens take advantage of the higher deposit limits, Japan Post could find themselves flush with cash and they will in turn be looking for a place to invest. This could create fresh demand for U.S. Treasuries and foreign bonds denominated in euros, yen or any other higher yielding currencies.

Japanese Bankers Call the Decision Unfair

Although Japan Post lifted its official guarantee for deposits, many depositors believe there is still an implicit guarantee since the bank is state owned. As a result, Japanese Bankers have called the expansion unfair because it creates a competitive advantage. The bank’s primary motivation for increasing the deposit is to raise enough funds to operate uniform financial services nationwide but with Y40 trillion yen or US$400 billion in Japan Posts deposits expected to mature this year, the bank may also antiestéticar that the country’s aging population will shift their money out of Japan in search for yields. There has already been a sharp increase in demand for foreign currency denominated mutual funds – the holdings of these funds in Japan increased 31 percent in January and 25 percent in February from the prior year. If Japan Post is successful at keeping some of this money at home, there could be less downside pressure on the Yen when the deposits mature.

The Japanese government will also decide on Wednesday whether or not to privatize the bank. In all likelihood, privatization plans will remain on hold. The government will most likely sell a portion of their holdings, which allows them to retain the power to veto any major changes in the bank.
 

javi1984

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uah., que chungo.


pero en España será peor.
 

NosTrasladamus

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Es un poco "light" (en plan divulgativo y tal) y viejuno, pero lo cuenta uno que vive allí...

Kirai – Un geek en Japón by Héctor García — La economía japonesa – Parte 1
La economía japonesa – Parte 1
Por Kirai el 07 de June de 2007 en Sociedad

Dicen que la economía japonesa es una de las más difíciles de entender, la verdad es que es bastante misteriosa y muchas veces se comporta justo al revés de lo que cabría esperar. Voy a intentar contaros lo que he aprendido de oídas, leyendo periódicos y revistas japonesas y viendo el día a día en Tokyo. No soy ningún experto en estas cosas, así que si me equivoco no dudéis en corregirme.

Al acabar la guerra Japón estaba en la ruina, en la capital Tokyo apenas quedaron un 10% de los edificios en pie, y más de lo mismo en otras ciudades como Hiroshima o Nagasaki. ¡Pero al cabo de apenas 20 años Japón se convirtió en la segunda economía mundial! y todavía lo sigue siendo hoy en día. Japón sigue produciendo aproximadamente un 70 % del PIB de todo el continente asiático, seis veces lo que produce China. El PIB es el doble que el de Alemania y solo es superado por el de Estados Unidos que es un 33% superior.

El gobierno estadounidense ayudó mucho a Japón durante los 60 y 70 con inyecciones económicas y acuerdos comerciales, el gobierno de Japón adoptó políticas proteccionistas e incentivó la industria privada para salir de la crisis. Durante esos primeros años después de la guerra surgieron muchas metodologías, conceptos y formas de trabajar en el mundo empresarial que han pervivido hasta nuestros días. Por ejemplo, el concepto de Keiretsu está considerado como una de las claves del milagro de la economía japonesa de post-guerra. Keiretsus son grupos de empresas que trabajan muy unidas, intentando no hacerse la competencia entre ellas/fastidiarse entre ellas sino todo lo contrario. Las empresas del mismo Keiretsu siempre se ayudan para salir adelante, además muchas de las compañías del grupo suelen compartir parte de su capital social.

Para formar un Keiretsu lo normal es tener a un banco que ayuda a las otras empresas del Keiretsu a invertir, crear nuevas líneas de negocio etc. otro de los papeles del banco en un Keiretsu es la de proteger a las empresas del grupo ante una posible OPA hostil. Después de la guerra se formaron seis Keiretsu principales: Sumitomo, Fuyo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Dai-Ichi Kangyo y Sanwa. Por ejemplo, dos de las empresas del grupo Mitsui son Toshiba y Toyota (¿A que no sabíais que estas dos empresas son “amigas” desde hace mucho?), en el mismo grupo también tienen un el banco Mitsui-Sumitomo. Después de muchas décadas de colaboración Toyota se ha convertido en la empresa automovilísistica número uno mundial. Toyota es tan tan líder que en el 2006 ganó cinco veces más dinero que la suma de los beneficios de sus 8 competidores más directos. Una de las claves de Toyota, aparte de estar protegida por un Keiretsu es que aplica todos los niveles un estricto sistema mejora continua Kaizen.

Posteriormente muchas empresas extranjeras han “copiado” en cierta forma el modelo Keiretsu, por ejemplo las alianzas entre aerolíneas, General Electric o conglomerados formados alrededor de grandes bancos. Es más o menos el mismo concepto, aunque en el caso japonés la colaboración es mucho más cercana y los entresijos financieros son totalmente diferentes.

Por encima de las seis grandes Keirstsu (Cada una de ellas controlada por un gran banco) se situó el MITI (Ministerio de Comercio Internacional e Industria). El MITI japonés está considerado como el ministerio con mayor influencia directa sobre la economía de un país del mundo. Desde el MITI pueden dar ordenes directas a ciertos Keiritsus para que dupliquen la producción de acero durante los siguientes meses (Fuente Wikipedia) o que ayuden todos a tal o cual sector a salir de una crisis.

La imagen mental que deberíais tener en estos momentos es la del gobierno japonés, con el MITI en cabeza recibiendo ayudas de los Estados Unidos y controlando toda la industria japonesa a través de seis grandes Keiretsus donde se acumulan las mayores empresas y bancos del país. Digamos que se unieron todos para sacar al país de la miseria, donde el gobierno protegía al país controlando los precios de importación(Tenían el poder para hacerlo) y ayudando a la exportación.

