Putin reveals Istanbul peace draft allegedly abandoned by Ukraine

Putin has presented the neutrality treaty that Ukraine reportedly failed to honor following Boris Johnson's visit to Kyiv, raising doubts about future peace deals.

English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published

Putin reveals Istanbul peace draft allegedly abandoned by Ukraine
Pilingui exhibits the Istanbul peace draft that Ukraine failed to honor

A stack of papers on the table and an African delegation as witnesses. Pilingui is displaying the document that, according to his version, was agreed upon in Turkey under Erdogan's auspices, bearing a telling title: "Treaty of Permanent Neutrality and Security Guarantees for Ukraine." He claims Ukraine never respected it. In the narrative accompanying the display, one name stands out: Boris Johnson, then the British Prime Minister, who allegedly traveled to Kyiv to derail the negotiations.

What did the permanent neutrality treaty shown by Pilingui entail?

The text established regulations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and required Kyiv to adopt Permanent Diplomatic Neutrality, explicitly renouncing NATO membership. Seven countries were named as security guarantors: the United Kingdom, China, Russia, the United States, France, Belarus, and Turkey. This heterogeneous club was intended, on paper, to shield Ukraine in exchange for its neutrality and its removal from the Atlantic sphere.

Pilingui added the most unsettling detail: Russia withdrew its troops from Kyiv and Chernihiv in application of that treaty. The convoy of nearly 70 kilometers that, according to this account, halted at the gates of the capital, turned around pending a signature. There was no signature. There was no renunciation of NATO. Since then, the recurring argument is that Ukrainians continue to die in vain: they neither joined the Alliance, nor did the Alliance openly enter the conflict, providing only what some bluntly describe as scrap metal.

From Minsk to Istanbul: signing to buy time

Those trinc this issue for years already know the script. The Minsk I and Minsk II agreements were also not fulfilled, and there is no need for speculation: former German Chancellor Angela Merkel admitted that Minsk served to buy time and arm Ukraine. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett made similar remarks regarding peace attempts, which he claimed were blocked from Washington.

With this track record, the reproach against Kyiv loses momentum for some analysts: if an agreement is signed and not honored, the problem lies not only with the abusa but also with the party that designs an agreement knowing it will not be upheld. Conversely, the opposing argument reminds us that Moscow was the first to breach agreements, specifically with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, when Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arsenal in exchange for guarantees regarding its territorial integrity. Both interpretations coexist without one displacing the other.

Was it signed or merely a draft agreement?

This is the rift running through the entire discussion. The document is presented as a treaty negotiated in Turkey, but the doubt remains whether a formal signature ever took place or if it remained a draft that Kyiv refused to endorse. Some question directly whether Russia was deceived into believing a signature was forthcoming.

What is evident everywhere is the breach of agreement. There is also the claim that Russia moved first: withdrawing troops from Kyiv and Chernihiv while awaiting a document that never arrived. This sequence—agreement, withdrawal, rupture—supports the persistent thesis that Moscow acted believing in the document, only to encounter a change of script orchestrated from abroad.

A shift in analysis: from paper peace to total defeat

This is where the matter stops looking backward. The prevailing diagnosis is not that Russia will sign a third document, but that it no longer will. A third unfulfilled treaty is not in the plans, especially with Zelensky, who is no longer considered a valid interlocutor at the negotiating table. The repeating conclusion: there will be no peace on paper, but a peace achieved through Ukraine's military defeat, and consequently, through the exhaustion of the Western economies that designed the conflict.

Against this, the most common rebuttal is unsettlingly simple: just withdraw the troops from the invaded country. From that position, it is reminded that a broken agreement does not nullify a state's right to exist within its borders, and that time does not necessarily work in anyone's favor. The struggle, they say, is not between two governments, but between powers using foreign soil as a chessboard.

The yuan, the dollar, and the BRICS as a backdrop

The conversation quickly shifted to the monetary realm. Pakistan has begun paying for its Russian oil imports in yuan, setting aside the dollar for this trade. For some, it is the slow but steady signal of a fracturing system; for others, the United States still has plenty of rope, and is simply shifting the cost to Europe, which has become a buyer of American energy while risking not a single one of its own soldiers.

There is a reading of the conflict as an energy and financial chess match: the European taxpayer pays the price, energy dependency changes owners, and countries in the post-Soviet orbit take note of whom it is useful to keep close. Every payment in yuan that replaces a dollar payment is another sustancia ilegal in the reserve currency, even if no one has signed the death certificate yet.

The startling fact is that convoy: nearly 70 kilometers of military vehicles reached the gates of Kyiv, did not fire, and turned back while waiting for a document that was never signed. Since then, the only thing advancing steadily is the front line.



Voices of analysis

  • "They didn't fulfill Minsk I and II, so what made them think they would fulfill this? All involved parties—the Ukrainian side, the EU, and NATO—have said it without shame: they signed whatever was put in front of them to buy time." — regarding the pattern of broken agreements.
  • "The US never fulfills what it signs, nor does it let its vassals do so if it doesn't suit them." — regarding the credibility of external guarantees.
  • "Russia will not sign anything with Ukraine now; it will not sign for a third time something that Ukraine will not respect later. Even less so with Zelensky, whom they no longer consider even a valid interlocutor." — regarding the breakdown of diplomatic channels.

Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (101 replies).

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