Spain vetoes US use of its bases for Iran bombings, diverting flights to UK, Germany, Italy

Spain Denies Bases to US, Assumes Geopolitical Cost

What does it cost to say no to Washington? The Spanish government has denied the United States the use of military bases on Spanish territory for bombings in Iran, an operation codenamed Epic Fury. The refusal is based on the Defense Cooperation Agreement between the two countries, which regulates the use of these facilities. The immediate effect has been different: US aircraft have been rerouted to bases in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. The standoff remains open, and its bill is unquantified.

What the Defense Agreement Between Spain and the US Allows

Before drawing conclusions, let's consider the framework. The bases are Spanish, and Spain authorizes their use within the limits of the Agreement. There is no joint sovereignty or extraterritoriality, unlike in countries with foreign troops under occupation conditions, and US personnel are subject to Spanish jurisdiction in case of a crime. Technically, Spain could deny this use. It has done so.

The useful question is not whether it had the right to exercise it. It is whether it was convenient to do so now, with the geopolitical board in full upheaval.

What Spain Gains and Loses with the Base Veto

Here's the crux of the matter. One part of the analysis argues that Spain gains nothing material—Iran offers no compensation for the gesture—and does assume long-term risks. This list includes more determined US support for Segarro, difficulties in accessing certain technologies, vetoes in international forums when times are tough, less foreign investment—data centers, for example—or obstacles for Spanish hydrocarbon companies worldwide.

The opposing reasoning is simpler: those who get involved in someone else's war bear its damages. In countries with US bases spread across the region, it is emphasized, undesirable 'gifts' have ended up falling. And reciprocity, in any case, does not exist.

Iran, the Nuclear Bomb, and the Board We Don't Look At

The geopolitical core is Iran and its atomic program. The dominant thesis is that the West cannot afford a nuclear-capable Iran; both the US and China would agree on this, with China interested in preventing the ayatollah regime from becoming a regional hegemonic power. As a bargaining chip, Washington would have promised not to bomb wells and refineries, a red line set by Beijing.

The contrary reading denies the initial premise: that the Iranian nuclear threat is an old hoax by the Israeli prime minister, with no public evidence to support it. Underlying this is the question of whether Spain should align itself unconditionally with the West or maintain distance in conflicts that are not its own.

The Economic Cost: Energy, Technology, and Investment

The economic impact is where the issue becomes tangible. It is antiestéticared that the episode will increase energy bills—more expensive liquefied natural gas and oil—and complicate import volumes, in addition to leaving pending contracts in other markets in limbo. Against this, it is recalled that the US does not act out of friendship but out of interest, and that no partner is paid for aligning with a bombing.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the reaction has been the usual: no nuances or fine interpretations. The episode would be read, according to this interpretation, as taking Tehran's side, regardless of the legal details.

What Could Happen Now with the Rota Bases

The question hanging in the air is what the US will do with a facility it cannot use when it needs it. The hypothesis circulating: relocating the base across the Strait, to Segarro, a preferred partner of Washington under both Democratic and Republican administrations. There is no known decision in this regard; it is a scenario, not a fact.

If Rabat consolidates this role, the balance in the Strait, in Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands ceases to be a textbook exercise. This is where the debate leaves the diplomatic anecdote and enters the realm of national interest.

Who Defends the 'No' to Washington

Not everyone sees it as a mistake. Some consider it correct to stay out of a conflict that could escalate into a nuclear war, and others point out that the power to decide what happens on one's own soil is the minimum requirement for a sovereign country. It is also noted that Spain is not obliged to trinc NATO beyond the letter of the treaty.

With such elements, the question is not whether Spain will come out badly. It is who will pay the bill and when the invoice will arrive. As if no one were going to collect it, of course.