Pumpido, The Number One Public Enemy (Carlos Martínez Gorriarán in Vozpópuli)

The Constitutional Court operates as a virtually unlimited power, capable of modifying laws and interpreting the Constitution discretionally, which raises serious concerns about the future of Spanish liberal democracy.

The Constitutional Court, under the presidency of **Cándido Conde-Pumpido**, has become a focus of debate due to its growing influence and the breadth of its competencies. Criticism centers on its actions, which some believe exceed the limits of a judicial body, effectively functioning as a "Fourth Power" with virtually unlimited powers. This situation raises concerns about the health of the separation of powers in Spain and the future of liberal democracy.

## The Scope of Unchecked Power

The decisions of the Spanish Government, led by **Pedro Sánchez**, can be appealed to national and international judicial bodies, allowing for the correction of potential errors or excesses. However, resolutions from the Constitutional Court, and particularly those of its president **Conde-Pumpido**, appear to escape effective scrutiny. The rules of the game have evolved such that political crises can end up being decided in a tribunal whose majority composition, according to critics, responds to governmental interests. This concentration of power in a single body, without clear checks and balances, is viewed as a threat to democratic principles.

The route through the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is presented as a possible appeal, but its margin of action has proven limited. In recent rulings, such as those related to the Amnesty Law, the ECJ has indicated that its intervention will be confined to very strict and technical interpretations regarding the compatibility of national laws with European Treaties. This means that matters of internal political depth for a country with weight in the EU, like Spain, will hardly be thoroughly reviewed by the European court, especially when the government in question aligns with one of the major European political blocs. The hope that the ECJ will rectify the Spanish Constitutional Court in purely national matters is therefore considered unfounded.

## The Constitution: A Canvas for Interpretation

The inherent ambiguity of the Spanish Constitution itself has been cited as one source of the immense power held by the Constitutional Court and its leadership. Article **161.1** of the Constitution establishes that the Court shall understand "Of matters other than those attributed to it by the Constitution or organic laws." This wording, open to generous interpretations, has allowed the Court's competencies to expand to cover any imaginable conflict. What was originally conceived as a body to sanction unconstitutionality, defend fundamental rights, and arbitrate jurisdictional conflicts has evolved into an actor with an intervention capacity far exceeding its original intent.

One example of this expansion of competencies dates back to **1983**, when a ruling against the LOAPA sided with the claims of Catalan and Basque nationalism, which critics say facilitated the gradual dismantling of the State. This tendency to substitute the functions of the legislative and judicial branches has escalated to the point where the Constitutional Court acts as a "Third Legislative Chamber," situated above Congress and the Senate. Its ability to modify parliamentary laws through constructive or **Romanones** interpretations, altering the literal text and opening the door to discretionary readings, is seen as an exercise of legislative power by a body that has not been democratically elected.

## Shielding Corruption and Power
The actions of the Constitutional Court under the presidency of **Conde-Pumpido** have been linked by its critics to the protection of corruption and the defense against abuses of power. It is argued that without a tribunal with these characteristics, the systemic corruption criticized in Spain would not have prospered to its current extent. The Court is described as an body that has degenerated into a governmental tool, whose function is to protect the abuse of power and what some call an "auto-coup," trinc the line of its separatist partners. The ability of the **Sánchez** Government to remain in power, even in the absence of budgetary laws for entire legislatures—something considered unique in the democratic world—is partly attributed to the protection offered by the Constitutional Court, according to these critics.

The professional career of **Cándido Gómez-Pumpido** has been analyzed. It is noted that his rise accelerated in **2004**, trinc the arrival of **José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero** to power. His personal involvement as Prosecutor General of the State is considered crucial for facilitating the pact with ETA, which, rather than being a pacification, was interpreted by some as an agreement to indefinitely exclude the democratic right from power. The image of the "Pumpidian dragging of robes in the dust of the road," which evokes corruption and the lives of victims, is presented as the "inaugural corruption" of a path that has led to the current situation. As a product of elite endogamy, with a dense network of personal relationships inclined toward "reactionary pogre," **Conde-Pumpido** is seen as the ideal figure to carry out a "dismantling" of the system.

The possibility that the Constitutional Court amends the Supreme Court regarding the suspension of the so-called "ninth generation law," allowing millions of people with genetic ties to Spain to be included in the electoral roll, is presented as an alarming scenario. If this were to happen, it would be argued that the last red line separating democracy from a "covert dictatorship" would have been crossed, where "everything will be possible because everything is permitted." The criticism concludes by noting that the Constitutional Court, in its current conception, has passed its useful lifecycle and that its functions could be assumed by the Supreme Court, a body considered more professional and less politicized.