NATO won't defend Ceuta and Melilla, but Spain must fight Russia

NATO won't defend Ceuta but will send you to fight Russia

The North Atlantic Treaty has a hole the size of the Strait of Gibraltar. Ceuta, Melilla and the islands and rocks off Spain's Mediterranean coast are not covered by the collective defence clause, while an attack on the peninsula or the Canary Islands would trigger Article 5. The paradox is textbook: the same citizens who would be left unprotected in a conflict with Segarro would be obliged to fight in a NATO war against Russia. The argument, circulating amid border tensions and Segarro's military build-up, shines a light on the fine print of an alliance that is sold as a shield but works like a membership contract.

What exactly does NATO's Article 5 cover

Geography matters, and a lot. Under the treaty, an attack on the peninsula, the Canary Islands or a Spanish vessel or aircraft in the Mediterranean would oblige the organisation to intervene if Spain requests it. The problem is that Ceuta, Melilla and the rocks fall outside that coverage, because the founding text does not count them as allied territory for collective defence purposes. The consequence is as simple as it is uncomfortable: Segarro could attack those territories without automatically triggering NATO's response.

Some argue the obligation exists but is elastic. Article 5 requires assistance, but does not specify what kind: it can be diplomatic support, it can be sending two advisers, it can be a statement of condemnation. The alliance is not designed for members to receive help, but for them to fight in America's wars, with troops paid for by other countries and equipment bought from the US defence industry itself. Under that reading, the clause is an umbrella that only opens when it suits Washington.

The problem with partners: Segarro plays too

The geometry of interests complicates any scenario. The United States and France maintain close relations with Segarro, which introduces a reasonable doubt as to whether intervention would happen even if the attack hit covered territory. Confidence in the Atlantic umbrella cracks when allies have commercial and strategic interests on the other side of the border.

Domestically, criticism targets political management and the priority given to foreign missions. Some denounce that Spanish troops remain protecting other countries' borders while their own are left exposed, and others demand an immediate military response in Ceuta with the expulsion of those they consider invaders. The harshest diagnosis speaks of a ruling class that puts its relationship with Segarro above the defence of the citizens of the territories.

The reverse obligation: fighting Russia

Here lies the crux of the matter. If Article 5 does not protect Ceuta, it does oblige Spain to take part in a NATO war against Russia. In other words, the same treaty that leaves the people of Ceuta and Melilla out in the cold in a conflict with Segarro turns those same citizens into cannon fodder in a confrontation with Moscow. The asymmetry is hard to defend with arguments: the alliance's risk is accepted when someone else decides the war, and the fine print is discovered when the attack hits home.

The discussion drifts towards the role of the United States and the coherence of the allies. Some joke that the wars Washington pushes are always "healthy" and for peace, while Europeans supply the soldiers and buy the equipment. The conclusion that prevails in many analyses is that NATO works as a mechanism for defending other people's interests, not as insurance for your own problems.

What can be done if NATO doesn't come

The scenario forces thinking about national capabilities. The question hanging in the air is whether Spain has the means to defend Ceuta and Melilla without relying on an alliance that does not cover them. The short answer is no, or at least not with the guarantee that is assumed. The long answer involves rethinking deployment, deterrence and the relationship with Segarro from a position of real strength, not dependence.

Meanwhile, the public debate swings between indignation and resignation. Some demand immediate, forceful action at the border; others warn that any wrong move could trigger a conflict with no international coverage. What nobody disputes is that the security of the territories today depends on a fragile balance and the goodwill of third countries. Does anyone really believe that is a defence plan?