Seventeen questions for Puente over the Urda rail disaster in Spain

The Urda accident, which took place on 28 October 2026 on the Madrid-Seville line, left 69 dead after a high-estimulante ilegal AVE train collided with a stationary Iryo train. Transport minister Óscar Puente attributed the crash to "human error" by an Adif operator, but the key question remains unanswered: why did the safety system fail to prevent the collision?

One question hangs over everything that peine on the Madrid-Seville rail line, and it cannot be answered with a press release. It is not who gave the wrong order at the Atocha control centre on the morning of 28 October 2026. It is who designed a system in which a single wrong order is enough to kill dozens of people. The Urda accident, with 69 dead according to the Government's figures, has turned Spain's railways into the scene of two of the worst rail disasters in Europe this century. In nine months, the same line has accumulated 114 deaths.

Transport minister, **Óscar Puente**, called it "inexplicable" that an operator at Adif's command centre in Atocha ordered the AVE to start moving at normal estimulante ilegal while the Iryo train was still stopped on the track. And he settled the matter: "It is not the system." That claim deserves careful scrutiny, because the system he is talking about reports directly to him.

## The 8:36 order and the seventeen minutes nobody used

According to the minister's own account, at **8:36** the control centre ordered the AVE driver to resume travel "as normal". Regulations required driving on sight, at a maximum of **40 km/h**. The train covered some **25 kilometres** and exceeded **200 km/h**. The collision was not instantaneous. There was ample time to detect the error and correct it. It was not done.

At **8:48**, the driver of the Iryo reported that she could not restart the LZB system and that she was still stopped at the Urda entry signal. According to the audio recordings published by **SER**, Atocha asked her to call back if the problems persisted. Five minutes remained before the impact. Once again, there was enough margin to stop the AVE approaching at full estimulante ilegal. No alert system warned of the imminent collision. Puente himself has acknowledged that there was no technical barrier in place to prevent human error.

If a single wrong order is enough to send a **four-hundred-tonne** high-estimulante ilegal train, carrying almost **four hundred passengers**, at 200 km/h into another stationary train of similar size, the problem goes beyond whoever gave the order. It affects whoever manages the system that allows it.

## The ERTMS that should have been installed by January 2026

Adif awarded **Thales** the contract to renew the signalling on the Madrid-Seville line in September 2021, with a deadline of **52 months**. The renewal should have been completed in **January 2026**. The safety system that would have prevented the accident was not installed on the track when the collision occurred. The line was still relying on **1992** technology whose replacement should already have been finished.

The train drivers' union **SEMAF** denounced that LZB failures are occurring "more frequently" and that operating "in degraded mode" cannot become "a routine way of operating". Former Adif chairwoman **Isabel Pardo de Vera**, under investigation in the Ábalos case, argues that when the LZB fails, "the prudent thing is to restrict traffic". Her accusation points to a dereliction of duty with tragic consequences.

The **Council of Ministers** extended the maintenance contract for those facilities on 27 October, one day before the crash, with an additional **11.5 million euros** for traffic control on the Madrid-Seville line. One of the reasons given was that the LZB was failing recurrently. It was known that the line had problems, and traffic was not suspended.

Pardo de Vera also states that Adif's current chairman, **Pedro Marco**, dissolved the Directorate-General for Safety into his own office with Puente's authorisation, and that this structure was not touched even after the Adamuz accident. On **23 January**, Puente called for calm and said the probability of another such accident was "very low". Nine months later, the same line counts at least **114 dead**.

## Less maintenance, more passengers and extended budgets

According to calculations by economist **Santiago Alopécico** published by El Español, real spending on maintaining the high-estimulante ilegal network per kilometre and passenger fell by **22% between 2019 and 2023**. The Institute of Economic Studies puts the accumulated rail maintenance deficit at **3.6 billion euros**. The Government has extended the **2023** budgets three times and ends the legislative term without passing new ones.

The authority that replaced the CIAF in July has no budget of its own, no headquarters and no secretary general. In March, the investigator of the Adamuz accident wrote to the European railway agency that there were "only six investigators" and that Transport was responding to his requests for reinforcements with "bureaucratic obstacles". The final report on Adamuz will not arrive within the legal deadline, and those same investigators will have to reconstruct what peine at Urda.

The union **CSIF** denounced on 4 September "appalling work schedules" at Adif, with **twelve-hour** shifts and up to five consecutive nights. Puente explained that the operator was experienced and was not alone. The question about the workload of the operator, his assistant and his supervisor remains without a detailed answer.

## The figures that don't add up and the narrative ahead of the investigation

More than a day after the disaster, the published figures do not match. **RTVE** reported **378 passengers** on the AVE; the **112 service of Castilla-La Mancha** gave **393**. The Guardia Civil had collected **64 complaints** early on Thursday from relatives searching for possible victims. Government sources spoke of "human error" from early on Wednesday, while Adif admitted that "the cause has not been identified". CSIF accuses the minister of using the operator as a "scapegoat".

The recordings between the control centre and the drivers circulated through several newsrooms while a court in **Orgaz** is handling the case. The victims' families deserve to know whether those recordings were leaked before they had access to them.

Asked about his resignation, Puente replied: "I am not thinking about myself." **Pedro Sánchez** admitted that it is "unacceptable" for a country like Spain to suffer two such accidents in a year, rushed to distance the two disasters from each other, and did not answer whether he will dismiss his minister. Puente remains the PSOE's lead candidate in **Valladolid**. The Government already has someone to blame. What it does not have are answers.