PP and Vox in Spain: pension and housing privatisation's hidden cost

Cutting income tax while raising health spending to 40% of the budget: PP and Vox's numbers don't add up if pensions are privatised and housing is opened to investment funds.

English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published

PP and Vox in Spain: pension and housing privatisation's hidden cost
Privatising pensions and housing: the plan they won't mention during the campaign

The Spanish right hoping to govern promises to cut taxes and increase health spending. The figures circulating in the debate point to a contradiction that doesn't add up: you can cut income tax and raise the health budget to 40% of the total, but someone pays the difference. And that someone, the most critical voices argue, is the citizen who depends on a public pension and an affordable rent.

The starting point is a warning about the risk of moving the retirement system into the private sector. The experience of 2008 hangs over the argument: investment funds collapse, and when they collapse there is no public bailout that gives back the lost retirement. The privatisation of pensions is not a technical reform, it is a change in who bears the risk.

What is proposed for housing and who wins

The diagnosis being floated is that investment funds specialising in real estate assets would be encouraged and landlords of rental housing would benefit. In other words: the rental market becomes financialised and the tenant competes with institutional capital for an essential good. It is not a distant hypothesis; it is the logic of a model already operating in other European countries.

The immediate objection is that the regional budget of Extremadura presented by PP and Vox raises health spending and cuts income tax. The figure is used as a shield: if health spending goes up, there are no cuts. The problem is the sequence. Cutting taxes and raising spending can only be sustained with debt, with later cuts, or both. The third way, privatising services so that public spending falls without the service disappearing, is the one that raises the most suspicion.

The incompetence argument versus the ideology argument

There is a line of analysis that does not question the programme but the capability. It holds that those aspiring to replace the current government are more incompetent than the executive they seek to replace, and that their advantage is not management but the wear and tear on their opponent. It is a criticism that needs no data: it rests on the perception that the changeover improves nothing.

The counterargument is that the current government does not present a management record that inspires confidence either, and that alternation alone introduces discipline. Neither side presents a full accounting of what its programme would cost. And that is the hole: the campaign is fought on the ground of name-calling, not of numbers.

The calculated silence and the role of the media

The most concrete accusation is deliberate concealment. It is claimed that part of the programme is being held back until after the elections to avoid losing votes, and that certain right-wing journalists would have advised the candidate to keep quiet until then. If that is true, the electorate is voting on an incomplete brochure.

It is not a practice exclusive to one party. Every lengthy programme has dark corners that are illuminated after scrutiny. The difference is one of degree: when what is hidden affects pensions and housing, it affects the spending structure of two generations.

The comparison nobody wins

The debate often drifts into historical comparisons between governments. Names are cited and the conclusion is that none was perfect, which amounts to no conclusion at all. Comparisons are odious, and in economics they are usually useless too, because the context changes more than the manager.

What can be compared are the priorities. A budget that devotes 40% to health says something. A falling income tax says something. A pension system peine to private capital says a lot. The sum of the three things is what has to be read together, not separately.



It remains to be seen whether the electorate rewards ambiguity or punishes it. With the available data, the reasonable prediction is that the full programme will not be known until after the elections, and that the real debate will begin then. By that time, the vote will already have been cast.

Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (97 replies).

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