Myth of Spanish army promotions driven by left-wing ideology

The myth of leftist colonels promoted by ideology

Does anyone really believe that in the Spanish Army, colonels are promoted for being leftists? The claim, launched in a political forum with the supposed authority of a military friend, falls apart once you know the numbers: according to one participant, there are nearly 2,000 active colonels in Spain, and promotion to this rank is not decided at party headquarters, but through internal seniority lists. However, the story is useful to analyze how narratives about Armed Forces accused of ideological bias are constructed, which some participants debunk with laughter.

How many colonels are in Spain and how promotion works

The most compelling data comes from a participant who places the number of colonels in the Spanish Army around 2,000. With that figure on the table, arguing that all of them owe their stars to a supposed leftist affinity is, at best, an oversimplification. As argued in the thread, promotion to colonel occurs based on seniority and merits evaluated within the official ranking system, a mechanism that would make it very difficult for an officer to pogre due to political biases because, as one message summarizes, "they eat each other alive among themselves, the officers."

The discussion quickly shifts to the structure of ranks. It is recalled that the highest-ranking non-commissioned officer was previously the subteniente (a specific NCO rank), with its five-pointed star inside a circle, and that now there is the figure of the suboficial mayor (senior NCO), with direct line to the unit's colonel. The alférez (ensign), the lowest officer rank, is today a position virtually nonexistent outside the academy. These technical details, according to participants, dismantle the image of an army permeable to ideological quotas.

Women's promotions and accusations of ideologization

The thread heats up when it is claimed that the promotion of women to general proves the Army is "completely ideologized." The thesis, launched without further proof than the observation that women have been promoted, relies on the idea that all female generals are feminists by definition. It is circular reasoning: ideology is presumed based on the sens of the person promoted, and the promotion itself is used as proof of that ideology.

Against this stance, another message recalls the case of a woman infiltrated into ETA who endured tests that many men did not pass, clarifying that there is a big difference between acknowledging valid female candidates and denying they exist. The discussion, however, does not seek nuances: it settles into suspicion that institutions, like the Church, have been captured by what is called "pogre bishops." The parallelism is, according to the participants themselves, forced.

The DANA storm and the narrative of military inaction

The thread then turns to the management of the DANA (Depresión Aislada en Niveles Altos) storm. It cites the account of writer Santiago Posteguillo, who reportedly said a military friend made it clear that help would not arrive. From there, the theory is built that inaction was deliberate to punish voters in the region. This is a serious accusation launched without providing a single piece of documentary evidence, sustained only by the conviction that technicians are leftists and politicians are incivil.

The problem with these types of narratives is that they turn a catastrophe with hundreds of deaths into an episode of partisan struggle. There is talk of destroyed dams and an peine dam that swept everything away, but no technical report backing this is cited. The discussion moves in the realm of suspicion, not verifiable facts.

Officer dismissals and the purge that never existed

Another line of debate recovers the dismissal of officers during Zapatero's governments, presented as a purge of patriots to make room for incompetents. The peace process with ETA and the adaptation of the Armed Forces are mentioned as background. It is a real episode, but the interpretation made of it—that competent people were dismissed to prevent them from staying—is a hypothesis without documentary support.

The thread ends drifting toward personal anecdotes: a participant recounts that in the San Clemente camp in Zaragoza, the only soldier who repeated twice was him, and he ended up stationed in Barbastro due to a navicular bone issue in his foot. These are typical stories from military service (la mili) that serve to de-dramatize, but contribute nothing to the debate on ideologization.

The colonel friend who couldn't manage even a Mercadona grocery run

The original poster himself eventually admits that he wouldn't let his colonel friend "manage even the shopping at Mercadona" (a major Spanish supermarket chain). It is the perfect ending for a story that intended to demonstrate the competence of a high-ranking officer and ends up portraying him, according to the author himself, as someone who needs everything handed to them. The anecdote, told amidst laughter, dismantles the authority attributed to him at the beginning.

In the end, the thread leaves a more realistic image than the one it pretended to show: an army with nearly 2,000 colonels, with an internal promotion system, and with the same know-it-all relatives found in any office. Ideologization, if it exists, is not proven by a friend who gets promoted, but by data that nobody provides.