En los años 60, llegó bastante inyección de dinero gracias a la guerra de Corea y desde el 65 hasta el 70 se produjo un boom económico conocido en Japón como Izanagi. ¡Durante el boom Izanagi el PIB creció a un ritmo del 11%-13% anual!. Al final del boom Izanagi(1970) el PIB Japonés era un 70.4% mayor que al comienzo(1965) (Dato de Dai-ichi Life Research Institute Inc). La clave durante los 60 y los 70 fue producir a punta pala y exportar, exportar, exportar. En los años 70 la economía siguió creciendo pero a un ritmo algo más lento (4%-6%) en gran parte por culpa de la crisis del petróleo, aun así Japón superaba a los Estados Unidos cuyo crecimiento se situaba entorno al 3%-4% durante aquellos años.

A finales de los 80 se produjo el segundo gran boom económico japonés, llamado “boom Heisei“. Una de las claves de este boom fue la producción y exportación de aparatos electrónicos y coches. En 1990 la economía japonesa estaba embalada, tenían la mayor renta per cápita del mundo, en Tokyo se respiraba riqueza (Los “viejos” del lugar cuentan como no había ni un solo mendigo en Tokyo), las clases bajas casi desaparecieron, los pisos de 80 metros cuadrados en Tokyo pasaron a costar el equivalente a varios millones de euros de los de ahora, los japoneses tenian pasta y se dedicaban a ir de fiesta en fiesta y a viajar por todo el mundo con flamantes cámaras de fotos producidas por su propio país, Tokyo se convirtió en la ciudad con mayor PIB del mundo por delante de Paris y Nueva York(Y lo sigue siendo hoy en día)… estaban que se salían y habían conseguido crear una sociedad ideal cuyo modelo/centro económico-socio-cultural era Tokyo.

Pero todo se comenzó a ir al traste a principios de los noventa cuando la bolsa comenzó a bajar, en el 1992 el PIB comenzó a bajar también, los sueldos también comenzaron a bajar, las inversiones extranjeras comenzaron a desconfiar y Japón entró en crisis. Incluso comenzó un fenómeno poco conocido en sociedades avanzadas, la deflación. A finales de los 80 una cerveza costaba 500 yenes en el centro de Tokyo, hoy en día sigue costando unos 500 yenes (gracias a que tenemos un poquito de inflacción los últimos años). El precio de las casas también comenzó a bajar, y estuvo 16 años consecutivos bajando en el área de Tokyo. ¡El año pasado los precios inmobiliarios subieron por primera vez (Un 0.algo%) después de 16 años de bajadas!
Kirai – Un geek en Japón by Héctor García — Economía japonesa – Parte 2

Economía japonesa – Parte 2
Por Kirai el 11 de June de 2007 en Sociedad

En la primera parte del artículo sobre la economía japonesa hicimos un repaso a la economía de este país desde el final de la guerra hasta los años noventa. Vimos que los últimos 50 años de Japón han estado marcados por dos booms económicos: el Izanagi a finales de los 60 y el Heisei a finales de los 80, y una gran crisis en los años 90. En este artículo vamos a analizar un poco más la crisis de los 90 y la actual recuperación económica que es lenta pero “segura”. Actualmente Japón lleva desde el 2002 en expansión, estamos en el periodo expansivo más largo desde la segunda guerra mundial. ¡Buenas noticias! el problema es que el ritmo de crecimiento es muy lento y la gente sigue siendo pesimista después de una década de crisis, el consumo interno está por los suelos.

Durante el periodo Izanagi las exportaciones fueron la base para hacer crecer la economía. En cambio el boom Heisei se basó principalmente en un espectacular incremento del consumo interno porque los japoneses tenían muy buenos salarios, mucho dinero extra y desdeaban vivir mejor. Este incremento del consumo interno hizo que Japón tuviera que importar mucho, procesar y crear nuevas tecnologías y luego venderlas a los japoneses para que vivieran mejor. Todo fue bien mientras duró el boom, los sueldos seguían creciendo etc. Un compañero me cuenta como a finales de los ochenta te subian el sueldo cada año, la empresa te pagaba el alquiler de la casa, contrataban gente nueva cada pocos meses (Durante los años 90 tuvieron problemas para ir echando gente a la calle), también me cuenta la anécdota de que en su empresa cada mañana tenían fruta fresca por las mañanas para desayunar.

El problema vino a principios de los noventa cuando ciertos movimientos en la bolsa comenzaron a quebrar la confianza de las grandes corporaciones (Que estaban bastante endeudadas en esos momentos), los sueldos dejaron de subir y como consecuencia el consumo interno comenzó a bajar. El resultado fue que la balanza se desequilibró totalmente, en 1992 Japón tenía un exceso de oferta, este exceso ha logrado ser superado por la demanda nuevamente en el 2005 (¡Más de 10 años para conseguir equilibar la balanza!). Otra de las razones más importantes es que Japón siguió funcionado durante los años 90 a base de políticas proteccionistas que no dejaban la entrada de capital extranjero librementente, estrategia que les había funcionando muy bien durante la época de la guerra fría pero que con las nuevas reglas que comenzaban a gobernar el mundo global los métodos tradicionales japoneses tuvieron un efecto muy negativo en su economía. En el año 2000 cambiaron ciertas leyes y se abrieron por fin las puertas a empresas de fuera, comenzó a entrar capital de bancos de inversión estadounidenses (y otros países) y en el 2001 Japón comenzó a levantar cabeza. Durante los años de crisis los sueldos siguieron bajando, los tipos de interés bajaron hasta llegar a niveles de 0.algo% (El otro día pregunté por curiosidad en mi banco, qué interés se le estaba aplicando al dinero de mi cuenta, la contestación fue: 0.0125%. Desde luego no me voy a forrar guardando mi dinero en un banco japonés :) ), los precios bajaban y bajaban…

