Spain’s trade shift to China marks strategic pivot, says analysts

2025 data reveals a deteriorating commercial relationship with the US: Spain sells less and buys more, while China gains weight as a partner. The key question is whether this shift reflects a deliberate strategy or mere tariff arithmetic.

Trade between Spain and the United States closed 2025 with an uncomfortable balance. Spanish exports to the US totaled **16.716 billion euros**, down **8%** from the previous year. Imports from the US reached **30.174 billion**, up **7%**. In short, Spain buys nearly twice what it sells to its Atlantic partner, and the gap widens in the wrong direction. Tariffs and sanctions Washington imposed on Europe in 2025 explain much of this deterioration, but the result is that the trade relationship with the US loses relative weight for the Spanish economy.

## The double trade deficit not solved by submission

US tariff logic did not distinguish between loyal partners and inconvenient ones. Denmark, Germany, and other European countries that had aligned their foreign policy with Washington received the same commercial blow. This leaves an uncomfortable conclusion for those who defend submission as a strategy: if the punishment arrives regardless, submission does not buy immunity. Spain, which buys twice as much from the US as it sells—maintaining a structural trade deficit with its partner—was no exception.

Trade with the US declines despite diplomatic deference. The relationship, as currently structured, functions as a lose-lose scenario: Spain loses sales and gains import dependency, while the US applies tariffs that do not distinguish between allies and non-allies. There is no room to fix this through diplomatic courtesy.

## China is now a larger trading partner than the US

Data from the Spain-China Foundation confirms that **China is already a larger trading partner for Spain than the US**. Trade with China grows while trade with the US shrinks. This presents an opportunity that goes beyond simple arithmetic: China needs friendly countries in Europe, and Spain has three ports—**Algeciras**, **Valencia**, and **Barcelona**—with a strategic position in the Mediterranean and direct connection to maritime routes linking Asia with Southern Europe.

The historical comparison made with the **Marquis of Ensenada** points in this direction: replacing French and British partners with Chinese and American ones as preferred associates. Ensenada, in the 18th century, promoted a policy of active neutrality and commercial diversification to avoid dependence on conflicting powers. The contemporary reading would be similar: if the US punishes all of Europe, seek partners who do not punish.

## Transatlantic tensions and military spending

The US demand that European allies dedicate **5% of GDP** to defense clashes with a fact: the US itself does not reach **4%** of its own GDP in military spending, and much of what it demands from Europe is to purchase weapons manufactured in the US. In other words, the European fiscal effort would end up financing the American industry. Spain has already absorbed military commitments and accepted cooperation in defense matters, but the underlying framework remains asymmetric.

On the political front, the Trump administration accumulates disapproval records in the US, and several Republicans have begun to distance themselves. The threat to invade Greenland, territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, an EU member state, introduced a new variable: for the first time, a historic US ally publicly questions the relationship. A survey by **Research Co** conducted in **2026** shows **48% of Canadians in favor** of Canada joining the European Union and **34% against**. Trump’s pressure on Canada had an unexpected effect: it moved a G7 country closer to the European bloc.

## Gas, tariffs, and energy costs

The trade war and geopolitical tensions have left Europe without cheap Russian gas and with rising energy prices. Gas prices have risen by **90%** in the context of this standoff. For an economy like Spain’s, where the energy bill weighs heavily on the trade balance, this increase is another argument for diversifying partners and supply routes.

Pedro Sánchez has maintained a position of rejecting war and seeking alternative partners, and that stance carries a diplomatic cost with Washington. The open question is whether the shift toward China and commercial diversification will compensate for losses in the US market. 2025 data suggests the relationship with the US was already deteriorating before Spanish policy leaned toward other partners. The statesman’s strategy, if it is one, is measured in decades, not quarters.