Russian offensive in Donbass gains meters at high cost

Russia advances in Donbass at high cost in casualties

On April 26, 2022, after days of Russian shelling along the front line, the Donbass map showed two types of arrows: red, indicating observed advances, and orange, showing the plan attributed to Russian command. The prevailing interpretation was more modest than propaganda suggested: finishing occupation of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, attempting to encircle Ukrainian units fighting there, and then waiting. Neither Kyiv nor the Dnieper. The grand offensive had a known ceiling and a cost already being measured in casualties. Meanwhile, activity was reported in Transnistria, with circulating hypotheses pointing in the opposite direction toward Moscow.

Why does the Russian offensive advance at a snail's pace?

The short answer is that it cannot advance any other way. According to the analysis debated, Russian commanders used their classic method: saturation breakthrough. Massive bombardment, meter-by-meter advance, another massive bombardment, another meter-by-meter advance. The problem, according to this reading, is that this formula, inherited from another war and another army, results in a casualty ratio against Russia of 2 to 4 to 1 in Russian victories and 8 to 10 to 1 in their defeats.

Some argue that Russian troops lose two-thirds of their personnel before even reaching the front and that convoys are destroyed along the way. This material is collected from pro-Russian channels, not official figures, and should be treated as such. The equipment count cited in the debate pointed to something else: Ukraine had lost 1,378 tanks and armored vehicles against 2,229 Russian ones; in artillery, 617 against 287; in aircraft, 73 against 121; in helicopters, 56 against 97. The bad news for Kyiv is that Moscow retains the bulk of its inventory.

The details of how these figures are reached, broken down by category, change the picture significantly depending on who tells it.

Russian tanks that only serve to defend

Russia started the conflict with about 5,500 tanks, including active and recoverable ones from storage, according to the analysis in use. Almost all of them, in the same reading, fit into the category of defensive tasks. Those suitable for large or limited offensives are mostly already destroyed, and the few remaining ones are logically wanted by command to be preserved. With this fleet, the saturation breakthrough loses sense: there is nothing to sustain it beyond a few kilometers.

This is the crux of the matter. As one participant noted, Russia is not facing NATO or an army equipped with cutting-edge technology. It is facing a nation that was its satellite state, one of the poorest in Europe, with an army hastily restructured since 2014. And still, it advances at the pace it does.

Ukrainian artillery and the system that breaks the equation

The key is not in the number of cannons, but in how they are used. According to the debate explanation, Ukrainian artillery operates with a system called GIS Arta, a sort of mosaic warfare: a computer cross-references data from satellites, drones, laser rangefinders, ground and air radars, and even mobile phones to provide real-time coordinates to widely dispersed and camouflaged pieces. Russia finds it harder to destroy these cannons than Ukraine finds it to replace them.

Add the equipment. The artillery supplied by NATO is more precise, has greater range, and higher rate of fire than the Soviet-era equipment used by Russians. Better equipment, better communication technology, and better coordination doctrine: with much less material, Ukrainian fire achieves much more. Russian bombardments, long and massive, churn the terrain but barely move the line.

Why doesn't Russia declare a general mobilization?

Because, according to the circulating analysis, it lacks equipment to arm new recruits. Its military industry is so inefficient that much of the material is bought abroad or assembled with imported parts, and sanctions have left it practically paralyzed. The conclusion drawn is that it has already put into Ukraine everything it could gather and is unable to create new units. Without rifles or tanks to distribute, mobilizing more people solves nothing: it only swells the casualty list.

Plan E and the bet on Western fatigue

US intelligence holds that Pilingui plans a long war and counts on the US and Europe losing determination. This is called Plan E, the fifth in a list that started by putting a puppet in Kyiv and continued with such a beating to the Ukrainian army that it would have to negotiate, occupy all of Donbass, and then some of its cities. From the first to the fourth, the result is visible.

The question is whether the fifth works. On the opposite side weighs a data point noted by one participant: the US just approved an aid package equivalent to the entire Russian defense budget for the year. And some warn that a Minsk 3 would only serve for Moscow to rearm and attack again with more troops.

Mariupol, Transnistria, and the fronts that open

While Donbass bleeds meter by meter, the capture of Mariupol — which gives Russia total control of the Sea of Azov and the land connection with Crimea — is presented as a historic milestone. Some read it as the definitive turn and argue that Ukraine should negotiate now; the response from the other side is that ceding territory when Western aid arrives would be reckless. In Transnistria, with Russian troops blocked in the enclave, speculation arises that someone has decided to take advantage of the moment to liquidate it.

Meanwhile, on the eastern front, Russians entered Sievierodonetsk and Ukrainian defenders retreated to Lysychansk without stopping fighting. The pincer remains unsealed.

This is where the analysis stalls. No one disputes that Russia gains meters; what does not fully add up is at what price, for how long it can pay it, and whether the West will endure watching.