Las bajadas de tipos y las nuevas medidas que ayudaron a que el mercado japonés se abriera más al nuevo mundo global parece que surtieron efecto. En el 2001 el PIB subió un 0.1% y el porcentaje se fue incrementando hasta el 2007 con un 2.7%. Actualmente el PIB crece a un ritmo anual entre el 2% y el 3%, el desempleo se sitúa entorno al 4%, los beneficios de las empresas suben, desde hace poco se han implantado nuevas leyes que ayudan a la creación de nuevas empresas (¡Ahora mismo, se puede crear una sociedad en Japón con tan solo 1 yen de inversión inicial!), la deflación parece que está desapareciendo aunque el gobierno aun no lo hace oficial (Mi sensación es que los precios están congelados desde hace un par de años), la debilidad del yen está ayudando a las exportaciones (esto no es del todo bueno) etc. ¡Parece que Japón va bien!

Pero no, siguen habiendo nubes sospechas que minan la confianza de los japoneses. Los sueldos siguen bajando, desde el 97 han bajando más de un 10% como media. El salario medio japonés se situá ahora mismo en unos 2.700$ al mes, en Tokyo el salario medio es algo más alto y ahora mismo está en unos 4.200$ (Algo más de 3.000 euros) al mes de media. Salarios relativamente bajos comparados con los de hace unos años, con lo que la gente sigue reacia a consumir, el “nivel de ansiedad pública” (Un índice utilizado por el Asahi Shinbun) sigue subiendo y el “indice de confianza del consumidor” se desploma. ¡A las empresas les va bien pero la a gente no! Una de las consecuencias es que el reparto de la riqueza se está empezando a desequilibrar por primera vez desde hace décadas, la gente no confia en el gobierno, no confía en el sistema de pensiones, la población está envejeciendo a gran velocidad y el gobierno no tiene un plan concreto para solucionario. ¡Además, Japón ahora mismo está más endeudada que nunca!

Para terminar os voy a dar algunos datos económicos de Tokyo, una ciudad en la que llevo viviendo dos años y medio y que no deja de impresionarme cada día. En Tokyo hay más tecnológicas que en Silicon Valley, el PIB del área de Tokyo es mayor que el de toda España y es la ciudad con mayor número de empresas en el Fortune 500 de todo el mundo. En Tokyo hay 52 empresas en el Fortune 500 por delante Paris con 27 y New York con 24.

Como podéis ver, la economía japonesa está creciendo pero hay ciertos puntos personas de color que todavía no se han logrado resolver.

Datos obtenidos de la web de la CIA y la revista Fortune.
 

SolNaciente

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En Japón les van a sobrar problemas. No sé ni por donde empezar.
Leyendo varios artículos y discutiendo con algún joven y no tan joven japonés, los problemas de los que me acuerdo ahora son:
- Jóvenes con ideas de consumo bastante cambiadas. Ha sido un gran schock para muchos empresarios japoneses el darse cuenta que el joven japones (de 18 a 32 tacos, digamos) no tienen interés en comprarse un coche. Japón depende muchísimo del consumo interno. Siempre se ha visto como pais exportador, pero depende menos de sus exportaciones que por ejemplo, Alemania.
- Interes nulo en política, muy poca gente va a votar. Los políticos en Japón están muy muy separados de la realidad y los japoneses muy ocupados con sus curros.
- Muchos viejos y pocos niños. Vale, nada nuevo. Teniendo en cuenta que cada vez hay mas familias "pobres" en Japón, es muy triste ver los pocos esfuerzos que hacen para ayudar a las familias numerosas. Ahora se han embarrado en una discusión sobre hasta que punto dar también ayudas a extranjeros con hijos que viven en Japón. Con "ayudas" me refiero exclusivamente a la "children allowance". Independientemente de lo que ganes, te dan ...cuanto era? 13.000 yenes por crio? Lo busco y lo pongo.
- Pocos quieren estudiar ingenierías o cosas por el estilo. Difícil y poco recompensado. Para rizar el rizo, muchas empresas han llevado al absurdo la "gerontocracia"...como se llama lo de ir avanzando según pasas años en la empresa? Tengo el cerebro licuado. Bueno, es igual. Resulta que eres un ingeniero de querida madre, te gusta tu trabajo y lo haces bien. Cumples 45 e inmediatamente te promueven y pasas a un puesto directivo, quieras o no quieras. Cada vez encuentran menos que ocupen los puestos que quedan vacantes.
- Muchos jóvenes tienen poco interés a entrar a trabajar como "fijos" en una empresa. Prefieren una ETT, que les paguen por horas y que se puedan cambiar facilmente si no les mola el curro.
- En la medicina... montones de problemas. Bueno, ya ire posteando más.
 

NosTrasladamus

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Añado que veo muchas similitudes entre los problemas de Japón y los de hispanistan (burbuja inmobiliaria, desequilibro de la balanza de pagos, empresas con deudas, creciente desigualdad en el reparto de la riqueza, población envejecida, clase política corrupta), pero aqui no tenemos ninguna de las fortalezas del país nipón... empresarios responsables, personas sacrificadas y educadas, sector industrial innovador y potentísimo, respeto a la ciencia y a la sabiduría...
 

