Migrant vote tips Europe to the left: the data

The migrant vote now decides elections in Europe

In Sweden, the left and far-left bloc won 176 seats and 49.6% of the vote; the right bloc got 173 seats and 48.8%. The national margin was around 50,000 votes. Among voters born outside Europe or with one or two foreign-born parents, support for the left reached 70%; among native Swedes, that figure was only around 48%. Among native Swedes, the right bloc had won. This is the first election in Europe decided against the will of the national population thanks to the foreign vote, according to the analysis in the article by Cristian Campos published in El Español these days.

The pattern is not exclusively Swedish. In France, 69% of Muslim voters backed Mélenchon in the first round of 2022; in the 2024 European elections, 62% of that electorate chose the far left and 83% cited the Gaza war as decisive for their vote. In Germany, the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen exit poll gave 29% of the migrant vote to Die Linke and 28% to the SPD, versus 12% for the Union and 6% for AfD. In Berlin, Die Linke went from 16-17% among Catholics and Protestants to 51% among Muslim voters.

The shift away from social democracy

The starting point was different. In France, this electorate had historically voted for the Socialist Party. In Norway, Statistics Norway documents that between 50% and 60% of voters of African and Asian origin had chosen the Arbeiderpartiet in 2017; by 2021 that support had fallen by about ten points. In the United Kingdom, Ipsos estimated a Labour vote of 46% among ethnic minorities in 2024, but Labour lost eighteen points among that electorate compared with 2019, mostly to the Greens and pro-Palestinian radicals.

Some read these figures as a simple realignment by class and income. Others argue the key is identity: voters of migrant origin reward left-wing social policies but punish any party they perceive as hostile to their tradition. The Dutch case cited —a party founded by Turkish immigrants with left-wing social policies and an uncompromising defence of their tradition— points in that direction.

What happens when the BOE manufactures voters rather than citizens?

Campos's article argues that liberals believe the BOE (Spain's official state gazette) manufactures Spaniards, while the left knows that what the BOE manufactures is voters for the left. The thesis is backed by the French data: second- and third-generation immigrants say they are nationals of their families' countries of origin despite holding French nationality. Possessing a Carte Nationale d'Identité has apparently not generated identification with the country — to the surprise of liberalism, which believes the state, not history, homeland, culture and family, makes the citizen.

In Vienna, the SPÖ won with 41.6% in 2020, but among Austrians born in Turkey support rose to 45%, and among those born in Serbia to 46%. SÖZ, a far-left party with an identity-based message, took around 20% among Turks. Vienna then had more than 220,000 naturalised citizens of foreign origin.

Abstention as a response

On the political conclusions, part of the analysis argues the situation can no longer be reversed by voting. The argument is that democracy as conceived makes no sense if people are allowed to vote who do not even live in Spain, or who have an economic relationship with a particular party or government. The obvious objection: that same reasoning would exclude half of Spain.

Another current defends voting anyway, even as the lesser evil, because abstaining amounts to leaving the field open. The full calculation, with the breakdowns by country, origin and election, yields a surprising difference: in Sweden, the upset was decided by around 50,000 votes. How many European elections have been decided by less?

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This article is based on the electoral data analysis published by Cristian Campos in El Español and on the figures collected there.