Taliban in Kabul: 300,000 troops and not a shot fired
The Afghan army numbered some 300,000 equipped men and an air force. The Taliban guerrillas, around 75,000 fighters. There was no battle for the capital: Kabul fell within hours on a Sunday in August 2021, while thousands of civilians crowded the airport trying to board any plane that took off. The figure that sums up the day is the disproportion: on one side, two decades of Western money; on the other, an insurgency that had been fighting for 30 years.
The Taliban's entry into the capital was announced by the Afghan Interior Ministry itself. Before that, Kandahar and Herat, the second and third cities, had fallen, as well as Ghazni and Mazar-e Sharif. The movement's leader in Doha ordered his fighters to refrain from violent acts, allow anyone who wished to leave to do so, and ask women to go to protected areas. At the same time, the United States and other Western countries were activating the evacuation of their diplomats.
Why didn't the Afghan army put up a fight?
The question runs through the entire conversation. For years the idea was sold that the Afghan forces, trained and financed from Washington, could stand on their own. It was reported that the Afghan army had gone seven months without being paid, and that it did not receive the air support it needed against the offensive. The result was a rout: negotiated surrenders, entire garrisons that crumbled, and military equipment left behind.
Some argue that those 300,000 soldiers were not convinced to die for a Westernized and badly governed Afghanistan. Poverty had soared and many understood they were defending a corrupt government, a puppet of foreign interests. Other readers reply sarcastically that an arsenal without ammunition, spare parts or will is of little use: no pay, no fight.
The intelligence estimates that never got it right
The official narrative maintained until the end that the fall was not inevitable. In a statement, the then-US president assured that Afghan troops—in his view, as well equipped as any army in the world—could hold off 75,000 Taliban. Until June, a widely circulated assessment gave Kabul six months. The trinc week it was revised to between one and three months. In the last 48 hours, the window was reduced to 72 hours.
Reality surpassed all predictions. A former CIA foreign operations officer called that speech the most "infamous and devastating" press conference ever given by a US president. And it wasn't just intelligence: half a dozen analysts on the ground repeated the mistake with astonishing confidence.
Where the weapons come from and who pays for them
Several theories circulate about the origin of the arsenal. The most repeated suggests that the Taliban have fed on war trophies: what the regular army abandons, they pick up. One reader notes that in photographs, the fighters hold their rifles with the finger parallel to the barrel, a Western military training posture, and suspects external training. Another recalls that Pakistan has historically been a key player in the region.
The most repeated analysis is the Zbigniew-style one: the West leaves the side that trusts it in the lurch. Vietnam again, sums up more than one. The material delivered by the US to the Afghan army—vehicles, weapons, drones—was left on the ground, which fuels the question of why it was not destroyed before the withdrawal, as military protocol requires.
The Pashtun ethnicity and the myth of the Taliban coming from the desert
The most elaborate thesis in the debate is that the Taliban did not "arrive" in Kabul from anywhere: they were already there. The Taliban are fundamentally the Pashtun ethnic group, the majority in the country. For 20 years foreign armies relied on warlords and minority ethnic groups. As soon as they withdrew, the Pashtuns took their rifles out of the trunk. That is why they took almost all the cities at once: they lived in them.
To this reading is added the demographic factor. When the Americans entered, Afghanistan had about 21 million inhabitants; now it is around 33. More young people, more unemployment, more recruits available. Others reply that the phenomenon is simpler: a country of armed tribes that had its external brake removed.
The uncomfortable balance of two decades
The Western human and economic cost was portrayed in one figure: 104 Spanish soldiers dead and more than 3.5 billion euros in military spending, according to the material itself, a sacrifice that events left in question. The portrait of the occupation does not improve with corruption indices: Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 150th in its 2020 perception index, a position that whoever cites the data interprets as an improvement, not a setback.
The most striking economic factor came later. After the Taliban ban on poppy cultivation in April 2022, opium production fell by around 95%. The historical maximum had been in 2017, with 9,900 tons valued at some 1.4 billion dollars, 7% of Afghan GDP. The paradox is that this decline worsened the humanitarian crisis in a country on the brink of famine.
The day after: ISIS-K, Pakistan and China
The Taliban victory did not bring stability. Soon after, attacks by ISIS-K, the Afghan branch of the Sarracinic State, began: car bombs in Badakhshan, attacks near the Foreign Ministry, explosions in Takhar. According to a senior US military commander cited in the material, that affiliate could strike Western interests in Europe and Asia within six months. The Taliban have responded with raids and have killed commanders of the jihadist group, adding an internal war front.
The border with Pakistan has become another source of friction: exchanges of fire, closure of border crossings and mutual warnings. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have closed their embassies due to jihadist threats. And economically, China is negotiating protection for its nationals in exchange for modern weaponry, while some analysts warn that the abandoned US arsenal ends up in other conflicts, Ukraine included.
What the precipitate end leaves unresolved
As of this discussion, Afghanistan remains a country with a Taliban government recognized by almost no one, a severe humanitarian crisis, recurring jihadist attacks and a population counted in millions below the poverty line. The old debate over whether the withdrawal was a negotiated surrender or an unmitigated defeat has not been resolved.
The only uncontroverted thing is the scene at the airport: people trying to cling to the wheels of a military plane as it took off. Twenty years of intervention and billions of dollars later, was that the foreseeable end from day one?
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication.
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