The Temptation of Political Violence in Spain

The temptation of violence as a political response

Political violence has not died in Spain; it sleeps beneath the surface. In online debates, the idea of a patriotic militia taking justice into its own hands resonates more strongly than the official narrative admits. The question is whether that rhetoric remains mere provocation or can have real consequences.

The mirror of ETA

The comparison with ETA is inevitable. Those who defend the need for an armed organization point out that the terrorist group began by attacking civil guards and police officers, not politicians, and that only over time did it degenerate into killing councillors and family fathers. That drift, they argue, is the inherent risk of any political violence: the initial target becomes corrupted and the cause is lost. The case of Melitón Manzanas, ETA's first murder, is often cited as the starting point of a spiral that eventually reached innocent victims.

Legitimacy in question

Another recurring argument is distrust of the State and its security forces. It is claimed that a patriotic militia would have as much or more legitimacy than any body that depends on the government of the day. Against this, some respond that the solution is not to arm oneself, but to change those in power through the ballot box. Democracy, however imperfect, allows representatives to be replaced without resorting to weapons. The irony that many of those proposing violence are the first to refuse to do military service themselves is not lost on critics.

Representative democracy under suspicion

The deepest criticism is aimed at the system itself. It is argued that representative democracy is a sham, because most citizens do not know their representatives. Some propose direct democracy as an alternative, others even an authoritarian regime. But that view clashes with reality: most people are not willing to sacrifice their comforts for an armed cause, as the scant practical support for militias demonstrates. Some recall that the ETA experience proves that a handful of gunmen can put a regime in a tight spot, but that without funding and external support it cannot bring it down.

Recent history shows that political violence usually ends in tragedy, but social frustration does not disappear by decree. As long as institutional channels continue to be perceived as insufficient, the temptation of violence will remain present, even if its materialization seems unlikely.