Two theories behind a possible snap election in Spain

Snap election: state of siege or letting the PP govern

One week. That is the timeframe in which the announcement of a snap election, the Constitutional Court's deliberation on Puigdemont's amnesty, and according to one participant, a battery of hastily commissioned polls all coincide. The May elections, with municipal and regional votes, and the closing of the European funds tap also fit into the same calendar. From this intersection emerge two narratives competing to explain one thing: why the Government would dissolve the Cortes now and not exhaust the legislature in 2027. Neither is backed by evidence and both suffer from the same flaw: taking for granted that everything obeys a plan.

What the two theories about the snap election say

The first is the most cinematic. Elections are called on Tuesday, the King travels to Ceuta, Segarro reacts badly—with the Government's connivance, according to this version—and, with the Cortes already dissolved, a state of siege is declared to tackle the problem. The acting president thus remains a couple of years, indefinitely. On paper it sounds like a closed script. In the BOE there is not a single public indication that supports that chain of events.

The second renounces the epic and bets on cold calculation. Elections are called, Feijóo is allowed to govern with Abascal with 176, 185, 196 or perhaps 210 seats—even with a constitutional reform in between, although that requires consensus and does not seem at hand—and the PSOE remains in opposition waiting for its moment. Two years of hot streets, cuts and conflicts, and then the return. The mirror used for the forecast is France, where, according to this version, the freezing of pensions and civil servants' salaries has just been announced, just like in 2010, and where there are elections.

The calendar that fuels suspicion: amnesty, Constitutional Court and May

The most significant element in the snap election hypothesis is the coincidence with the Constitutional Court. The week of the announcement coincides with a decision on Puigdemont's amnesty in which the crime of embezzlement could be annulled. It is the kind of ruling that shakes the board and admits two readings: simple coincidence or cross payment. Public conversation has chosen the second without too many questions.

To this is added the Catalan board. As stated in the debate, Alianza Catalana will not run in the general election, so Junts would have no competition on that flank in a Spanish election. And today Junts would not support something that goes against its party's bases, at least the economic ones. Whoever designed the move would know in advance. The Overton window, supporters of this reading argue, is wide open ahead of May, with unions, foundations and observatories moving quickly to manufacture the framework.

The economic argument: gas, oil and debt

Here political speculation intersects with economic forecasts launched without public backing: natural gas would become around 50% more expensive; food prices would skyrocket after several months with oil hovering around $100; and public debt interest is soaring. With that cocktail, 2027 does not invite hanging the recovery medal. The party, this analysis suggests, knows that historical memory and social aid sustain the vote up to a point. When companies close and unemployment rises seriously, things change.

The second clock is that of European funds. The small works and projects, the Kit Digital, the 400-euro cultural voucher, are ending. All that subsidized spending sustained much of the consumption of recent years and now it is turning off.

Can a state of exception suspend elections?

The short answer is no in the sense suggested by the first theory. Article 116.5 of the Constitution and Organic Law 4/1981 establish that the Congress cannot be dissolved while a state of alarm, exception or siege is declared. The state blocks dissolution, it does not provoke it. The figure serves to prevent the dissolution of the Chambers during an emergency, not to extend the legislature.

That does not close the matter, it only shifts it. The relevant question is no longer whether the vote can be suspended, but whether anyone has incentives to go that far. And at that point, everyone chooses their own movie.

The opposite thesis: there will be no elections at all

Faced with the two big theories there is a third, more down-to-earth position: there simply will be no snap election. The argument is that a Government that needs to maintain control of police, judges and the prosecutor's office does not risk the ballot if it can avoid it, and that it will exhaust the legal deadline. Hence the reference to the grandchildren law, which in that reading is interpreted as a census operation.

Along those lines circulate thicker conjectures without any proof, such as calling elections on the Immaculate Conception long weekend, forcing postal voting or sabotaging trains so that voters do not arrive on time. These are unfounded suspicions, just as it is to attribute to stupidity what others see as pure Machiavellianism: some argue that there is no plan at all and that attributing Sun Tzu strategies to it is giving it a value it does not have.

The narrative: express polls, Redondo and media that shift

In parallel, the framework is set up. There is talk of express polls commissioned in a hurry and the return of Iván Redondo, who would have said that the PSOE will be the leading force and that the 2008 generation will now be able to vote. For part of the analysis, that message works just like Tezanos's CIS: it does not describe reality, it serves so that its own voter does not relax and to scare the lukewarm.

The other move is that of the media, which have shifted course and now sing the praises of the snap election, with live specials on rallies of half a thousand onlookers. In that operation fit the talk-show analyses that subscribe to the second theory: the right would govern as a parenthesis with the street in permanent conflict, as in the times of the CEDA. The quote that sums up the mood is from Machiavelli: "few see what we are, but everyone sees what we appear to be." Very few believe they see what is planned in private and everyone discusses what appears in public.

In the end, the disconcerting fact is none of the big ones. It is that the absolute majority of Congress is played out in 176 seats and that all the scenarios being considered—176, 185, 196, up to 210—draw different governments with the same underlying arithmetic. The distribution changes, not the system. And whoever calls the election always chooses the framework.