Ukraine admits up to 200 daily deaths in Donbas

Ukraine admits up to 200 daily deaths as analysts look to Russia

The numbers do not add up. Ukraine has quantified its own attrition: presidential advisor Oleksiy Arestovych told The Guardian there are 150 dead and 800 wounded every day; fellow advisor Mykhaylo Podolyak told the BBC that between 100 and 200 Ukrainian soldiers die daily. In monthly terms, more than 20,000 casualties. Never before had the invaded side peine the door to its accounting with such bluntness, and it does so just as the front line has become a long-range meat grinder.

The lingering question is what state the Ukrainian army will be in if the war drags on until autumn. This applies to the Russians too, with a fundamental difference: the invaders already control large swathes of the country and can stop fighting with territorial advantage in their pocket. Those defending their home do not have that option.

The double standard of Western reports

Western analysts barely put numbers to Ukrainian losses. Their briefings detail Russian ones: one circulating estimate speaks of between 15,000 and 20,000 dead out of an invasion force of 150,000 men or more. But the Russian army has not lost its offensive capability, leaving the impression that Moscow is doing worse than official reports suggest.

The problem with this narrative is artillery arithmetic. With a fire superiority of 10 or 15 to one, according to Ukrainian sources, the casualty rate for the invaders may now be significantly lower: they deal death from distances where the defender cannot see them. Some reduce Russian losses to fewer than 3,000 dead and raise Ukrainian ones to nearly 100,000; the most pessimistic forecasts speak of 20,000 to 30,000 Russians and 150,000 to 200,000 Ukrainians. No one signs off on these figures, and that is precisely the news.

5,000 shells a day and the 152 mm running dry

Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, has put numbers to consumption: Ukraine fires between 5,000 and 6,000 artillery rounds per day and has "almost exhausted" its reserves of standard Soviet 152 mm projectiles. It now depends on NATO's 155 mm howitzers, and it is unclear how many are available.

On the other side, a circulating estimate places Russian fire at 10,000 to 50,000 shells daily. The comparison ridicules any presumed Western production capacity: a factory capable of producing 7,000 howitzers a month would not cover even one day of that consumption rate. That is the real hole in the war, rather than any headline about sarracena.

How many men does Ukraine have left?

Here the debate becomes uncomfortable. A circulating calculation starts from 18 million Ukrainian men of mobilization age and doubles it to 36 million by including women in mandatory service: at a rate of a thousand casualties daily, Ukraine would have reserves to resist for about 98 years. The figure is a joke, and understood as such.

What is not a joke is what happens underneath. Kyiv's forces are far from a collapse point, but several months of high casualties will significantly erode their combat strength, even assuming some of the wounded recover. In the Donbas, bombardment is so intense that many survivors will suffer combat stress sequelae, and reports of desertions on the Ukrainian side are already appearing.

The international legion of experienced foreigners could be on the front within less than a month of crossing the border. At the same time, publicizing casualty figures is the worst possible advertisement for the next recruit: the deterrent effect is evident.

Strong ruble against IMF-funded payrolls

While the front bleeds, the economy sends opposing signals. It is argued that Russia has the strongest ruble in five years and is lowering interest rates, while Ukraine has had to borrow money from the International Monetary Fund to pay this month's salaries. Meanwhile, the West suffers inflation and rising rates, and the enrichment of China and India leaves it in an awkward position.

What could happen now

With this picture, it is reasonable to expect Ukraine to continue ceding ground as long as Western ammunition lasts, and that casualty figures cease to be a propaganda matter to become an operational constraint. The reserve is huge: no one knows how many 155 mm howitzers remain in allied warehouses, and without that data, any forecast is empty talk. If supply holds, the war lengthens. If it fails, the question stops being how many men are left and becomes how long they can keep firing.