North Korea: From Rusty Missile to 11-Axle Hwasong-20

From Rusty Scrap to Hwasong-20: A Decade of Rearmament

On July 3rd, the regime tested the combat system of the destroyer Kang Kon, the second in the Choe Hyon class, with strategic cruise missiles, onboard cannons, automatic artillery, and electronic warfare. The first, number 51, is already in service; the third and fourth are under construction. This is the latest development in an inventory that in 2015 barely had a name and today boasts solid-fuel ICBMs, nuclear underwater drones, and a 8,700-ton nuclear submarine.

What Has Changed in North Korea's Arsenal Since 2015

In February 2015, a SES-type fast attack craft appeared, with a low radar signature and four anti-ship missiles. A year later, the Kwangmyongsong-4 confirmed that the space program was holding up after the failures of 2012. In January 2021, the Pukguksong-5 was paraded at the Eighth Party Congress as a solid-fuel SLBM. The sequence is not cosmetic: it went from a display arsenal to a production chain that designs, tests, and deploys.

Artillery trinc the same path. In May, the regime showcased a 24-tube, 240mm multiple rocket launcher with an extended range of 90 km, and a 65 km projectile for the 155mm self-propelled howitzer. Pieces designed to saturate, not just to parade.

The Hwasong-18 and the End of Prior Warning

The real leap came in April 2023. The Hwasong-18, the first true solid-fuel ICBM, reduced launch preparation from hours to minutes and allowed launchers to be hidden in tunnels, ready to deploy immediately. April 2024 added the Hwasong-16B, an IRBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle that flies above Mach 5 at low altitude and maneuvers to evade radars. In March 2025, an Il-76MD converted into an AWACS; in October 2025, the Hwasong-20 on 11-axle TEL trucks.

The Cost That Doesn't Add Up: $63 Billion vs. One Missile

The economic analysis is painful. The US Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system has accumulated over $63 billion for a defense that its own material describes as mathematically insufficient: intercepting a cheap missile with an expensive interceptor is a losing business for whoever has the bigger wallet.

On the other side of the argument is skepticism. Some recall the unfinished hotel in Pyongyang and argue that much of the infographic is cardboard. Others read the rust on the first submarine as proof that the hardware is used and the crews train. Both interpretations coexist unresolved.

What Doesn't Fit

The material leaves two claims unaddressed. First, that the Kang Kon destroyer is fully operational and not just a test mock-up. Second, the real role of North Korean sappers in Kursk, wearing Russian uniforms and equipment and carrying a political class notebook. Coherence, however, is not lacking in the official narrative.

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