Spain's PP accused of hiding ideology better than PSOE

Liberals camouflage themselves better than socialists and communists

Why do center-right voters in Spain feel more deceived by the People's Party (PP) than by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)? The answer circulating among economic skeptics is uncomfortable: socialists and communists are predictable, but liberals are not. The former wear their labels openly; the latter wave flags, recite José Antonio Primo de Rivera, and then do the opposite. This asymmetry—the transparency of declared adversaries versus the opacity of those who disguise themselves—underpins a debate that has lasted 1,206 days with 163 unanswered replies.

The starting point is a thesis that unsettles both sides: liberals are worse than socialists and communists. Not because their policies are more harmful, but because their packaging is harder to unmask. The argument relies on electoral behavior observations: the PSOE doesn't need to disguise itself, while the PP campaigns as Catholic, pro-life, and more patriotic than anyone else, only to systematically betray that voter base, according to this view.

The camouflage thesis: why liberals deceive more

The core of the argument is a hierarchy of danger. Socialists and communists would be "destructive and harmful beings, but they don't deceive, or at least only fools." Liberals, however, "camouflage themselves better and are smarter." The phrase summarizing the reproach is serving two masters: they declare themselves Catholic but haven't stepped into a church since first communion, and boast about patriotism while, according to this current, viewing immigration favorably if it allows speculation and profit.

There is a repertoire of phrases this reading considers characteristic: "if you close the Gibraltar fence, you kill neighboring towns," "Spanish colonies are poor and Anglo ones are rich." Added to this is an affection for the Anglo-Saxon world—the photo of Manhattan or London in the dining room—and the idea that civilization belongs to them, with the atomic bombs in Japan seen as a necessary evil and visits to Normandy to thank US soldiers.

Liberalism as sin and the 2030 Agenda

The conversation quickly drifts into religious territory. It is argued that the Church has already positioned itself against liberals who call themselves Catholics, equating that condemnation with what Marxists deserve. The sharpest formulation: "Liberalism is sin and leads us to the chaos of the 2030 Agenda; it's them or us." In response, the skeptical reply is immediate: if you aren't a socialist, communist, or liberal, what are you? The answer—"I am Catholic, I don't need parties to represent me"—closes the circle and leaves the debate where it started.

The opposing trench appears soon after. Some defend that "some things about liberals are very good, provided strategic resources and sectors are not touched." Others point out that the problem isn't liberalism but its caricature: a system that needs to take half your earnings in taxes, create an elephantine administration, and meddle in your sensual tendencies isn't liberalism; it's something else with a changed label.

Has liberalism ever been applied in Spain?

Here the analysis becomes more interesting than the squabble. The most repeated argument is that Spain has been communist, fascist, socialist, slave-owning, and even capitalist, "but never, I say never, liberal." The conclusion drawn: people harshly criticize the only system that hasn't been tried. The corollary is that liberalism would end small handouts, pogre tax brackets, pensions above contributions, and the idea that certain services are paid for by "the rich."

The counter-reply comes via consistency: if liberalism has never truly been implemented, it can't be blamed for what global financial power does. "Call it liberalism, call it global financial power, it makes no difference to me," responds the critical flank, accusing liberals of using the same excuse as socialists: that their real model was never applied.

Financial power above the State

One of the most substantial derivatives argues that the State is not above banks and multinationals, but rather the reverse. Private central banks, Basel, and the Bank for International Settlements are cited as the true architecture of power, contrasting with what is described as "liberal lies." In this reading, that financial power is also aligned with the pogre agenda imposed coercively from the Anglo-Saxon sphere.

The objection to this thesis is elementary logic: if a dozen families controlled the world, they wouldn't need to buy politicians. The power to command belongs to the State, not to millionaires. And here a sustancia ilegal opens that nobody closes: if the magnate whispers in the politician's ear, the system cannot be Marxism, but nor is it pure liberalism. Contradictions accumulate on both sides.

Feudalism under another name

The most acidic description of the current system doesn't call it liberalism, but feudalism: "lords living in their castles who herd and shear you in exchange for a bit of security and lots of antiestéticar." The comparison has traction because it connects with defending the Middle Ages as one of history's best eras and claiming the civilizing role of the Church and the Spanish Empire.

In that framework, liberalism is presented as the first left, not the right it is associated with today. The paradox is highlighted that many of its defenders boast of patriotism while, according to this critique, they serve Anglo-Saxon interests. The example given is a PP leader applauded in the British Parliament.

Immigration as proof of double standards

The migration issue functions as a coherence test. It is reproached that pogre are blamed for mass immigration when, according to this reading, millions entered during PP governments. The liberal response is that the immigration they defend isn't the one subsidized by state handouts, but that governed by reciprocity: if a migrant can enter and get free residence and healthcare, then a Spaniard should have the same in their country of origin.

The exchange gets heated and loses precision. Personal reproaches appear, references to NATO and Western Sahara, and a recurrent accusation: that liberalism is usury disguised as doctrine. The discussion closes, as almost always, without agreement and with the feeling that each side is responding to an imaginary interlocutor.

The list nobody wants to answer

One of the most valued messages proposes a simple test to know if society is moving toward more or less liberalism: Is there more or less State? More or fewer regulations? More or fewer taxes? More or less individual freedom? More or less public debt? More or less money creation? More or less indoctrination? More individual empowerment or more sheep-like conformity?

The list doesn't seek an answer but highlights that the label matters less than the direction of movement. And there, indeed, nobody agrees. Some see more State and less freedom; others see exactly the opposite. Liberalism, meanwhile, remains largely untested. Or so they say.