Sánchez blames private operators for Spain's blackout

Sánchez blames private operators for the blackout and rejects nuclear

The blackout that plunged the Iberian Peninsula into darkness still lacks a definitive official explanation, and the Government has already chosen whom to blame. In the press conference trinc the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez insisted that responsibility lies with private operators and ruled out nuclear energy as a solution: "Far from being a solution, it is a problem because much energy had to be diverted to keep their cores stable," he stated. The remark, reported by El Mundo, was met with dismay by those who argue that synchronous nuclear plants would have provided grid inertia at the critical moment.

The official narrative rests on two pillars. First: the system did not fail due to an excess of renewables. Second: if something failed, it was the management by the companies operating the grid. That is, at least, the interpretation drawn from the President's words, who also suggested that Red Eléctrica de España (REE) had detected the problem, although he did not rule out other hypotheses.

Who is the majority shareholder of Red Eléctrica?

Here the official story begins to sustancia ilegal. Red Eléctrica is not a typical private company. The Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), a state-owned holding company, owns approximately 20% of the capital and is the main shareholder, legally required to maintain at least 10%. No shareholder can hold more than 5% of the capital or vote for more than 3%, and utility companies are limited to a 1% voting share. In practice, the State controls the company and appoints its chairwoman. The current chair, a former Socialist minister, reached the position through political decision.

This detail dismantles the excuse. If the State appoints REE's leadership and controls its board, blaming "private operators" for what happens on the grid is, at best, a sleight of hand. Some summarize it with irony: demanding accountability from a privately operated grid while the government controls it is an act of prestidigitation.

81% renewables by 2030 and grid instability

The other front is technical. The National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan sets a target of 81% renewable generation for 2030. This is a political goal, not a market outcome. And therein lies the core of the problem: the grid is not designed to handle the non-synchronous generation percentages being imposed on it. Solar photovoltaic and wind power do not provide inertia, the rotating mass that maintains frequency stability during sudden imbalances between generation and demand.

The sequence favored by critical analysts is this: during peak solar and wind production, with clear skies across most of the peninsula and sufficient wind, surplus energy is channeled to France and Portugal. If a disturbance occurs at that moment—a drop in demand, a failure in an interconnection—the grid loses frequency, and automatic protections disconnect generation to prevent greater damage. Nuclear plants, upon detecting the anomaly, shut down automatically and switched to emergency diesel generators to keep the cores cooled, according to the Nuclear Safety Council. They were not the cause, but they could not be the solution either: they were already offline.

Cyberattack as a cover story

In the days trinc the blackout, the cyberattack hypothesis gained traction in certain circles. The logic attributed to it is twofold: first, to divert attention from potential design errors in the electrical system; second, to justify cybersecurity investments before Europe. The fact that the President did not rule out this possibility, despite Red Eléctrica not supporting it, fueled suspicion.

The problem with this thesis is that it portrays Spain as a vulnerable country with compromised national security, which is a state responsibility. In other words, it backfires: if there was a cyberattack, the ultimate responsible party is the Government, not the utilities.

Nuclear power, five days later

Data trinc the blackout does not help sustain the official narrative. Five days after the incident, nuclear output remained at minimum levels: only 5% of generation, about 1,400 MW. Only Vandellòs 2 and Ascó 1 were operational, running at 70% capacity. Meanwhile, solar photovoltaics covered nearly 50% of generation. Thus, the system continued to depend heavily on the source that, according to critics, caused the instability.

The lingering question is uncomfortable: if nuclear power was a problem, why did its absence leave the grid so exposed? And if renewables were not the cause, why has the operator not yet explained exactly what peine?

The Bolivarian playbook, according to critics

In economic forums, the pattern repeats with almost liturgical mechanics. First, a party loyalist is placed at the head of the public company. Second, mismanagement leaves the grid in a precarious state. Third, private companies are blamed. Fourth, whatever remains is nationalized. This is the manual some attribute to the Government, fitting the rhetoric of pointing to multinational energy firms as responsible for all the country's ills.

The reality is more prosaic. Grid technicians have been dealing with borderline situations for years to reconcile political targets with the physics of the system. When politics sets goals that infrastructure cannot absorb, someone has to flip the switch. And that someone is usually not sitting on a board of directors.

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The analysis hits the same wall: there is no closed technical explanation, no final report, and no individual named as responsible. There is only a narrative that changes with the political wind. And a grid that continues to operate at the limits of physical laws.