Merz admits nuclear error as Germany faces highest energy costs

Chancellor Merz acknowledges the nuclear phase-out was a strategic mistake, leaving Germany with the world's most expensive energy transition.

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Merz admits nuclear error as Germany faces highest energy costs
Merz admits nuclear error and Germany pays for the most expensive energy

How much does it cost to shut down plants that were already paid off? German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has just answered that question aloud: abandoning nuclear power was "a serious strategic error" and his country bears the world's most expensive energy transition. He stated this bluntly, admitting that at least three years ago they should have kept the last reactor running. The confession comes late and in isolation: not a word about the Nord Stream pipelines, blown up in the Baltic Sea, nor about the industrial bill dragging down Europe's largest economy.

What exactly did the German chancellor acknowledge?

The recognition has three pillars. First, that the nuclear phase-out was a mistaken decision. Second, that the cost of the so-called German energy transition is unmatched: it is the most expensive on the planet. And third, the most uncomfortable point, that the exit was completed with timelines that now seem rushed. Merz places the point of no return three years back, when the last reactor was switched off.

What stands out is not the rectification itself, but its scope. The discourse points to environmentalists and energy engineering, but dodges the chapter that weighed most heavily on the final cost: the break with cheap Russian gas and the sabotage of the pipelines that delivered it. Some say it plainly: the problem wasn't just closing nuclear plants, it was also blowing up the alternative. For now, the chancellor looks the other way.

The industrial bill: who pays for the experiment?

Germany hasn't just lost electrical competitiveness. It has lost industry. The circulating diagnosis is that the damage isn't limited to the energy sector: it drags down automotive, chemicals, and steel, the pillars of the German export model. The most expensive energy in the world is a burden that no electricity-intensive factory can offset with productivity.

The comparison with Spain appears early. Some argue the error here is greater, because the Spanish nuclear fleet faces closure without extension while uranium exploration and extraction are banned, a public body linked to the fuel cycle is maintained, and the electrification of boilers and cars is pushed simultaneously. The counter-argument also holds water: Germany's distributed generation, with panels on rooftops, allows for some self-supply that a megaplant system cannot offer.

The role of the Greens and the political cost of the narrative

The most repeated thesis points to green parties as an indispensable hinge for German parliamentary majorities. From moderate formations two decades ago to positions many now qualify as radical, their influence on energy policy is considered decisive. Without their support, this reading argues, the closure calendar makes no sense.

The other reading is less kind to the political class and more critical of the electorate. They aren't naive; they are executors of policies dictated from higher instances, with loyalty to office as currency. In this framework, the figure of the teenage activist who fronted the climate movement is read as a useful alibi, not a cause. Joan of Arc with a braid, the implication goes.



And now what? Repair, reopen, or wait

There are three options on the table and none are cheap. Repairing the Baltic pipelines would require a first-order geopolitical shift, with Washington watching askance. Reopening closed reactors clashes with timelines and permits. And maintaining the current course means continuing to pay the continent's most expensive electricity while industry relocates.

Meanwhile, German public discourse has turned toward another possible culprit. Under the label that in German signifies a declaration of war, part of public opinion attributes the pipeline sabotage to its own Atlantic ally. There is no public evidence backing this attribution, but the unease exists and conditions any debate about buying Russian gas again.

That the chancellor admits the error but moves no pieces is, probably, the most German part of the entire story.

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Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (111 replies).

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