Repression and Castro's Succession Strategy
Focus on Cuba
An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project
Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies
University of Miami
Issue 69
October 3, 2005
Staff Report
Repression and Castro's Succession Strategy
The crackdown in the spring of 2003, involving the imprisonment of 75
opposition activists, was a staggering blow to civil society in Cuba. While
many saw it as an isolated event, repression on the island continues
unabated, and in many cases has been intensified. These actions of the
government in Havana are typical of authoritarian regimes preparing for a
threat to their rule and are focused on one primary objective: maintaining
an unchallenged position of power now and after Fidel Castro's
disappearance. The realities of Castro's mortality have touched off a
recentralization of the economy, an increasing role of the military in the
economy, and even the legal protection of the socialist nature of the
revolution. Yet, the most chilling strategies have been reserved for the
most unpredictable threat to dictatorial regimes, the population. The
continued repression and the reinvigorated use of broad revolutionary laws
to suppress dissent may be a sign that Cuba's ruling class is preparing to
prevent change.
PRE-CRIME IN CUBA
The Cuban government has a number of legal tools at their disposal to
curb opposition, including the power to prevent any crimes against the state
even before they happen. Earlier this year, the Cuban government began
rounding up hundreds of urban youth and sentencing them to up to four years
in prison. The cited offense was "dangerousness," a vague legal concept
which gives Cuban authorities the ability to monitor or incarcerate
individuals on the presumption that they may commit a crime in the
future.(1) Article 72 of the Cuban Penal Code broadly defines dangerousness
as "a special proclivity to commit crimes, demonstrated by conduct observed
to be in manifest contradiction with the norms of socialist jovenlandesality."(2)
Other criteria include "antisocial behavior" and conduct that "violates the
rights of others, or.damages the rules of harmony or upsets the order of the
community" or being "[an individual who] lives as a social parasite off the
work of others, or exploits or practices socially reprehensible vices."(3)
While this broad concept is hardly new in Cuban revolutionary law, the
speed and scope of its recent use is shocking: over four hundred, mostly
poor Afro-Cuban youth were charged and incarcerated.(4) In February of last
year, sixty-eight citizens of San Cristóbal, Pinar del Río were warned and
placed under surveillance for a similar charge.(5)
This latest usage of Article 72 may be a signal of a shift in Havana.
The accused were disproportionately Afro-Cubans from poor urban areas and
disillusioned with the lack of economic opportunities. Also, the vast
majority of accused were not placed under surveillance, but imprisoned, many
for the maximum penalty of four years. The Cuban government's use of
"dangerousness" to the fullest legal extent in a population that could
clearly become a source of opposition is a sign that they are eliminating
any potential dissent.
jovenlandesaL AND PHYSICAL STONINGS
Rapid Response Brigades have been a common weapon against dissent in
the Cuban political landscape. Formed by the government in 1991 and composed
of plainclothes security personnel and supporters of the regime, these
brigades were originally intended to curb potential uprisings amowing the
fall of the Soviet Union. They have proven their usefulness in maintaining
control and have been maintained as an effective weapon to intimidate public
dissenters. In the words of a local Committee for the Defense of the
Revolution (CDR) leader, these groups were to be directed against
"individuals with political and ideological problems."(6) This has typically
been done through staged "acts of repudiation" with groups of supposedly
spontaneous protesters organized by the government to counter public acts of
dissent.
There has been recent aggressive use of these acts to counter public
displays of opposition to the regime. In August, the houses of several
well-known dissidents were barricaded by hundreds of citizens shouting
pro-government slogans and threats for not toeing the government line. One
dissident observed that these tactics have thrown the political climate back
fifteen years, stating that "[the government] has returned to the methods of
these brigades which mete out a kind of civil firing squad or jovenlandesal
stoning."(7)
This implied line between jovenlandesal and physical punishment by the
brigades is being blurred. On September 16th in the city of Santa Clara,
approximately a dozen dissidents gathered outside a local police station to
demand the release of a fellow opposition member who had just been arrested
the night before. One of the group, Guillermo Fariñas, the editor of the
independent Cubanacán Press Agency, was surrounded by at least sixty brigade
members armed with clubs. Fariñas was punched, kicked, hit with clubs
repeatedly, and told that if he said "Viva Fidel," the beating would stop.
