Without immigration, Spain would return to 1950 levels

Without immigration, Spain would have 28 million people, like in 1950

The idea that streets would be empty without current migration flows clashes with a key data point: in 1950, Spain had about 28 million inhabitants and was not described as a wasteland. This sparks an economic debate beyond demographics, involving falling birth rates, housing, and the labor market. The conclusion is far from unanimous.

Birth rates fell 25 years before mass immigration

A common argument states that Spain's birth rate collapse began in the 1970s, about 25 years before large-scale immigration started. If true, the cause-and-effect relationship reverses: Spaniards are not missing because migrants arrive; rather, migrants arrive in a country already reducing fertility for decades. Another analysis points to a more mundane reason: compulsory schooling. Previously, children worked in agriculture and supported parents' old age; when they stopped being economically viable, families adjusted their size downward.

Generational momentum adds to this. With over four decades of sustained decline, there are fewer Spaniards of childbearing age, so absolute births fall even if the rate stabilizes. It is estimated that 40% of native-born Spanish women will never have children, and one in five conceived does not result in a live birth. Given these factors, any generational replacement scenario requires population inflow from abroad.

How many people should Spain have?

Here appears the headline figure: 25 million inhabitants. This is the ideal scenario considered by some analyses, antiestéticaturing full employment, affordable housing, and quieter streets. The historical reference comes from the country itself: in 1950, with 28 million, there was no depopulation problem. In contrast, the analysis mentions the current 48 million.

Circulating estimates suggest a smaller population could reduce housing costs by 20% to 30%, which would in turn encourage family formation. Proponents argue the mechanism is twofold: less pressure on land and reduced public spending on services linked to new arrivals.

Housing, wages, and unemployment: the economic explanation

The strongest objection does not dispute the figures but the order of factors. If there were decent jobs, wages, and affordable housing, this school of thought maintains, there would be no need to bring anyone in: birth rates would rebound on their own. They add an uncomfortable counterpoint: with high unemployment, the supposed need for foreign labor is unsustainable.

The argument concludes with spending priorities. Aid directed at newly arrived populations could have been invested in boosting local birth rates, solving the problem twice over, they claim. The opposing view warns that without this flow, consumption, production, and job supply would drop, ultimately hitting living standards.

Security and public services: the recurring argument

Another line focuses not on demographic balance but on daily costs. It argues that a smaller population would ease pressure on healthcare, education, and social services, claiming these costs grow with incoming population. This assertion is presented as a direct consequence rather than measured data, facing opposition due to lack of supporting statistics. The analysis does question the priority of aid, suggesting it currently goes first to newcomers.

The conspiracy narrative entering the conversation

Not all material is economic. Some invokes the so-called Great Replacement, presented by proponents as a deliberate plan, and the "Kalergi Plan," acknowledged as a conspiracy theory lacking evidence. These frameworks, at best, label real phenomena—aging and immigration dependency—but fail to explain causes. The discussion also shifts to degrowth and energy: the thesis that population decline can be managed with technology meets the reminder that technology equals energy, duties that should have been addressed earlier.

With these elements, the question is not whether Spain can have fewer inhabitants without collapsing, but whether the current model—more arrivals to sustain spending—is viable long-term. No one closes the debate.