Rodríguez Braun: Housing is expensive because wages are low

Housing prices up 47% since 2020 while wages stagnate

An apartment that cost a certain amount in 2020 now costs 47% more, according to data circulating in the debate. The salary, the one that barely reaches the end of the month, has hardly moved. This is the starting point proposed by economist Rodríguez Braun, who sums up the problem in an uncomfortable phrase: in Spain, housing is expensive because wages are low. It is not just that brick and mortar prices have skyrocketed; it is that paychecks have remained frozen while the market heated up. With €1,200 in the bank, no rent seems cheap, no matter how much prices are capped or cranes are raised.

The thesis is not new, but it makes both sides uncomfortable. The left because it shifts the focus from regulation to the labor market. The right because it admits there is an income problem, not just a supply issue. And at the heart of the discussion appears a ghost nobody wants to look at directly: if wages rise, does rent also rise?

What exactly does Rodríguez Braun’s diagnosis say?

The approach is simple, which is why it hurts. Apartments have risen 47% since 2020, while salaries remain almost the same. His conclusion is that housing policy alone fixes nothing: you can cap rental prices, incentivize construction, or release land to the market. If the tenant earns €1,200, the problem is not the price on the sign, but the ability to pay.

Some argue this reading is an elegant way of looking away. That the real problem is that housing prices have decoupled from the real economy and that the urgent task is to lower them, not raise wages so people can afford them. The proposal circulating along those lines is brutal: cut sale and rental prices by more than 50% and then see if wage adjustments are needed. The logic is not far-fetched: if the asset is inflated, correcting it is faster than waiting for paychecks to converge.

The problem is that such a correction was already attempted and was not free. Between 2012 and 2013, housing prices fell sharply, and some recall that the government at the time did everything possible to stop the drop. In other words: when prices fall, bailouts appear. The question is who gets bailed out.

The trap of the price-wage spiral

Raising wages sounds good until you look at the other side of the counter. If the tenant earns more, the landlord may demand more. That is the classic objection: a general wage increase translates into higher rents and real effort barely changes. The paycheck goes up, the bill goes up, and the percentage of income spent on housing remains the same.

It is not a physical law, but it has its logic. In a market with rigid supply, any increase in purchasing power tends to be capitalized into prices. And here, supply is anything but elastic. Data used in the analysis point to an imbalance that cannot be fixed with a wage hike: around 100,000 homes completed annually versus 1.2 million people arriving each year. That ratio does not add up anywhere.

The important nuance is that national figures are misleading. Migration pressure is concentrated in a few areas —those with jobs, services, and transport— and that is where the imbalance becomes unsustainable. Building in Soria does not solve Madrid’s problem. And the land where it is needed is already occupied or protected.

The State takes half: tax pressure as background

There is another layer rarely seen in public debate: what the State keeps from every euro that moves. Taxes, social contributions, fees. If half the cost of housing or a salary goes to public burden, the margin for prices to drop or wages to rise narrows from both sides.

The argument put forward is that this pressure is the price of having pensions, healthcare, and education. And that the alternative is the US model, where public services collapse except for the military. The reply is immediate: here, the only thing not collapsing are the pensions. The rest is in shambles, with the highest tax burden in history and debt eating up any room for maneuver.

The circle closes on itself. Revenue is needed to pay debt and pensions. Taxes go up. Housing becomes more expensive and net wages are compressed. And back to square one.

The elephant in the room: who enters and who leaves

At the bottom of the debate lies an issue raised with varying degrees of bluntness depending on who says it: the link between migration flows and housing pressure. Some analyses maintain that Spain creates employment tied to population growth, with flat and low wages, to sustain the pension system. It is an uncomfortable and politically tainted diagnosis, but it is on the table.

The objection to this framework is that the imbalance between completed housing and incoming people is the problem, not the people themselves. And that the areas concentrating pressure are the same ones concentrating jobs. There is not enough land, nor enough construction, nor enough affordable rent.

What seems clear is that the Spanish labor market does not absorb everyone arriving under quality conditions. Some summarize it with a recurring image: a worker striving to open more bottles, better and faster, will hardly qualify for a raise. Wage mobility is scarce and the productive structure does not help.

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With these elements, the conclusion is that there is no single lever. Lower prices, raise wages, build more, manage flows, reduce tax pressure. Each has its cost and resistance. And while deciding which one to pull first, the tenant with €1,200 continues looking at ads they cannot afford.