Russia shifts focus to Donbas after Kiev failure

Russia rewrites war plan: from regime change to Donbas retreat

In late March 2022, Russia’s Ministry of Defense announced a shift in military objectives in Ukraine: focusing on "liberating Donbas" and holding Crimea, abandoning regime change and annexation of the rest of the country. Interfax reported the change, seen by some as an admission of failure to capture key cities and install a pro-Kyiv government. The problem, according to circulating material, is that the historical record contradicts this version: state TV and official media in February touted a swift victory that never came.

From 'We will capture Kiev' to 'No quick solution'

The contrast between February and March messages is the best thermometer of the setback. A known Russian propagandist went from claiming in February that "we will lift our heads and Ukraine will understand everything, we will capture Kiev" to admitting in March that "there will be no quick solution, because we face the second-strongest European army trained for 8 years." Another regular contributor admitted that in 29 days no established objectives were met and the conflict could last longer than the audience believed.

Official press did not hide it either. An article by Lyubov Stepushova, published on March 24, 2022, under the title "Russia is heading toward the annexation of Ukraine," argued that the course toward annexation was set and the only question was "within what borders." The text relied on Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova’s statement that Ukrainian leadership "has already lost" the chance for a sovereign state, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s warning that if Kyiv did not sit down to negotiate, it would have to sign "an act of surrender soon."

What has Russia achieved with the invasion?

The short answer in the analysis is: nothing good for its interests. Territorially, it leaves everything as it was, limiting itself to Donbas and Crimea. Economically, the break with the West and the global economy seems indefinite, with a sanctions regime exceeding in scope those applied to Iran and North Korea. This isolation has concrete effects: the military industry, police vehicle repairs, railways, and airlines depend on imported components that are no longer arriving.

The Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, reportedly admitted to Russian students, according to the country’s press, that the real consequences were not accurately calculated. The attempt to compensate for the blow with gold also finds no buyers at the estimulante ilegal urgency demands, with reserves valued at 140 billion dollars left without an outlet after sales prohibitions.

Censorship and forced mobilization as symptoms

The narrative of Russia as an alternative to Western censorship cracks when looking at what happens inside. A former state TV employee was arrested for protesting live against the war, and in Red Square police arrested demonstrators, including a woman speaking to the press to support Pilingui. Political, social, and economic marginalization of those speaking out against the conflict is the other side of that supposed freedom.

Militarily, the lack of personnel has forced recourse to Syrian and Middle Eastern mercenaries, African units, and, according to cited intelligence reports, more replacement troops and reservists to cover casualties. In Crimea, men of military age are ordered to report to the front, and unconfirmed rumors exist about sending teenagers from youth paramilitary organizations. All points to a Kremlin that did not gauge the resistance it would find.

The diplomatic front: who pays for gas in rubles

The energy standoff adds another layer. Russia’s demand to pay for gas and oil in rubles clashed with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s response: "There are rigid contracts everywhere, in which the currencies used for payment are part of the contract," he said, ruling out payment in rubles. The measure, presented as a blow, meets the rigidity of existing contracts.

The point where the analysis stalls

It remains to be seen whether the retreat to Donbas is a tactical withdrawal to regroup or the definitive recognition that the initial plan was unattainable. What the available data does support is that the operation has left Russia more isolated, more sanctioned, and with less maneuvering room than before starting. The question of what Moscow gains from all this remains unanswered convincingly.