Meloni and Denmark lead migration group that leaves Spain out

Meloni and Denmark lead migration group that leaves Spain out

An 18-country breakfast. Spain, left out. The gathering, held on the sidelines of the European summit, was hosted by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her Danish counterpart Mette Frederiksen, and served to showcase an axis of countries calling for "innovative solutions for managing migration." The headline came from the outlet that reported the meeting: some governments, it was said, are capable of replacing their population with migrants just to stay in power. The accusation was not aimed in writing at anyone in particular, but in Spain it was read as an internal jab. And that's where the spark flew.

The issue on the table: the mass regularization of migrants pushed forward by the Spanish government, which, according to a calculation circulating in the debate, puts Spain ahead of Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Germany combined in annual arrivals. The figure is not broken down in the meeting, but it works as a trigger for a debate that mixes demographics, public finances and electoral calculations.

What the figures being discussed actually say

The quantitative starting point repeated throughout the conversation is a comparison between governing cycles. According to a calculation circulating in the debate, under the PP governments of Aznar and Rajoy, the net increase in registered foreign residents stood at 1,475,172 people, with 1,345,000 naturalizations granted, for a cumulative total of 2,820,172. Under the PSOE governments of Zapatero and Sánchez, the same figures rise to 4,881,932 net registrations and 2,130,000 naturalizations, up to 7,011,932 people. These are figures that circulated in the debate and, like any aggregate data, admit a thousand readings: they depend on the period chosen, the net balance and the definition of naturalization.

The counterpoint comes from those who point out that under Rajoy there were several years of negative net migration, meaning more people left than arrived. And the technical nuance: a regularization is not the same as an arrival; it changes the legal status of someone who is already there. Confusing the two is the most common mistake in this discussion, and also the most politically profitable one.

The Meloni-Denmark axis: fewer migrants or better management?

Here the debate breaks down. Some claim Meloni has reduced arrivals and that part of the migrants reaching Spain come from Italy, pushed out by tighter residency requirements: a minimum of fifteen years to access benefits, which excludes most. The consequence, according to this thesis, is a shift towards France and Spain.

The opposing view is that under Meloni the number of foreigners in Italy has continued to rise, and that the promise to reduce irregular immigration was an electoral lure. A complicating detail is added: nearly one million people of Maghrebi origin now hold Italian citizenship. If the goal was to reduce the foreign presence, the numbers do not support it.

The Danish case deserves a paragraph of its own. The argument is made that Copenhagen does not reject migrants out of conviction, but rather identifies them, counts them and rejects some when it suits, charging the EU around 20,000 euros per rejection under the 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum. A mechanism that turns migration policy into accounting and publicity at the same time.

The business lobby, the employer and low wages

The economic discussion appears early on: some argue that the main parties interested in the arrival of labour are business organizations, which need workers for sectors intensive in low-skilled employment. The objection is reasonable: the business lobby wants cheap labour, not necessarily people without jobs living on benefits. And employers do not control the borders.

The corollary is uncomfortable for everyone: if the demand for workers exists and the domestic supply does not fill the vacancies, someone has to fill them. The question is at what wage and under what conditions. There, the debate stops being about identity and becomes about labour.

The Kalergi Plan: the theory that explains everything

The reference to the Kalergi Plan runs through the entire conversation. For some, it is the key that explains the alleged programmed demographic replacement. For others, it is a theory with no documentary backing used as a wildcard. The discussion over whether the original plan spoke of racial mixing or controlled internal conflict gets lost in interpretations, none of which is supported by verifiable documents.

What matters, for the purposes of this analysis, is that the theory works as a closed framework: any data contradicting it is explained as part of the plan. That makes it irrefutable, and therefore useless as an analytical tool.

The closing: the question that remains

With Spain left out of the 18-country breakfast and regularization as its banner, the Spanish government is left without partners in the hard-line axis and without room to present itself as a reference point. If migration policy is increasingly decided in Brussels and in the corridors, what remains of the sovereignty discourse? The question is not rhetorical. And no one, for now, has an answer.