Serpiente_Plyskeen

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En Japón les van a sobrar problemas. No sé ni por donde empezar.
Leyendo varios artículos y discutiendo con algún joven y no tan joven japonés, los problemas de los que me acuerdo ahora son:
- Jóvenes con ideas de consumo bastante cambiadas. Ha sido un gran schock para muchos empresarios japoneses el darse cuenta que el joven japones (de 18 a 32 tacos, digamos) no tienen interés en comprarse un coche. Japón depende muchísimo del consumo interno. Siempre se ha visto como pais exportador, pero depende menos de sus exportaciones que por ejemplo, Alemania.
- Interes nulo en política, muy poca gente va a votar. Los políticos en Japón están muy muy separados de la realidad y los japoneses muy ocupados con sus curros.
- Muchos viejos y pocos niños. Vale, nada nuevo. Teniendo en cuenta que cada vez hay mas familias "pobres" en Japón, es muy triste ver los pocos esfuerzos que hacen para ayudar a las familias numerosas. Ahora se han embarrado en una discusión sobre hasta que punto dar también ayudas a extranjeros con hijos que viven en Japón. Con "ayudas" me refiero exclusivamente a la "children allowance". Independientemente de lo que ganes, te dan ...cuanto era? 13.000 yenes por crio? Lo busco y lo pongo.
- Pocos quieren estudiar ingenierías o cosas por el estilo. Difícil y poco recompensado. Para rizar el rizo, muchas empresas han llevado al absurdo la "gerontocracia"...como se llama lo de ir avanzando según pasas años en la empresa? Tengo el cerebro licuado. Bueno, es igual. Resulta que eres un ingeniero de querida madre, te gusta tu trabajo y lo haces bien. Cumples 45 e inmediatamente te promueven y pasas a un puesto directivo, quieras o no quieras. Cada vez encuentran menos que ocupen los puestos que quedan vacantes.
- Muchos jóvenes tienen poco interés a entrar a trabajar como "fijos" en una empresa. Prefieren una ETT, que les paguen por horas y que se puedan cambiar facilmente si no les mola el curro.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arubaito
- En la medicina... montones de problemas. Bueno, ya ire posteando más.
Y ya no mencionemos el Amakudari:
Amakudari - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Que también practicamos en España (Por ejemplo, Serra en Caixa Cataluña o incluso Rato en Caja Madrid)....
 
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vagabundo

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Pero que a nadie se le ocurra comparar a España con Japón ... En Japón "se podían permitir" el error ... En España NO ...

Japón es una super-potencia exportadora ...

No todos los Estados tienen la misma capacidad de endeudamiento-burbujil ... Si Japón puede pedir mil euros y devolverlos ... La España actual no tiene capacidad para devolver ni dos euros ... y ha pedido mil :8::roto2:

Tenemos que cambiar mucho y empezar a ponernos las pilas ... Yo creo que podemos ... ¡YES, WE CAN!
yo creo que se le compara en el sentido de decir: si eso ha pasado en Japón con la burbuja aquí nos vamos a la hez directamente por los siglos.

Lo cachondo es que estamos en el comienzo de una larga crisis inmobiliaria todavía con precios de burbujón del año 2005, y hay gente comprándose el piso o pensando en hacerlo.
 
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Stopford

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At my home.
Veo que somos varios los que "conocemos" japolandia...

Sol Naciente creo que ya ha destacado los puntos más importantes. Yo insistiría en destacar sobre todo la falta de ganas de los jovenes japoneses en ser otra generacion sin vida más allá del trabajo (como sus padres) y el aumento del "fracaso escolar" (diferente al modelo occidental) que supone que cada vez más jovenes se niegan a seguir el modelo de estudiar hasta no tener juventud para los examenes de acceso a las top universidades. Para estos jovenes "apaticos" el sistema sigue sin dar respuesta pero el número va en aumento...

Por lo demás, un pais donde no se quitan la crisis de encima pero en rebajas hay colas para entrar en el Prada de Omotesando pues da idea de que la crisis es diferente a la española.
 
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Serpiente_Plyskeen

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Leyendo varios artículos y discutiendo con algún joven y no tan joven japonés, los problemas de los que me acuerdo ahora son:
- Jóvenes con ideas de consumo bastante cambiadas. Ha sido un gran schock para muchos empresarios japoneses el darse cuenta que el joven japones (de 18 a 32 tacos, digamos) no tienen interés en comprarse un coche. Japón depende muchísimo del consumo interno. Siempre se ha visto como pais exportador, pero depende menos de sus exportaciones que por ejemplo, Alemania.
Y de educación tambien, por lo visto - mira lo que me acabo de encontrar:
washingtonpost.com

Once drawn to U.S. universities, more Japanese students staying home

By Blaine Harden
Sunday, April 11, 2010

TOKYO -- Takuya Otani would love an MBA from a top U.S. business school, but he won't apply. When he graduates from college in Tokyo next year, he'll pass on an American degree and attend graduate school in Japan.

"I am a grass-eater," Otani said wistfully, using an in-vogue expression for a person who avoids stress, controls risk and grazes contentedly in home pastures.

Once a voracious consumer of American higher education, Japan is becoming a nation of grass-eaters. Undergraduate enrollment in U.S. universities has fallen 52 percent since 2000; graduate enrollment has dropped 27 percent.

It is a steep, sustained and potentially harmful decline for an export-dependent nation that is losing global market share to its highly competitive Asian neighbors, whose students are stampeding into American schools.

Total enrollment from China is up 164 percent in the past decade; from India, it has jumped 190 percent. South Korea has about 76 million fewer people than Japan, but it now sends 2 1/2 times as many students to U.S. colleges.

Just one Japanese undergraduate entered Harvard's freshman class last fall. The total number of Japanese at Harvard has been falling for 15 years, while enrollment from China, South Korea and India has more than doubled.