He refused, and the attack was stopped only due to the antiestéticar of killing him
in public.(8)
The government has taken a public stance in defense of these tactics.
In response to questions regarding the government's use of the brigades,
Felipe Pérez Roque, Cuba's Foreign Minister, clarified that "in Cuba, the
streets belong to the revolutionaries," and justified these measures by
claiming "all that commit a provocation should know that these things
happen." More frightening, however, is the official policy of looking the
other way when these brigades get violent. According to Pérez Roque, "if a
troublemaker provokes his neighbors, he should know that at some point they
will lose their patience and respond to the provocations."(9)
PRISON CONDITIONS
The conditions in the prisons of Cuba continue to be reprehensible.
There are regular reports of lack of health care, physical and mental abuse,
continuous use of solitary confinement, extremely poor food, contaminated
water, vermin, and limited contact with family. Three political prisoners
are undergoing hunger strikes to protest prison conditions. Two, José Daniel
Ferrer and Félix Navarro, are serving 25-year sentences for supporting the
Varela Project, a petition allowed by the Cuban Constitution calling for
democratic reforms. A third, Victor Rolando Arroyo, is an independent
journalist serving a 26-year sentence. Cuban policy also ensures that
penalties are felt outside prison walls by routinely transferring prisoners
to jails furthest from their families, making communication difficult and
punishing family members. Often, there are more explicit reprisals against
family members or they themselves are placed under surveillance.
Repression in Cuba remains an integral part of life on the island, and
it is clear that the government in Havana recognizes that the continuation
and intensification of these tactics are part of the strategy to maintain
the status quo. Fidel Castro's fiery words aimed at opposition elements
during the revolution's most hallowed anniversary on July 26th was a
sobering reminder of this reality. Castro claimed that the "alleged
opposition in Cuba does not exist except in the overheated imagination of
the Cuban-American mob and White House and State Department bureaucrats,"
and warned that the revolution would swiftly and decisively act "whenever
traitors and mercenaries go a millimeter beyond the point that our
Revolutionary people.is willing to accept."(10) This public recognition of
threat by the upper levels of government, their demonstrated willingness to
crush dissent, and a warning during the most public speech of the year may
be the clearest signal yet that continuous repressive measures are an
integral part of the Cuban government's survival plan, and that dark days
are ahead for those courageous enough to challenge the regime.
_________________________________________________
Notes
1. Transcript of CNN broadcast, "Mass Arrests in Cuba," May 15, 2005.
2. Cuba, Código Penal, Art. 72.
3. Cuba, Código Penal, Art. 73.1
4. "Crackdown on Cuba's disaffected youth," Miami Herald, May 12,
2005.
5. "Cita la policía a cuidadanos por 'peligrosidad,'" CubaNet,
February 3, 2004.
6. "Cuba recruiting groups to stop dissent," Miami Herald, July 12,
1991.
7. Rui Ferreira, "Ofensiva callejera contra los opositores,"
Disidente, August 2005,
www.disidenteuniversal.org.
8. "Independent news agency editor beaten by 60 pro-government
paramilitaries," Reporters Without Borders, September 26, 2005.
www.rsf.org
.. Also see "Communist 'posse' harasses and physically attacks peaceful
opponents in Santa Clara," Cubanacán Press, September 22, 2005.
www.puenteinfocubamiami.org/cuba_latest2005.htm.
9. "El régimen legitima actos de repudio en víspera visita comisario
UE," Terra España, March 21, 2005.
http://actualidad.terra.es/nacional/articulo/gobierno_ue_legitima_actos_repudio_209712.htm.
10. Speech given by Fidel Castro at the 52nd Anniversary of the
assault on the Moncada barracks, July 26, 2005.
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/.
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