Ukraine delays its counteroffensive: the West now points to 2025
Ukraine's counteroffensive has been pushed back to 2025: US intelligence expects only "modest territorial gains" and NATO talks of holding defensive lines until…
English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published
Ukraine delays its counteroffensive: the West now points to 2025
Ukraine's counteroffensive has been announced for more than three years and still has not begun. Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, told the BBC that the assault to retake territory occupied by Russia could start "tomorrow, the day after tomorrow or within a week." He gave no date. Since then, every season has been the right one: spring, summer, autumn, winter, and back to the start. The Times reported that Ukraine is not ready for the counteroffensive but no longer has a choice; US intelligence anticipates "modest territorial gains." The New York Times went further: allied sources speak of a defensive strategy until 2025.
When will the Ukrainian counteroffensive begin?
The official answer is that there is no answer. Danilov said they are ready to launch the counteroffensive, but mentioned no specific date. Experts quoted by public media suggested the start could come "at any time from late April to the first two weeks of June." Once that window passed, it closed and another peine: summer. Then autumn. Then 2024. Then 2025.
The pattern repeats with a punctuality that has become almost a seasonal tradition. Every time a deadline runs out, a new explanation appears: the mud, the shortage of ammunition, the slow delivery of promised weapons, the need for more air defense systems. The delivery of the pledged weapons will take weeks, if not months, according to Western sources cited by The New York Times.
What US intelligence says about the offensive
The most uncomfortable piece of information does not come from Moscow, but from Washington. According to The Times, US intelligence considers it unlikely that Kyiv can achieve more than "modest territorial gains" against Russian forces. In other words: even in the scenario where the counteroffensive is launched, the expected outcome is not a breakthrough of the front line, but a limited advance.
A senior NATO official quoted by The New York Times added that the support promised to Ukraine would allow it to "counterattack" Russia next year. Until then, the Ukrainian armed forces will hold defensive positions. The wording is telling: there is no talk of victory, or of recovering territory, or of a decisive push. There is talk of holding out.
The Western armored vehicles that have not yet seen combat
One argument keeps coming up to justify the wait: hundreds of Western armored vehicles have still not been seen in combat, and no one wants them left parked in Kyiv. The Leopards, the Bradleys and the rest of the promised package are the trump card being saved for the decisive moment. The problem is that this moment has failed to arrive for three years.
Meanwhile, artillery, air cover and rear logistics remain the real bottleneck. Without artillery superiority and without the capacity to sustain the advance with supplies, any offensive becomes a war of attrition. And attrition, in a war of attrition, favors whoever has more men and more factories.
What is expected of the offensive: axes and objectives
Hypotheses about the terrain keep piling up. One possibility is a counteroffensive in the Bakhmut area and another at Avdiivka, attempting to encircle Horlivka by summer while harassing Donetsk. Another is a push towards Melitopol, although some argue those attacks would be diversionary, meant to tie down Russian troops. Horlivka and Donetsk are much closer to the front line.
Movements have also been recorded on the Dnipro, with the capture of islands in the Kherson area and attacks south of Bakhmut. These are probing operations, not breakthroughs. The question hanging over every analysis is the same: are there the means for anything more than local raids?
2025 as the new target date
The latest update to the calendar comes from Western sources: Ukraine will not be able to mount a counteroffensive or retake significant territory this year. The delivery of promised weapons will take weeks or months. The promised support would allow a counterattack in 2025. Until then, defend.
The problem with this approach is that it turns the counteroffensive into a moving horizon. Every time the date draws near, it shifts. First it was spring, then summer, then autumn, then 2024, now 2025. The war does not wait for calendars, and meanwhile the front line keeps consuming men and materiel at a rate no economy can sustain indefinitely.
With all this, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has become the most announced and least seen event of this war. Some argue the real offensive is already underway and that what we are seeing are merely probing operations. Others believe there will never be an offensive like the one promised, but rather a sum of positional attacks and bombardments. And there are those who simply keep asking: when?
Ukraine's counteroffensive has been announced for more than three years and still has not begun. Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, told the BBC that the assault to retake territory occupied by Russia could start "tomorrow, the day after tomorrow or within a week." He gave no date. Since then, every season has been the right one: spring, summer, autumn, winter, and back to the start. The Times reported that Ukraine is not ready for the counteroffensive but no longer has a choice; US intelligence anticipates "modest territorial gains." The New York Times went further: allied sources speak of a defensive strategy until 2025.
When will the Ukrainian counteroffensive begin?
The official answer is that there is no answer. Danilov said they are ready to launch the counteroffensive, but mentioned no specific date. Experts quoted by public media suggested the start could come "at any time from late April to the first two weeks of June." Once that window passed, it closed and another peine: summer. Then autumn. Then 2024. Then 2025.
The pattern repeats with a punctuality that has become almost a seasonal tradition. Every time a deadline runs out, a new explanation appears: the mud, the shortage of ammunition, the slow delivery of promised weapons, the need for more air defense systems. The delivery of the pledged weapons will take weeks, if not months, according to Western sources cited by The New York Times.
What US intelligence says about the offensive
The most uncomfortable piece of information does not come from Moscow, but from Washington. According to The Times, US intelligence considers it unlikely that Kyiv can achieve more than "modest territorial gains" against Russian forces. In other words: even in the scenario where the counteroffensive is launched, the expected outcome is not a breakthrough of the front line, but a limited advance.
A senior NATO official quoted by The New York Times added that the support promised to Ukraine would allow it to "counterattack" Russia next year. Until then, the Ukrainian armed forces will hold defensive positions. The wording is telling: there is no talk of victory, or of recovering territory, or of a decisive push. There is talk of holding out.
The Western armored vehicles that have not yet seen combat
One argument keeps coming up to justify the wait: hundreds of Western armored vehicles have still not been seen in combat, and no one wants them left parked in Kyiv. The Leopards, the Bradleys and the rest of the promised package are the trump card being saved for the decisive moment. The problem is that this moment has failed to arrive for three years.
Meanwhile, artillery, air cover and rear logistics remain the real bottleneck. Without artillery superiority and without the capacity to sustain the advance with supplies, any offensive becomes a war of attrition. And attrition, in a war of attrition, favors whoever has more men and more factories.
What is expected of the offensive: axes and objectives
Hypotheses about the terrain keep piling up. One possibility is a counteroffensive in the Bakhmut area and another at Avdiivka, attempting to encircle Horlivka by summer while harassing Donetsk. Another is a push towards Melitopol, although some argue those attacks would be diversionary, meant to tie down Russian troops. Horlivka and Donetsk are much closer to the front line.
Movements have also been recorded on the Dnipro, with the capture of islands in the Kherson area and attacks south of Bakhmut. These are probing operations, not breakthroughs. The question hanging over every analysis is the same: are there the means for anything more than local raids?
2025 as the new target date
The latest update to the calendar comes from Western sources: Ukraine will not be able to mount a counteroffensive or retake significant territory this year. The delivery of promised weapons will take weeks or months. The promised support would allow a counterattack in 2025. Until then, defend.
The problem with this approach is that it turns the counteroffensive into a moving horizon. Every time the date draws near, it shifts. First it was spring, then summer, then autumn, then 2024, now 2025. The war does not wait for calendars, and meanwhile the front line keeps consuming men and materiel at a rate no economy can sustain indefinitely.
With all this, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has become the most announced and least seen event of this war. Some argue the real offensive is already underway and that what we are seeing are merely probing operations. Others believe there will never be an offensive like the one promised, but rather a sum of positional attacks and bombardments. And there are those who simply keep asking: when?
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Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (99 replies).
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