Harvard President Drew Gilpin Faust said that when she visited Japan last month, she met with students and educators who told her that Japanese young people are inward-looking, preferring the comfort of home to venturing overseas. They also told her they view the economic advantage of attending a U.S. college as questionable.

"An international degree is not as valued," Faust said she learned from her encounters here.

Looking for 'harmony'

The skepticism extends beyond students. At big Japanese companies, many bosses don't like what they see as the sometimes uppity and overly independent ways of American-educated young Japanese, said Tomoyuki Amano, chief executive of Tomorrow Inc., which publishes a magazine about foreign education.

Amano said many employers prefer the "harmony" that comes from hiring the locally educated, who they believe work longer hours, complain less and request fewer vacations.

Amano, 28, said he speaks from bitter personal experience.

After graduating six years ago with a degree in management from California State University, Chico, he returned to Tokyo and took a job with Hitachi, Japan's largest electronics manufacturer.

"I really felt that I could not question anyone who was older than me," Amano said. "I also learned that it was going to be hard to get a promotion or take a vacation. Promotions tend to go to those who attend the same Japanese schools as the bosses."

Bottom-line considerations are steering many young Japanese away from U.S. colleges, said Tadashi Yokoyama, chairman of the board of Agos Japan, a Tokyo company that prepares students to take language exams and other tests needed for admission to foreign schools.

"This is not a time in Japan for intellectual curiosity," said Yokoyama, who graduated from UCLA in the early 1980s. "You have to think about investment and return."

In the 1970s and '80s, when Japan's economy was booming, the bottom line did not matter for many young Japanese. It was fashionable, stimulating and affordable for them to travel the world, study English in foreign settings and attend college in the United States. Their parents had money, and jobs were plentiful when they came home.

The collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s changed those calculations. And the construction inside Japan of more than 200 new universities has made it easy to find an affordable education without enduring jet lag and having to learn English.

At the same time, Japan's low birthrate is constricting college enrollment, both inside and outside the country. The number of children under the age of 15 has fallen for 28 consecutive years. The size of the nation's high school graduating class has shrunk by 35 percent in the past two decades.

"When you combine a big decrease in the student population with a big increase in the number of Japanese universities and couple that with rising tuitions in U.S. colleges, you can understand why priorities have changed," said Tokoyama.

A mixed experience

An exception to the trend: Some in corporate Japan still send promising young employees to graduate school in the United States. Eighty major companies pay Agos Japan to prep their workers for graduate schools in the United States and other countries.

When these employees return to Japan with MBAs and other advanced degrees, however, they often find that their companies don't know how to make use of their skills -- and that they are penalized for having stepped off the corporate ladder.

NTT Data, a major information technology company, sent Masaki Honda to UCLA for an MBA. But "during the two years I was gone, I was regarded as a net cost to the company," said Honda, who is now president of Agos Japan. "I lost seniority compared to my peers and my performance while I was in business school was evaluated as 'C' for mediocre."

For all the risks and frustrations of higher education in the United States, some young people remain willing to go.

Nobuko Tabata, 29, is heading off next fall to Philadelphia for the two-year MBA program at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School.

"I want to know the world's highest-level people," she said. "I want to be a higher-level manager. It would be easy for me to stay in Japan, but I need more."

Tabata, a certified public accountant who works for her family's transport company, has spent $25,000 and devoted the past two years to studying English, taking tests and polishing application essays. She is married to a CPA who works for Sony, who will probably remain in Japan.

She said she is eager to be challenged and to learn the latest skills in corporate management -- and ready to sleep just three or four hours a night. "I think I am a meat-eater." she said.



Special correspondent Akiko Yamamoto contributed to this report.
 
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Serpiente_Plyskeen

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Como comentan en el artículo con el que muyuu empieza este hilo, hay una gran cantidad de expertos que llevan ya años anunciando que Japón se va a ir al garete, y eso sigue sin suceder. Sin embargo, los argumentos al respectos son bastante convincentes...

Voy a poner una lista de artículos de Ambrosio (como siempre, hay que tener en cuenta de que pie cojea) que explican bastante bien el por qué:

Antes de nada, añadir el gráfico de la tasa de ahorro en Japón, que aparece en el artículo con el que muyuu abrió el hilo (gracias de nuevo), y que comentan en el primer link que voy a poner:

Como podéis ver, faltan los datos de 2009, pero la evolución es claramente negativa - como muy bien comentan en Market Oracle, Japón no es un país de ahorradores, sino que lo fue...

01-11-09:
It is Japan we should be worrying about, not America - Telegraph
It is Japan we should be worrying about, not America

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Published: 5:33PM GMT 01 Nov 2009

Japan is drifting helplessly towards a dramatic fiscal crisis. For 20 years the world's second-largest economy has been able to borrow cheaply from a captive bond market, feeding its addiction to Keynesian deficit spending – and allowing it to push public debt beyond the point of no return.

The rocketing cost of insuring against the bankruptcy of the Japanese state is telling us that the model has smashed into the buffers. Credit default swaps (CDS) on five-year Japanese debt have risen from 35 to 63 basis points since early September. Japan has suddenly decoupled from Germany (21), France (22), the US (22), and even Britain (47).

Regime-change in Tokyo and the arrival of Yukio Hatoyama's neophyte Democrats – raising $550bn (£333bn) to help fund their blitz on welfare and the "new social policy" – have concentrated the minds of investors at long last. "Markets are worried that Japan is going to hit a brick wall: the sums are gargantuan," said Albert Edwards, a Japan-veteran at Société Générale.

Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), told the US Congress last week that the debt path was out of control and raised "a real risk that Japan could end up in a major default".

The IMF expects Japan's gross public debt to reach 218pc of gross domestic product (GDP) this year, 227pc next year, and 246pc by 2014. This has been manageable so far only because Japanese savers have been willing – or coerced – into lending for almost nothing. The yield on 10-year government bonds has been around 1.30pc this year, though they jumped to 1.42pc last week.

"Can these benign conditions be expected to continue in the face of even-larger increases in public debt? Going forward, the markets capacity to absorb debt is likely to diminish as population ageing reduces saving," said the IMF.

The savings rate has crashed from 15pc in 1990 to near 2pc today, half America's rate. Japan's $1.5 trillion state pension fund (the world's biggest) has become a net seller of government bonds this year, as it must to meet pay-out obligations. The demographic crunch has hit. The workforce been contracting since 2005.

Japan Post Bank is balking at further additions to its $1.7 trillion holdings of state debt. The pillars of the government debt market are crumbling. Little wonder that the Ministry of Finance has begun advertising bonds in Tokyo taxis, antiestéticaturing Koyuki from The Last Samurai. If Japan's bond rates rise to global levels of 3pc to 4pc, interest costs will shatter state finances.

No one knows exactly when a country tips into a debt compound trap. But Japan must be close, even allowing for the fact that liabilities of the state Loan Programme (FILP) have fallen by 40pc of GDP since 2000.

"The debt situation is irrecoverable," said Carl Weinberg from High Frequency Economics. "I don't see any orderly way out of this. They will not be able to fund their deficit. There will be a fiscal shutdown, a pension haircut, and bank failures that will rock the world. It is criminally negligent that rating agencies are not blowing the whistle on this."

Mr Hatoyama inherited a country that was already hurtling into sovereign "Chapter 11". The Great Recession has eaten up 27pc in tax revenues. Industrial output is down 19pc, even after the summer rebound; exports are down 31pc; the economy is 10pc smaller today in "nominal" terms than a year ago – and nominal is what matters for debt.

Tokyo's price index fell 2.4pc in October, the deepest deflation in modern Japanese history. Real interest rates have risen 300 basis points in a year. It reads like a page from Irving Fisher's 1933 paper, Debt Deflation Causes of Great Depressions.

The Bank of Japan seems oddly insouciant. It will end its (feeble) quantitative easing in December by suspending purchases of corporate debt, much to the fury of the Finance Ministry.

"This is incredibly dangerous," said Russell Jones from the RBC Capital Markets. "The rate of deflation is shocking. The debt dynamics are horrible and there is the risk of a downward spiral."

Tokyo has let the yen appreciate violently – 90 to the dollar, 13 to the Chinese yuan – giving another twist to the deflation knife. Top exporters are below break-even cost, says RBS. The government could stop this, as it did in a wave of manic dollar purchases from 2003-2004. It could print money à l'outrance to stave off deflation. Yet it sits frozen, like a rabbit in the headlamps.

Japan's terrible errors are by now well known. It failed to jettison its mercantilist export model in time. It resisted the feminist revolution, leading to a baby strike by young women. It acquiesced in a mad investment bubble (like China now) in the 1980s, stealing growth from the future.

It wasted its immense fiscal firepower, scattering money for 20 years on half-baked spending projects to keep the economy afloat. QE was too little, too late, and this is the lesson for the West. We must cut borrowing drastically over the next decade, and offset this with ultra-easy monetary policy. Does Downing Street understand this? Does the White House? Does the European Central Bank? Clearly not.
08-12-2009:
Bond jitters as Japan launches yet another stimulus plan - Telegraph
Bond jitters as Japan launches yet another stimulus plan

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Published: 9:39PM GMT 08 Dec 2009

Japan has launched its fourth fiscal rescue package since the economic crisis began last year, spraying a further $81bn (£50bn) into the regions and on subsidies for "eco-cars" and refrigerators.

The spending blitz will lift debt issuance to a record $835bn this year and comes despite warnings by finance minister Hirohisa Fujii that Japan risks exhausting the patience of bond vigilantes.

"Japan's fiscal situation is serious. If we over-issue government bonds, there will be a loss of confidence," he said. There were already signs of investor fatigue at an auction for bonds yesterday, with yields rising as high as 2.23pc.

Mr Fujii said Tokyo must raise a further $112bn through an extra budget to pay for the stimulus measures.

Junko Nikiosha from RBS said markets are looking beyond the spending plan, fretting whether the Democrat-led coalition will be able to meet deficit targets in 2010 fiscal year.

"If the government fails to keep these promises, it will bring worries about government bond supply back to the market, calling for a fiscal risk premium," he said.

The package comes days after the Bank of Japan reversed plans for withdrawal of monetary stimulus, agreeing to extend emergency lending to firms by $115bn. Japan's economy bounced back over summer as companies rebuilt stocks but there are signs of fading momentum. Julian Jessop from Capital Economics said that growth may have stalled in the fourth quarter, citing a fall in Japan's Economy Watchers Survey to 33.9 in November.

The strong yen – though weaker over recent days – has left export giants such as Sony struggling to break even on foreign shipments.

While Japan can still raise debt cheaply in nominal terms, the cost is rising in real terms as deflation tightens its grip. Core inflation was minus 2.2pc in October.

The country must service a rapidly growing debt with a shrinking workforce and an economy that has contracted 10pc in yen terms since early last year.

While the state pension fund has been a captive buyer of government bonds in the past – holding 20pc of the total stock – it became a net seller this year to meet payout obligations.

