Spanish councilman claims 15-20% of rigged contracts go to party

Spanish councilman claims 15-20% of rigged contracts go to party

A municipal official with a part-time dedication, earning just over €3,000 a month plus an expense card and certain "extras," describes his situation in an online economics forum. What began as a simple Q&A turned into a detailed account of how Spanish town halls operate behind closed doors. The source does not hide: he asserts that for contracts awarded without bidding—negotiated procedures without publicity, minor contracts, or emergencies—the percentage diverted to the ruling party "never drops below 15-20%," and can reach 100% if the beneficiary is a front company.

What percentage does the party take from rigged contracts?

The most incisive question asks for a range. The answer is blunt. The official distinguishes between types of direct awards and places the markup in a specific bracket, always after deducting the share for the party and the governing group. This aligns with a previous explanation about why many tenders are void: the administration sets prices "strangely low and clearly below market rates," inviting companies to compensate through other channels. The technical clue given is "negotiated procedure without publicity."

VAT adds a layer of administrative realism. A user asks if the company deducts the 21% VAT on the commission. The response is that it is paid "scrupulously" on the full invoice amount because no one wants to attract attention from Hacienda (the Spanish tax agency), "especially if the central government is not of the same persuasion." Representation expenses are described as just another operational cost, indistinguishable from any other business.

Part-time role, €3,000 salary, and an expense card

The economic profile is completed by his own description: part-time dedication, a salary slightly above €3,000, an expense card, and "certain extras." He avoids exact figures to prevent identification via the official gazette. When asked about the percentage of the budget spent on nepotism, friends, foundations, and parallel administration, he replies that it depends on each case.

The path of the naive vs. the savvy

One long intervention asks for a layman's summary: how does one go from joining a party to becoming a deputy mayor? The answer distinguishes two paths. The "naive" path starts at the local headquarters with ideological zeal, leads to getting a membership card, and ends with doing dirty campaign work. The "savvy" path is different. The protagonist admits he was a councilor at 24, believed he could reform the system from within, and resigned "motu proprio" before two years. Had he stayed, he says, he would have been pressured to resign. His conclusion is bitter: "This country deserves the worst."

Pressure, antiestéticar of losing the job, and backdoor exits

Another question explores why officials might antiestéticar losing their positions regardless of elections: illegal procedures, discovered schemes, displeasing the mayor or party boss, or confronting municipal staff. While not detailing specifics, the prior story of forced resignation clarifies that local politics has expulsion mechanisms outside electoral processes. The conversation shifts to hierarchy: the difference between deputy mayor and vice-mayor, which he calls "perfect synonyms," and the jump from sergeant to lieutenant, belonging to different scales.

From jokes to threats about roadside killings

The tone oscillates between humor and veiled threats. Some quote the joke that a deputy mayor is a "milestone" (a pun implying obstruction), others ask if he went out with prostitutes with the mayor, and some inquire about the culture councilor's personal life. An uncomfortable question appears: "Do you think you'll escape the ditches?" Referring to roadside killings often attributed to organized crime or political violence in sensationalist narratives. His reply, widely cited, is: "When ditchings begin, it is hard to know who will end up in the ditches." He does not clarify if he is joking.

Water, waste, and IBI: the other side of the coin

Against the portrait of widespread overpricing, there is a defense of non-professional politicians. One participant argues that his management has kept IBI (property tax) and other taxes lower than the rest of the province, with no land value uplift charges and almost nonexistent building licenses except for projects over €100,000. He acknowledges this maintains a privileged status compared to those who "break their backs to pay taxes, fees, and other burdens." The exchange leaves an unresolved question: are these margins sustained by efficiency or by keeping much activity out of the formal circuit?

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The protagonist summarizes his position with an unassailable phrase: "I am an honest and upright public servant; let them audit me." The irony is his. The problem is that, after reading how 15-20% of a rigged contract is distributed, it is difficult to tell where the joke ends and the indictment begins.