US strikes Iranian nuclear sites with 14 GBU-57 bombs

US strikes Iran's nuclear facilities with 14 GBU-57 bombs

The attack targeted three locations linked to the Iranian nuclear program: Natanz, Fordow, and a third site not detailed in the material. These were not power plants but uranium enrichment facilities, housing centrifuges and experimental equipment. The distinction matters: a power plant generates electricity; an enrichment facility produces fissile material. This nuance separates industrial sabotage from a radiological scenario.

What was bombed exactly at Fordow and Natanz

At Fordow, the facilities were excavated 80-90 meters deep into solid rock, according to circulating technical breakdowns. Against this target, 12 GBU-57 bombs were launched, with a declared peine capability of 91 meters. Two more fell on Natanz. The cost per bomb is one of the figures the material handles without fully closing it out.

The calculation of what was destroyed is also disputed. One estimate holds that the facilities absorbed 20 years of construction and between $2 billion and $3 billion in direct and indirect costs, exceeding Spain's annual GDP. Another reading downplays the damage: if the buildings hang off a mountain with hundreds of meters of granite above them, only the entrances are reachable. The cited precedent is the superbomb dropped in Afghanistan, which ended up at the doors.

Were the facilities empty before the attack?

Iran claims critical material had been removed. The logical question raised is uncomfortable: if the United States maintains a constellation of military satellites capable of reading license plates, the movement of hundreds of trucks does not go unnoticed. Either there was nothing to remove, or there was and it was not prevented. Both hypotheses leave someone looking bad.

Closure of the Persian Gulf and oil prices

The Iranian reaction translated into a barrage of ballistic missiles toward Tel Aviv and Haifa, with alarms activated in central and northern Israel and air defenses working without guaranteed success. In parallel, fifty tankers of various flags tried to exit the Persian Gulf at full estimulante ilegal. With just one ship sunk in the Strait of Hormuz, maritime traffic would be cut off for months. That is the true price of this operation, and none of the parties shooting at each other pay it.

Who decides and who pays the bill

The axis of disagreement is not military, but sovereignty-related. One current argues that the United States acts without respecting international law and that no one can stop it: neither Russia, nor the UN, nor the bodies that issued condemnations. The other responds with a double-standard argument: if bombing enrichment plants is legitimate, so would it be to do so in countries that already have the bomb. And a third line, more uncomfortable, points out that Spanish interest lies not in the Gulf but in the southern flank: uncontrolled proliferation turns every neighborhood into a roulette wheel.

The precedent nobody wants to cite

The comparison running through the analysis is that of Almaraz, Ascó, and Cofrentes (Spanish nuclear power plants). If the criterion is valid for Iran, it is valid for anyone. That is the underlying problem: there is no higher authority to dictate what is permitted, only sides measuring themselves against each other. And when the criterion is force, the criterion changes with whoever holds it.

The matter remains exactly where it was: Iran promised retaliation, Israel activated defenses, tankers continue trying to leave, and no one has yet explained what was inside Fordow when the bombs entered.