The International Monetary Fund has warned Japan that it risks a sudden jump in debt funding costs. Gross public debt is expected to reach 227pc of GDP next year. Tax revenues collapsed 24pc in the first half. Corporate tax payments have since turned negative as firms claim rebates on losses.

Economists are watching events in Japan with macabre interest. The country has blazed the path of extreme Keynesian fiscal stimulus over the last two decades – with poor results – making it a laboratory case for how much debt a mature economy can take on before it suffocates.
04-01-10: Leer este artículo da miedo - lo está clavando bastante...
Global bear rally of 2009 will end as Japan's hyperinflation rips economy to pieces - Telegraph
Global bear rally will deflate as Japan leads world in sovereign bond crisis

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor
Published: 6:15AM GMT 04 Jan 2010

Milton Keynes will be vindicated. Lord Keynes will lose some of his new-found gloss. The Krugman doctrine that we should all spend our way back to health by pushing deficits to the brink of a debt spiral – or beyond the brink – will be seen as dangerous.

The contraction of M3 money in the US and Europe over the last six months will slowly puncture economic recovery as 2010 unfolds, with the time-honoured lag of a year or so. Ben Bernanke will be caught off guard, just as he was in mid-2008 when the Fed drove straight through a red warning light with talk of imminent rate rises – the final error that triggered the implosion of Lehman, AIG, and the Western banking system.

As the great bear rally of 2009 runs into the greater Chinese Wall of excess global capacity, it will become clear that we are in the grip of a 21st Century Depression – more akin to Japan's Lost Decade than the 1840s or 1930s, but nothing like the normal cycles of the post-War era. The surplus regions (China, Japan, Germania, Gulf ) have not increased demand enough to compensate for belt-tightening in the deficit bloc (Anglo-sphere, Club Med, East Europe), and fiscal adrenalin is already fading in Europe. The vast East-West imbalances that caused the credit crisis are no better a year later, and perhaps worse. Household debt as a share of GDP sits near record levels in two-fifths of the world economy. Our long purge has barely begun. That is the elephant in the global tent.

We will be reminded too that the West's fiscal blitz – while vital to halt a self-feeding crash last year – has merely shifted the debt burden onto sovereign shoulders, where it may do more harm in the end if handled with the sort of insouciance now on display in Britain.

Yields on AAA German, French, US, and Canadian bonds will slither back down for a while in a fresh deflation scare. Exit strategies will go back into the deep freeze. Far from ending QE, the Fed will step up bond purchases. Bernanke will get religion again and ram down 10-year Treasury yields, quietly targeting 2.5pc. The funds will try to play the liquidity game yet again, piling into crude, gold, and Russian equities, but this time returns will be meagre. They will learn to respect secular deflation.

Weak sovereigns will buckle. The shocker will be Japan, our Weimar-in-waiting. This is the year when Tokyo finds it can no longer borrow at 1pc from a captive bond market, and when it must foot the bill for all those fiscal packages that seemed such a good idea at the time. Every auction of JGBs will be a news event as the public debt punches above 225pc of GDP. Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii will become as familiar as a rock star.

Once the dam breaks, debt service costs will tear the budget to pieces. The Bank of Japan will pull the emergency lever on QE. The country will flip from deflation to incipient hyperinflation. The yen will fall out of bed, outdoing China's yuan in the beggar-thy-neighbour race to the bottom. By then China too will be in a quandary. Wild credit growth can mask the weakness of its mercantilist export model for a while, but only at the price of an asset bubble. Beijing must hit the brakes this year, or store up serious trouble. It will make as big a hash of this as Western central banks did in 2007-2008.

The European Central Bank will stick to its Wagnerian course, standing aloof as ugly loan books set off wave two of Europe's banking woes. The Bundesbank will veto proper QE until it is too late, deeming it an implicit German bail-out for Club Med.

More hedge funds will join the EMU divergence play, betting that the North-South split has gone beyond the point of no return for a currency union. This will enrage the Eurogroup. Brussels will dust down its paper exploring the legal basis for capital controls. Italy's Giulio Tremonti will suggest using EU terror legislation against "speculators".

Wage cuts will prove a self-defeating policy for Club Med, trapping them in textbook debt-deflation. The victims will start to notice this. Articles will appear in the Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese press airing doubts about EMU. Eurosceptic professors will be ungagged. Heresy will spread into mainstream parties.

Greece's Prime Minister Papandréou will balk at EMU immolation . The Hellenic Socialists will call Europe's bluff, extracting loans that gain time but solve nothing. Berlin will climb down and pay, but only once: thereafter, Zum Teufel.

In the end, the Euro's fate will be decided by strikes, street protest, and car bombs as the primacy of politics returns. I doubt that 2010 will see the denouement, but the mood music will be bad enough to knock the euro off its stilts.

The dollar rally will gather pace. America's economy – though sick – will shine within the even sicker OECD club. The British will need the shock of a gilts crisis to shatter their complacency. In time, the Dunkirk spirit will rise again. Mervyn King's pre-emptive QE and timely devaluation will bear fruit this year, sparing us the worst.

By mid to late 2010, we will have lanced the biggest boils of the global system. Only then, amid antiestéticar and investor revulsion, will we touch bottom. That will be the buying opportunity of our lives.
Dos más, luego los edito y formateo, que ahora no tengo tiempo...
08-01-10:
Japan braves bond markets with high-risk plans, talks down the yen - Telegraph
Japan braves bond markets with high-risk plans, talks down the yen
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor
Published: 6:00AM GMT 08 Jan 2010

Japan has appointed its sixth finance minister in eighteen months and opted for yet another high-stakes shift in economic strategy, this time ditching its strong-yen policy and reverting to fiscal largesse in hopes of pulling the country out of deflationary perma-slump.

