Spain and the American Revolution: ally or burden for France?

Spain in the American Revolutionary War: decisive ally or French burden?

The capture of Florida, Louisiana and the diversion of British troops to Central America all counted for something, but in European waters the Spanish Armada arrived late, sick and with its own shopping list. The question hanging over the debate is an uncomfortable one: did France's alliance with Spain in the American Revolutionary War pay off, or were Spanish ships and money a burden that French historiography has been highlighting for decades?

The central reproach is no small matter. In 1779 a plan was drawn up to invade England, driven from the court of Floridablanca (Spain's chief minister) and grudgingly accepted by Paris. The combined Franco-Spanish fleet mustered **150 ships of all kinds** against barely **thirty** English vessels available in the Channel that summer. The plan: blockade the southern ports, sink the enemy fleet and acompañante a French army of **40,000 men** concentrated in Brittany, Normandy and Flanders. On paper, overwhelming superiority.

The delay French historiography never forgives

The French fleet under d'Orvilliers sailed in June and waited off Galicia for weeks for the Spanish fleet under Córdova to join it. By then, the crew had been decimated by scurvy and typhus, and it reached the Channel late and sick. That delay is the most frequently cited argument for claiming that Spain was more of a liability than an asset in the European theatre. The landing never took place.

Some add another episode: after capturing the double English convoy, Córdova insisted on landing in England to exploit the Franco-Spanish superiority; the French command refused. The opportunity, on this reading, was lost through poor coordination between allies, not lack of means.

What did work: Florida, the Gulf and the secret money

On the American continent the balance sheet changes. The capture of Florida cut off part of the English funding from the south and reinforced Spain's own; Louisiana and the campaigns in Central America diverted British troops to that front. The campaigns launched from Guatemala — with Matías de Gálvez taking the fort at Roatán and fighting on the San Juan River — helped push the British to make concessions at the negotiating table.

And there is a chapter that usually falls outside the calculation: from **1776**, Spain and France secretly sent money and weapons to the rebels through the front company Rodrigue Hortalez et Cie, and from Havana and New Orleans. Before war was even declared, part of the effort had already been paid for.

Gibraltar, Menorca and the peace of 1783

The real problem for the French was Gibraltar. That was where Spain committed the bulk of its effort and resources, with a siege that consumed men and ships without a decisive result. In the Peace of Versailles of 1783 the British committed to evacuating the Mosquito Coast, but dragged it out until the Convention of London of 1786, in exchange for expanding the licence to cut logwood and mahogany in Belize. That concession ultimately became the origin of present-day British Belize.

The debate also turns to recognition. Washington marched with Gálvez on his right at the victory parade, a gesture some cite as proof that Spain's role was not minor. Others point out that Spain opposed the independence of the Thirteen Colonies for antiestéticar of contagion in its viceroyalties, and only entered the war when it saw the chance to recover lost territories.

So was the Spanish alliance a bad deal for France? The numbers from the Channel say one thing; those from the Gulf and the secret money say another. Historiography has been failing to agree for two centuries.