North Korea: from bomb tests to serial missile production

North Korea has turned its arsenal into an industrial production line

In December 2012, an Unha-3 rocket put the Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite into orbit. North Korea joined the club of the ten space powers and, in the process, validated the technology of an intercontinental missile. Thirteen years later, in October 2025, Pyongyang paraded three **Hwasong-20** missiles on eleven-axle TEL trucks. The leap is not just technical: it is industrial. The country that once carried out sporadic tests to negotiate is now manufacturing in series, according to the analysis that opens the thread.

The October 2025 display was not a parade of prototypes. Alongside the Hwasong-20 appeared **domestically designed suicide drones**, tanks with active electronic warfare systems and an AWACS built on an Il-76MD. In July 2026, the destroyer Kang Kon completed tests of strategic cruise missiles and electronic warfare systems. It is the second of a class with at least four units under construction. The question is no longer whether North Korea can launch a missile, but how many it can launch at once.

The asymmetric cost that breaks missile defense

The US Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system has accumulated an investment of more than **63 billion dollars**, according to the analysis. Its logic is to intercept a limited number of warheads. The problem is that the Hwasong-18, the first true solid-fuel ICBM, cuts preparation time from hours to minutes. The Hwasong-16B adds a hypersonic glide vehicle that maneuvers at speeds above **Mach 5** and low altitude. Defense has to succeed every time; the attack only once.

Some argue the real change is logistical. Solid fuel allows missiles to be kept hidden in tunnels, ready to fire from the erector-launcher truck. The Songun doctrine, which prioritizes the military in «first, second and third place», according to the quote that opens the analysis, has ceased to be a slogan and become a production plan. The Pukguksong-5, unveiled in January 2021, widens the diameter to hold more propellant. Each model does not replace the previous one: it adds to it.

Submarines, drones and the Haeil: the war under the water

In March 2023 the **Haeil** appeared, an uncrewed nuclear-attack underwater vehicle. Official propaganda presented it as a generator of radioactive tsunamis capable of infiltrating enemy waters and detonating underwater. Extended autonomous navigation over dozens of hours is the figure that matters: an area-denial weapon that needs no crew. In September, a «tactical nuclear attack submarine» was launched at the Sinpho shipyard. In 2025, the command supervised the construction of a strategic nuclear submarine of about **8,700 tons**.

The naval catalog is completed by the SES-type fast attack craft of February 2015, with four anti-ship missiles and a sens SAM launcher, and the Choe Hyon-class destroyers. The first, number 51; the Kang Kon, 52. The Air Force, meanwhile, presented its first domestically developed AWACS in March 2025. Air surveillance, battle management and a fixed radome over the fuselage. The modernization is not a sector: it is an architecture.

How many troops does the Korean People's Army have?

Between **1,000,000 and 1,250,000 active troops** and a reserve of 7.5 to 8.5 million, according to the figures used in the analysis. It is the fourth largest army in the world. The comparison with South Korea is not military, it is economic: South Korea's GDP multiplies North Korea's, but the North has opted for nuclear deterrence instead of economic convergence. The Songun policy, the official defense argues, is the guarantee of survival since the Clinton administration developed its tactical nuclear attack plan. The 1994 Geneva Agreement was signed, according to this reading, when the CIA confirmed that nuclear weapons existed.

Conventional artillery is also being upgraded. In May, Kim Jong Un inspected the 24-tube, 240 mm multiple rocket launcher with extended range of **90 km**, and the 155 mm shell that reaches 65 km. At the 2026 uncrewed technology exhibition, the 600 mm «Sniper» rocket launcher was presented. Tactical, strategic and cruise missiles share platform and doctrine. Serial production is what makes it possible to sustain such an inventory.

The Chonma 2 and the illusion of the decisive tank

The analysis of the Chonma 2 (M-2020) describes an engine that «seems to resemble the German MT883 of the Leopard 2 very closely», with its own turbocharger and intercooler. The lighter weight than the Leopard 2 could give it greater mobility if performance is similar. The rear is higher than the front. These are engineering details that do not answer the underlying question: a tank does not win a war without logistics, maintenance and trained crews. The North Korean doctrine knows this; that is why the tank is not the priority of the arsenal.

Modernization has a limit that the equipment itself hints at. A rusty submarine falling to pieces, one intervention notes, indicates that it is being used and that its crew is trained. A freshly waxed destroyer indicates the opposite. The best ship with the worst crew crashes into the first reef. The North Korean defense industry produces platforms; the question is whether it produces hours at sea.

Deterrence works until it stops working

The maxim running through the analysis is simple: if you have nuclear cucumbers and the means to launch them, nobody gives you any trouble. The New York Times editorial of June 2009 put it another way: North Korea is developing a «formidable record of making good on its threats». General MacArthur left his own warning in 1961: «Never get involved in a land war in Asia». General Mark Clark signed an armistice without victory in 1954 and called it «the unenviable distinction» of being the first to do so.

The exact point where the analysis gets stuck is this: North Korean deterrence works as long as the cost of attacking is greater than that of living with the arsenal. Serial production of solid-fuel missiles, nuclear submarines and drones changes that calculation. It does not eliminate it. It makes it more expensive for the other side. If the GMD has to intercept a limited number of warheads and the North manufactures dozens, the equation is inverted. Nobody knows how many there really are. That uncertainty is, probably, the most effective weapon in the inventory.