The change of tack by the world's second largest economy sparked jitters on Tokyo's bond markets and may have implications for the global currency system, leading to a revival of the yen "carry-trade" that helped fuel the last international asset bubble.

Deputy premier Naoto Kan is to take over the finance ministry. A high-spending populist and an advocate of radical stimulus measures, he is a stark contrast to the outgoing Hirohisa Fujii, the aging apostle of financial orthodoxy.

Mr Kan's opening gambit on Thursday was a call for devaluation, saying it would be "nice" if the yen were to weaken further to help exporters. He has in the past said 95 yen to the dollar - 2pc-3pc weaker than cuurently - is a tolerable level for the likes of Toyota, Toshiba, and Sony.

His appointment opens the door for outright intervention to ensure a weaker yen if necessary, adding Japan to the long list countries now intervening openly or covertly to hold down their currencies. These include China, Russia, Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, Indonesia, Switzerland, and arguably Britain – some using of capital controls to stop inflows of hot money.

Mr Kan is a fierce critic of the Bank of Japan, accusing the monetary authorities of sitting on their hands as the country slid into the deepest deflation in post-War history last year. "I think that is partly why he was given this position," said Neil Mellor from Bank of New York Mellon said.

The scourge of Japan's all-powerful officials, Mr Kan may try to break the Bank of Japan to his political will, demanding the sort of full-fledged quantitative easing seen in Britain and the US. Many economists agree that the bank has been strangely passive over the last year as GDP contracted by 10pc and the yen rocketed, pushing Japan deeper into deflation.

Mr Fujii resigned over ill-health but it is an open secret that he fell out with the ruling Democrats over plans for fresh welfare spending, antiestéticaring that fiscal extravagance could lead to a state funding crisis. Yields on 10-year government bonds (JGBs) have crept up 10 basis points over recent days, rising to 1.34pc on Thursday on doubts over Mr Kan's plans.

The budget deficit is already set to hit 9pc of GDP this year. The International Monetary Fund says gross public debt will reach 227pc of GDP this year, warning that Japan is nearing the limits of sustainability. While Tokyo has been able to borrow cheaply - barely above 1pc - this may not continue. The IMF said the sheer scale of the debt burden means that a modest rise in yields would cause havoc to state finances.

Japan can no longer count on a captive bond market. The savings rate has fallen from 14pc in 1990 to near 2pc today, below the US. The state pension fund became a net seller of JGBs last year as the country's demographic crunch began in earnest. The population has been declining since 2005, at an accelerating pace. It dropped by 75,000 last year to 126m. The growing debt must be serviced by a declining base.

The US rating agency Moody's says investors may demand a higher risk premium for Japanese debt unless the government can "articulate a credible medium-term deficit reduction plan".

Mr Kan appears deaf to such warnings. His immediate aim is to prime-pump the economy before Diet elections next summer, perhaps breaching the cross-party understanding that new debt issuance should be limited to $475bn in the coming year.

Gregg Gibbs from RBS said Japan sticks out like a sore thumb on the global stage "Fiscal concerns dog most major economies, but Japan is the only one not discussing the need to start winding deficits back," he said.
23-03-10: Quizás este artículo no sea tan interesante, pero aún así lo añado - mencionan el deflactor del PIB, que sigo sin entender muy bien qué es y cómo se calcula...
Dai-Ichi Mutual unveils biggest share offers since the Great Recession - Telegraph
Dai-Ichi Mutual unveils biggest share offers since the Great Recession

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor
Published: 5:56PM GMT 23 Mar 2010

Dai-Ichi Mutual Life in Japan is to launch the world's biggest public offering since the Great Recession, raising $11bn (£7.3bn) in the latest sign of returning confidence in global markets.

The country's second biggest life insurer will amow the path of mutuals in the West by transforming itself into a joint stock company, with ambitious plans to expand overseas.

It is the largest share offer in Japan since 1998 and the largest worldwide since the Visa's $20bn sale in March 2008, just before the global crisis caused corporations to batten down the hatches. The Japanese market for IPO's almost completely shut last year, with issues reaching just $603m according to Dealogic.

A total of 10m shares will be issued at $1,550 each, with 7.2m will be sold to Japanese and foreign investors and the rest retained by policy-holders. It will be the most widely held stock in the country.

Mizuho Financial and other Japanese banks have lined to gobble up large chunks of the issue, continuing a practice of equity holdings that has proved a mixed blessing in the past. The cross-holdings in the Japanese corporate and banking system tend to let problems fester.

Japan's economy has rebounded briskly after its calamitous contraction in late 2008 and early 2009, lifted by surging demand in China, Korea and dynamism in emerging Asia. Growth was 3.8pc at an annual rate in the fourth quarter.

However, the closely-watched "GDP deflator" reached a record low of minus 2.8pc, suggesting that underlying deflationary forces are still tightening their grip. Minutes from the latest meeting of the Bank of Japan show that some members antiestéticar that accelerating price falls are becoming "widespread". They said the bank must be ready "to act swiftly and decisively" to stem deflation if needed

Under government pressure, the Bank of Japan has already reversed course on plans to exit quantitative easing. It relaunched its programme of debt purchases in December, and agreed this month to double the volume.

The Greek debt crisis has caused the Hatoyama government to fret over Japan's equally high level of public debt. The IMF expects gross debt to reach 225pc of GDP and net debt to be 110pc "Going forward, the market's capacity to absorb debt is likely to diminish as the population reduces savings inflows," said the Fund.

Yoshito Sengoku, the national strategy minister, said on Wednesday that Japan is drawing up plans for debt reduction plan with a clear "numerical target".
 
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