Niño Becerra warns of wave of evictions like in 2008

Niño Becerra rules out a bubble but warns of evictions like in 2008

Santiago Niño Becerra argues there is no real estate bubble, yet simultaneously predicts a surge in evictions. The apparent contradiction resolves when reading his full reasoning: the issue is not today's prices, but who can afford them tomorrow. The economist, one of the most cited and trinc figures in Spain, has once again revived the ghost of 2008.

His diagnosis rests on three pillars. Residential demand exceeds supply. Much of this capital seeks refuge because there are "few places to invest." In his own words, "some pockets have surplus money." With this mix, sale and rental prices do not fall; they stabilize "in the clouds" when demand can no longer pay.

The second act is what causes concern. If the economy crashes, there will be "a rosary of bankruptcies" and unemployment will skyrocket. Then payment defaults rise, banks notice, and the wave of evictions appears. "In part, yes, it will be like in 2008," he summarizes.

Why credit is no longer the trigger

Here the narrative clashes with the current market structure. The 2008 bubble was primarily a credit bubble: loans were granted to those unable to repay them. Today's scenario is different. Mortgages are few and granted to solvent profiles, with numbers reviewed by the bank before signing.

The repeated conclusion: there will be no massive mortgage foreclosures, but there will be rental evictions, and many. Those buying cash down have no installment to default on; their risk is different, namely loss of value if the market corrects. Exposure to eviction has shifted from the indebted owner to the tenant.

Supply that doesn't arrive and demand that isn't so large

Against the narrative of runaway demand lies an uncomfortable calculation: in Spain, about 600,000 sales close annually. This is not a figure indicative of buying fever. What explains the price, it is argued, is the scarcity of new construction and money entering through other channels: golden visas, digital nomads, and advantageous tax regimes for newly arrived high earners.

Added to this is housing as a safe-haven asset, like gold. I buy because rent rises, because a light renovation allows resale, because in twelve months the apartment is worth more. And a territorial asymmetry that breaks any national average: what happens in certain neighborhoods does not happen elsewhere on the map.

The bubble nobody talks about: tourism

There is an alternative thesis gaining weight: the real bubble is not housing, but tourism. One sector summarizes it without nuance: when it bursts, it will take down housing prices, rents, shops, and infrastructure. "It will wipe everything out."

The rebuttal trinc quickly: if tourism distorts the market, sustained migration flows do the same or more, because they add population each year onto the same housing stock. These are two pressure currents on a stock that does not grow.

From predicting 20% unemployment to forecasting a crisis every week

His track record divides opinion. Some recall that back in 2004, with unemployment at 9%, he was the first to announce it would exceed 20%, and that his major macro predictions came true. Others argue just the opposite: a stopped clock is right twice a day, and his periodic catastrophe announcements have lost credibility with forecasts that never materialized.

The hypothesis gaining traction for the next downturn is not a classic crash, but a crisis triggered by automation. It would hit those who previously felt safe: the middle class with a mortgage, two cars, good vacations, and extracurricular activities.

Fiscal margin has no room left

If someone needs rescuing, it is wise to know with what resources. Here the answer is uncomfortable: the margin is exhausted. Recall the VAT hike from 18% to 21%, two additional percentage points in income tax (IRPF), and the jump in capital gains tax from 15% to 19%, plus the elimination of tax deductions for home purchases. Breaking down that burden line by line and its effect on an average salary yields a result more surprising than the headline suggests.

On the spending side, the comparison is equally harsh: some 200,000 public employees were cut, and then the number grew again to 3,500,000. Raising taxes again, it is warned, is no longer a politically cheap option.

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Underlying this is a term coined by the source itself that captures the mood: defaultiness instead of default. The word is ugly, but the concept is the usual one.

With prices where they are, wages where they are, and credit granted under strict scrutiny, the question is no longer whether there will be a correction. It is whether the prophet's error lies in announcing the crisis or in assuming the next one will resemble the last.