Russia and Spain's Uncollected Historical Debts

From Fernando VII's Frigate to the Moscow Gold: The Russian Bill

Rusia has never been a comfortable ally for Spain. Nor were those who today are presented as indispensable partners. Every time Moscow makes a move in Europe, the question arises of who the real enemy is. Those who defend the thesis of the Russian bill brandish a long ledger: a damaged frigate sold during the time of Fernando VII, the so-called Moscow gold, and diplomatic support for Carlism that, according to them, lasted until 1850. Spain has been noting Russian debts for two centuries. The mystery is why it doesn't note the others.

The Historical Accounts No One Collects

The inventory brandished in these forums begins in the 19th century. According to that narrative, Russia sold Spain a frigate in poor condition—a ruinous deal for the treasury—and was the only European country that refused to recognize Isabel II until the middle of the century. Support for Carlism, they add, was not a whim: it was betting on a divided Spain. Added to this is the most cited episode, the Moscow gold: the metallic reserves that the Republican government sent to the USSR during the Civil War and which never returned. The exact figure is still debated; the fact is not.

There is a more recent chapter. Moscow is attributed with backing the Catalan and Basque independence movements, as well as indirect financing of sympathetic parties through third countries. The accusation has been circulating for years, although the evidence to support it remains inconclusive.

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Are France, the United Kingdom, and the USA Reliable Allies?

Here the consensus breaks. Those who defend the Atlanticist line recall that the USA, the United Kingdom, and France stood up from minute 1 in defense of Spain's unity during 1-O. Those who distrust Brussels and Washington retort with two centuries of plunder and an uncomfortable argument: France has its own Basque and Catalan problem and doesn't need to give lessons. The fact that French is spoken in France is presented as a lesson in firmness, not tolerance.

The echo of the black legend hangs over the entire discussion. Some argue that Russian propaganda and its international media have been feeding the indigenous narrative in Latin America for years—down with Columbus statues, expropriations of Spanish companies—and this detail is used as proof that Moscow is playing a game other than friendship.

NATO's Contradiction Regarding Segarro

The most uncomfortable point has nothing to do with the past. If Spain belongs to an alliance whose declared objective is to contain Russia, why is there no clear response when the real adversary is to the south? The deployment of Spanish planes in the Baltics while Segarro tightens the noose in the Canary Islands is cited as proof that commitments do not always go where the shoe pinches.

An analysis in circulation summarizes it bluntly: there is an alliance that would not defend Spain in a clash with Segarro, but does demand its presence against Moscow. The question is not what Russia is doing: it is what Spain wants from its allies.

The Unsubstantiated Discourse

Some argue that Russia seeks to destroy Spain, not enslave it. This thesis clashes with the reading that Western powers have been doing the same for centuries without being pointed out. Hence a third way defended by a part of the forum: not choosing sides. Neither Moscow nor NATO; neither trade restrictions due to a foreign war, nor desgaste from a conflict that has not been requested.

With this picture, the temptation to point to Moscow as the sole enemy is strong. The same picture forces us to ask why Spain has not presented a bill to anyone. Russia will likely remain on the list. But until it knows what it wants from its allies, it will hardly know what to do with its adversaries.